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INTRODUCTION 
In a large part, my desire to understand moral perception is motivated by the 
presence of injustice, social inequality, and violence in our society. I am constantly 
disturbed and unsettled by our world’s addiction to brutalization and domination and its 
seeming aversion to systems and behaviors which humanize people and liberate life, human 
or otherwise. Happenings in my own lifetime (e.g., 9/11, the Iraq War, the #Metoo 
movement, Protests of the Keystone Pipeline, genocides in Myanmar, the continued 
brutalization of the black body and community, the vilification of the immigrant, the 
devastation of our planet, bullying in schools, the graduate student mental health crisis, ...) 
serve as constant reminders that the human condition is plagued by senseless suffering and 
surreptitious social pathologies that mutate in order to persist from generation to 
generation. We are, all of us, haunted by a history of domination and brutalization which 
often derails the moral arc of the universe’s progress towards justice. What is more, this 
history curates the present day’s controlling social apparatus and inscribes itself upon our 
individual sensibilities. In the non-ideal conditions of this life, the question of liberation, 
of understanding how it can be achieved within a humanizing society, reveals itself as also 
containing the problem of oppression, of understanding how structures and sentiments 
supporting domination and brutalization preserve themselves over time; this, as I see it, is 
the problem of our time.  
As we grapple with this issue, people often attempt to understand the problem of 
oppression using phrases like ‘our history makes us see something as wrong’ or ‘see it as 
good’ in our attempt to offer an explanation for human behaviors, judgments, or 
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apprehensions in morally pertinent situations within the backdrop of socialized history. For 
example, consider the 2019 interview of Know My Name author Chanel Miller by The 
Daily Show’s Trevor Noah. During a discussion of Miller’s memoir, which recounts her 
sexual assault and subsequent experiences with the U.S. Justice System, Noah makes the 
following observation: 
“What's interesting is what you write about [your rescuers] and you say that [this 
experience] made you realize [that], in all of these stories, it's not just the person that is 
doing the bad thing and the person that the bad thing is being done to, but there are those 
who see it and identify it as wrong and they do something about it.” 
Noah’s use of perceptual language is an attempt to capture an important aspect of the moral 
landscape surrounding Miller’s assault. Specifically, he highlights the relationship between 
a person’s capacity to ‘see a bad thing’, ‘identify it as wrong’, and subsequently ‘do 
something about it’ in virtue of the fact that it was seen as a wrong. What, then, might we 
say about Miller’s assailant? Did he ‘fail to see Miller’s personhood (or dignity)’, ‘fail to 
identify the moral demandingness of Miller’s personhood’ or ‘identify her as something to 
be dominated’, and did he subsequently ‘do something’ as a result of those observations, 
as reasons for acting? Moreover, what role did her assailant’s life, judgments, and 
socialized privilege play in his apprehension of the situation?  
While explanations of this kind call our attention to some important dynamics 
during morally pertinent encounters, the perceptual language is unhelpful because of its 
metaphorical-literal ambiguity. Granted, we should want to understand how an individual 
can observe someone being sexually assaulted, or brutalized on an account of one’s race 
… among other things, and ‘see’ such acts as profoundly immoral and unjust. We should 
want to understand how others could ‘see’ these acts as permissible or, worse, justified. 
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What is more, we should want to understand how a historicized socialization process 
influences one’s discernment of the moral features of these acts and the moral status of 
persons facing them. However, we should also want to understand the extent to which a 
subject’s discernments during moral perception are facilitated by judgment rather than 
literal perceptions because the latter are more forceful in terms of defining our beliefs about 
the world than the former.  
To illustrate, consider that it is incredibly difficult to be skeptical of the claim “that 
chair is in the room” when one can perceptually observe the presence of ‘that chair’ in the 
room (... I mean, its right there!). As Jennifer Church might put it, the justification for the 
idea ‘that chair is in the room’ is built into the phenomenological character of the 
experience’s contents (i.e., literally seeing the chair in the room) and, thereby, holds a place 
of privilege in one’s apprehension of their experience. In the same vein, if one literally 
perceives moral properties during occurrent experience then one’s justification for a moral 
claim would also be built into the phenomenological character of that experience’s content, 
its moral content would be perceptual in kind.  
The true danger of the metaphorical-literal ambiguity in our everyday perceptual 
language, and in the literature on moral perception, is that it covers up an important 
question in our quest to solve the problem of oppression: are our literal perceptions of the 
world potentially reinforcing, bolstering, our immediate moral viewpoints by building the 
justification for those viewpoints into the phenomenal character of an experience’s 
contents? Put otherwise, are we literally seeing the world’s moral dimensions in accordance 
with our preexisting, yet socialized and personally developed, beliefs about the world? As 
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I see it, unpacking this ambiguity would fill a gap in our understanding of the problem of 
oppression. If oppression’s persistence over time includes a literal perceptual component 
inasmuch as a subject’s everyday experiences include literal perceptual moral content, then 
the resistance to and great refusal of an oppressive society must include a perceptual 
intervention, one which radically transforms our experience of the world. As a result, the 
question of liberation is, for me, one which requires a deep investigation into the nature of 
moral perception.  
With this in mind, the initial aim of this dissertation was to investigate a series of 
three questions: (1) (the veridicality question) what does it mean to have accurate or 
inaccurate moral perceptions?, (2) (the normativity question) what should my moral 
perceptions of the world be like?, and (3) (the epistemological question) what 
mechanisms facilitate discernment formations during moral perception and what 
consequences follow from these mechanisms? However, the scope of this project in its 
current form focuses squarely, and only, on (3) for both methodological and practical 
reasons.  
While exploring the literature regarding moral perception, broadly construed, it 
became apparent that one cannot offer a satisfactory answer to (1) without first addressing 
question (2) by tackling normative ethical issues. That is, an ethical-rubric from which to 
measure the accuracy of a subject’s moral perceptions is required, first, before one can 
make veridicality assessments of any given moral perception, whether it be a judgement or 
a literal perception. However, the questions associated with (2) proved practically 
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unsatisfying, and, in some cases, it felt irresponsible to pursue normative ethics in a world 
plagued by non-ideal conditions and oppression.  
What is more, the philosophical and methodological challenges associated with 
pursuing objective ethics amongst the historicized shaping of our moral understandings 
regarding freedom, life, and so on are well documented and, at this time, beyond my 
practical goals as an ethical and social philosopher in service to a Marcusean style 
revolution in values. It felt, during the earlier stages of the project, far more responsible to 
assume a general set of ethical values based on a desire to curate conditions and ways of 
relating to each other which support the amelioration of life, in the Marcusean sense, and 
resist oppression’s presence in the world. As an exercise in genuineness, then, this project 
starts from the assumption that life is worth living, worth affirming, and trusts the 
testimonies and standpoints of oppressed peoples inasmuch as they identify society’s, as 
well as my own, moral shortcomings. Given the prevalence of identity-based injustice in 
the world and capitalism’s militaristic influence on the state apparatus, attending to 
question (2) felt like a luxury I could not afford myself and still does, especially when 
police literally have their knees on people’s throats. Thereby, a continually refined social 
justice ethics has been assumed as the normative backdrop of this project resulting in its 
shift away from questions (1) and (2) in favor of an attempt to unpack (3), the 
epistemological questions underlying moral perception. In this sense, ‘objectivity’ 
regarding moral values is defined as a process, one which follows the moral arc of the 
universe towards justice.  
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To be clear, moral perceptions occur when a subject makes an immediate 
discernment about the moral features of an occurrent experience. Notably, ‘perception’ in 
this usage is not a success term as it might be used by philosophers of perception, nor does 
it represent a full commitment to a perceptual way of approaching the issue. Instead, as an 
object of study, the phrase ‘moral perception’ is used to sketch the borders of a yet 
undefined field of philosophical inquiry, what I refer to as moral perceptual studies. This 
field, broadly construed, is concerned with (i) the epistemological status of moral 
perception as either a form of judgment or a literal perception, (ii) the perceptual or 
judgmental mechanisms articulating one’s moral perceptions, (iii) the development of 
one’s background epistemic resources which curate the moral contents of one’s moral 
perceptions, (iv) the normative standards from which to judge that one’s moral perceptions 
are adequate to living an ethical life, (v) the concept of veridicality as applied in moral 
perceptual contexts, and (vi) the ethical consequences that follow, socially and 
individually, from views on (i)-(v). Again, the scope of this project is to focus on issues (i) 
- (iii), reserving (iv) - (vi) for future work. 
In the first part of this project, I provide a taxonomy for categorizing theories of 
moral perception into one of two types: experientialism or judgmentalism. I, then, 
challenge judgmentalist views, which hold that moral perceptions are merely moral 
judgments, by using phenomenal contrast methodology to argue that moral properties are 
admissible contents of our perceptual experience. Notably, if moral properties are 
admissible contents of experience, then moral perceptions have an experiential component 
in virtue of this content’s capacity to yield perceptual moral knowledge about one’s 
occurrent experience. As a result, I conclude that one’s discernments about an occurrent 
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experience’s moral features are not merely a function of one’s judgment and give reasons 
to believe that we have literal perceptual experiences of moral properties. 
In the second part, I argue for my own view on moral perception, Moral Perceptual 
Orientation (MPO). MPO asserts that how and if moral features are perceived during 
occurrent experience is dependent on the collection of one’s background beliefs, ways of 
thinking, and affective sensitivities, what I refer to as our background epistemic resources. 
MPO gives an account of how it is that one encounters moral properties in perceptual 
experience and relies on the notion that moral experiences are cognitively penetrable, that 
our background non-perceptual mental states can have top-down influences on the contents 
of our perceptual experience. Under this view, one’s background epistemic resources 
provide the orientation by which one comes to experience the world’s moral features and, 
as a result, MPO provides a framework for understanding the mechanisms underlying 
moral perceptions as a synthesis of non-perceptual and perceptual mental states. 
In the third part, I further develop the notion of ‘background epistemic resources’ 
by investigating the mechanisms by which life’s experience curates its content and 
structures. To do this, I synthesize the work of Herbert Marcuse with the Phenomenological 
branch of Feminist Affect theory using Buddhist (Mahāyānan) moral psychology to 
construct a transdisciplinary way to understand the individual subject as engaging the world 
by means of a dialectical form of consciousness. In doing this, I develop a view on 
dialectical consciousness which provides a framework for conceptualizing socialization’s 
ability to shape a subject’s access to the moral features of occurrent experience by 
highlighting the way life’s experience has a pervasive influence on a subject’s background 
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epistemic resources. As a result, I argue that, given the role of dialectical consciousness in 
our lives, moral perceptions of occurrent experience are compulsory and outside one’s 
immediate, willful, control. I then conclude by suggesting that a directed moral cultivation 
of one’s perception is still possible by means of transformative experiences which can be 
sought by the individual or curated by progressive social forces. These experiences are ones 
which have the ability to alter our background epistemic resources and, thereby, reshape 
the way we see the world. 
The final part of the project develops a concept called ‘moral blindness’ by 
investigating socialization's capacity to perpetuate forms of moral ignorance. Ignorance 
amounts to the presence of persistent epistemic selectivities in one’s apprehension of a 
situation or topic and it is perpetuated by oppressive modes of socialization. I argue that 
oppressive socialization shapes a subject’s background epistemic resources (a.k.a., one’s 
epistemic toolkit) resulting in literal selectivities in one’s moral perceptions, thereby 
resulting in a kind of pathological blindness to moral reasons for socially just action. Not 
only does this moral blindness threaten a subject’s autonomy, in the relational sense, I argue 
that one has a moral obligation to seek out transformative experiences which emphasize 
humanization and liberation over brutalization and domination. I then conclude by 
suggesting that a fundamental reorientation of ourselves to the world, away from a culture 
of domination, becomes imperative if we are to access reasons for executing our obligations 
to others, especially where social justice and liberation are concerned. 
I would like to close by noting that those interested in the phenomenon of moral 
perception in one way or another (e.g., Audi, Blum, Väyrynen, Cowan, Faraci, Goldie, 
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McGrath, Willett, Ahmed, and others) often pursue their investigations in accordance with 
their respective academic communities and traditions. Among other reasons, I believe the 
practice of staying within a theoretical neighborhood harms our understanding of moral 
perception. It prevents us from appreciating the phenomenon through a variety of 
theoretical lenses and, as a result, in the lives of people who feel the daily weight of these 
perceptions on their ability to have lives defined by dignity and freedom. Moral perceptions 
play an essential role in our lives as we make ethically pertinent decisions. Being limited 
to one theoretical tradition, thereby, prevents us from seeing how literature on moral 
perception, broadly construed, can impact moral life and social justice efforts.  
With this in mind, I approach moral perceptual studies as a transdisciplinary field 
of research and this project puts a diverse set of philosophical traditions and non-
philosophical perspectives into conversation using an interdisciplinary methodology. I 
believe that this approach benefits from an intellectually inclusive and careful analysis of 
moral perception by utilizing a methodological framework which enables theoretical inputs 
and conceptual scoping across a variety of fields. As a result, what follows is designed to 
set up a systematic way of addressing the phenomenon of moral perception by, ultimately, 
laying the epistemological foundations for moral perceptual studies. 
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CHAPTER 1. RECONSIDERING MORAL PERCEPTION 
1.1 Introduction 
In a general sense, to have a moral perception is to encounter the world (i.e., its 
objects, people, spaces, and situations) and recognize which, if any, moral qualities are 
present during one’s occurrent experience, accurately or otherwise. Such events are a 
pervasive part of our lives and include, but are not limited to, moments where such insights 
facilitate our comprehension of another’s moral status or the moral qualities of some 
action.1 The moral agent regularly faces a variety of situations that require them to 
recognize the ethical dimensions of an occurrent moment in order to make morally salient 
choices. As many moral theorists point out, the ability to accurately recognize moral 
qualities during such situations is a precondition for reliably responding in accordance with 
the demands of morality, whatever those turn out to be.2 As a result, moral perception plays 
an essential part in curating the epistemological content we use to navigate our moral lives.  
For example, should someone (S) come upon a person (K) kicking an infant (I), we 
hope that S has the ethical wherewithal to take I as possessing a moral status, a kind of 
human dignity, incommensurate with S’s assault.3 Among other things, we also hope that 
S would take K’s actions to be immoral. Structurally speaking, the observer S encounters 
situation α (K kicking I) and takes α to possess these moral features. In the given scenario, 
S’s response to this situation should be facilitated by their moral perceptions of I’s dignity 
and the immorality of K’s assault. This is because S’s ethical choices are contingent, at 
 
1 This is especially paramount during situations where social justice issues are of central concern. 
2 See Blum (1994), Murdoch, I. (1970), Fricker (2007), and Little (1997 & 1995). Additionally, Aristotle, MacIntyre, others in the 
virtue ethics or neo-virtue ethical traditions, and those concerned with moral psychology or epistemology consistently make such 
claims.  
3 This case can be likened to McGrath’s (2018) case where a child is struck by an adult in a grocery store.  
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least epistemologically, on the moral qualities they take to be present during their 
observation of α. Assuming that S is acting rationally, unless they take α to possess a set of 
moral features (m), we would not expect S to reliably respond to α in ways demanded by 
m because S’s epistemic resources would not include m.4 However, the nature of what it 
means for “S takes α to possess m” is unclear. 
When asked to clarify our use of take-language to describe these situations we often 
resort to things like ‘S saw K’s actions as wrong’ or ‘S sees infants as possessing human 
dignity’ thereby trading ambiguities in take-language for other opacities in our use of 
perceptual-language. Human history contains a swath of examples where vagueness 
plagues our talk of moral discernments when we come face-to-face with morally germane 
events, especially those associated with instances of oppression. ‘Seeing historically 
marginalized and oppressed populations as lacking moral status’ (i.e., lacking a sense of 
human dignity) or ‘seeing instances of child-labor as a permissible practice’ are just a few 
illustrations of how we talk about moral perception in an opaque fashion when we are 
confronted with these situations. 
This confusion is fueled by what we can refer to as a metaphorical-literal ambiguity 
in our understanding of moral perception because the use of perceptual-language, or take-
language, can be understood in two ways. First, it could refer to a metaphorical allusion to 
a judgement formation about the presence of a moral property or, second, it can express 
the literal perceptual representation of a moral property. This ambiguity is found in 
everyday language and is a recurrent problem in the literature that investigates the 
 
4 Provisionally, to act rationally in this sense is, minimally, to respond to the reason’s one has available in such a way that is 
commensurate to the demands of rationality (i.e., to follow a rational course of action, perhaps in a syllogistic fashion).  
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epistemological features of moral discernments about occurrent experience.5 The question 
on the table then, regarding the nature of moral perception, is this: are moral perceptions a 
kind of judgment or are they literal perceptions of a situation’s moral features?6 The 
metaphorical-literal ambiguity covers up this judgement-perception question.     
Moving forward, I will use “moral perception” to refer to the general practice of 
taking a situation to possess some set of moral features or properties. Put formally, a subject 
S has a moral perception when (i) S encounters some situation α and (ii) S recognizes, 
either accurately or inaccurately, some set of moral features (m) taken, at least by S, to be 
present in α. Under this working definition, if one fails to discern some feature of a situation 
that it apparently possesses, I will call this a moral perceptual miss. If one discerns that a 
situation possesses a moral feature that it does not, I will refer to this as a moral perceptual 
misfire. Lastly, if one takes a situation to possess moral features that it actually possesses, 
I will speak of this as a moral perceptual hit.7  
 
5 Blum (1997), Fricker (2007), Little (1995 & 1997), Murdoch (1970), Sturgeon (1986), McGrath (2018), and Willett (2014) are 
examples of scholarship that does not resolve this metaphorical-literal ambiguity. Many fall into this ambiguity because they do not 
address the orthodox view that perceptual knowledge “X is F” entails having a perceptual experience that represents X as F. McGrath 
(2018) explicitly aims to avoid the ambiguity but ultimately seems to fall into it by specifically rejecting the orthodox view without 
clarifying an alternative. It is very difficult to accept the claim that perceptual knowledge of X as F can occur in the absence of an 
experience representing X as F without losing a precise sense of what it means to perceptive something or its properties. McGrath 
(2018) suggests that we shouldn’t give up on, say, perceiving moral properties because, like looking at a lemon, we can still “take up 
the immediate, non-inferential belief that there is a lemon on the table” if we do not have perceptual representations of lemons but 
only its shape, color, texture, and other sensory contents. She writes, “If circumstances are favorable… then your belief that there is a 
lemon on the table might be safe enough to quality as knowledge. Moreover, the knowledge in question, is perceptual knowledge.” 
(McGrath (2018), p. 178-179). However, coming to have an non-inferential immediate belief, even in the absence of any beliefs about 
the color and shape of the thing experienced, because a perception of the thing’s sensory contents “triggers your immediate belief” 
sounds more like a cognitive association (see Väyrynen (2018)) or intuition (see Audi (2013)) that perceptual content of X is F rather 
than a genuine perception. McGrath wishes to avoid the question of what the admissible contents of visual experience are, but this 
issue is unavoidable without sacrificing theoretical clarity for ambiguities about the nature of perceptual experience. Audi (2013) use 
of “intuition” carries similar difficulties.  
6 Since “evaluative perception” emerged in philosophy of perception, of which moral perception is a category, this issue has the 
potential to redefine how we approach moral perception and its consequences. See Bergqvist, A., & Cowan, R. (2018) for a general 
introduction to evaluative perception.   
7 Granted, whether we call a moral perception a miss, misfire, or hit, evaluations of our perceptions will need to be indexed according 
to some situation, some metaethical view regarding moral realism or antirealism, and in the context of some ethical theory which 
outlines the demands of morality. In the meantime, we can theorize about the epistemic nature of moral perception without addressing 
the evaluation because of reasons discussed in footnote 7.  
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It is worth noting that this definition of moral perception does not use “perception” 
as a success term when discussing genuine perception or, alternatively, as a metaphorical 
reference to an accurate judgement.8 Instead, moral perceptions, in this neutral sense, 
describes those occasions where S literally perceives situation α as possessing moral 
features m, even if it does not, or occasions where S genuinely judges α as possessing m, 
even if it does not. 9 Plainly put, moral perceptions refer to what one undergoes as a 
perceptual experience or what judgement one makes whereas any assessment as to the 
veridicality or accuracy of those states is an evaluation of a subject’s moral perception.10  
The nature of what one discerns during a moral perception and the adequacy of that 
discernment to represent the ethical dimensions of the occurrent experience are distinct 
issues. One focus of this paper is how we should approach the former.  
Additionally, theories of moral perception are used to elucidate the epistemological 
processes which underpin our encounters with morally pertinent occurrent experiences. 
They often explore some combination of the following three questions: (1) what is the 
epistemic nature of moral perception? (2) why does an agent take a situation to have moral 
properties of set m1 rather than of set m2?, and (3) what role do perceptions play in moral 
 
8 This distinction, as Wright (2007) points out, between perception as a success term verses a description of the individuals 
experiences is referred to as the factive v. aspect distinction. 
9 This strategy allows us to explore epistemological approaches to moral perception from a wide range of literature which explores the 
topic in an implicit (Fricker (2007), Little (2001, 1997, & 1995), & Willett (2014 & 1995) and explicit fashion (Audi (2018 & 2013), 
Väyrynen (2018), Cowan (2015), Faraci (2015), Church (2013), Goldie (2007), Wright (2007), & Blum (1994)) investigations of the 
subject. Such literature investigates the moral epistemological facets of our immediate moral discernments which occur during our 
encounters with the world. As such, authors of such work may be considered moral perceptual theorists It is worth noting that 
Aristotle and others in the virtue-theory tradition or neo-virtue theory tradition are often doing this work as well. They would be 
included in this category as well, as implied by Rabinoff’s (2018) Perception in Aristotle’s Ethics.  
10 Evaluations of this kind evolve into robust discussions about the nature of veridicality, judgement justifications, and so on. In some 
cases, especially for moral anti-realists, we come close to some version of error theory because there are no moral properties for our 
moral perceptions to correspond. Given the scope of the current paper, I have chosen to table the evaluation discussion about moral 
perception in favor of focusing on the epistemological nature of moral perceptions because insights into the latter seem to be a 
prerequisite for an adequate investigation into the former.  
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agency and autonomy? The other focus of this paper is to provide theoretical clarity for 
question (1) and to address it in kind.  
Given its potential influence on moral reasoning, it is vital that we approach moral 
perception with a high degree of clarity. To do so is to take steps towards understanding 
the nature of its role in our existence as moral epistemic agents. This paper attempts to 
disentangle the way we talk about moral perceptions by fleshing out some observations 
made by Blum (1994) regarding moral decision making and, using this, provide a 
meaningful taxonomy for categorizing theories of moral perception into moral 
perceptional experientialism (MPE) or judgmentalism (MPJ). I, then, explore the 
phenomenal character of morally pertinent experiences using phenomenal contrast 
methodology. From this, I argue that moral properties are admissible contents of our 
perceptual experience and that discerning an occurrent situation’s moral features is not 
merely a function of our moral judgments. Ultimately, what follows gives reason to believe 
that we have genuine perceptual experiences of moral properties during our everyday 
encounters with morally germane situations.   
1.2 Talking about Moral Perception: Acquisition & Recognition 
It is prudent, first, to define a framework for discussing moral perception that 
precisely clarifies the aforementioned metaphorical-literal ambiguity. Blum (1994) 
provides the basis for such a framework. His ‘situation-to-action-on-principle process’ is a 
useful apparatus for discussing occasions where agents encounter morally germane 
situations and perform morally applicable actions.11 In Blum’s schema, agents undergo a 
 
11 Blum 1994, p. 57-61 
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four-staged process when confronted by a morally pertinent situation.12 In short, agents 
apprehend a situation, decide whether to engage with it, make a moral judgment as to the 
appropriate action, and, then, choose how to achieve that end.13 His discussion of the latter 
stages is more pertinent for an investigation of moral deliberations informed by moral 
perceptions rather than the epistemic nature of such discernments. That is, the latter stages 
use moral perceptions to inform ethical actions rather than take steps to define the epistemic 
source of these discernments. As a result, they go beyond the scope of my current 
objectives. Thus, I will forgo a detailed account of Blum’s latter stages in favor of focusing 
on his breakdown of the first stage as it is relevant to the judgement-perception question. 
In his description of the apprehension-stage, Blum writes, “The first step is the 
accurate recognition of a situation's features. Here the situation itself is initially (as the 
person/agent comes upon it) inchoate -- not even a distinct “situation” -- and the person 
then takes it to be a situation of a certain character, that is, possessed of certain features.”14 
While the use of “takes” or “distinct situation” in this description is unclear, the idea 
expressed here is that S approaches situation α and epistemically acquires its descriptive 
features, or contents. This first step does the individuating of an experience’s contents and 
is “thus providing a setting in which moral judgment carries out its task.”15 In our 
introductory case, for example, S acquires a perceptual experience of K kicking infant I 
and becomes aware of I’s suffering at the hands of K, among other things. Given this, I 
shall refer to this first step as the acquisition step in reference to a subject’s acquisition of 
 
12 Blum 1994, p. 57 – Blum discusses the existence of “seven steps that take a person from a given situation to an action based on 
moral principle”. For the sake of brevity, I have organized these into four stages: agents perceive a situation [steps 1 & 2], decide 
whether to engage with it [steps 3 & 4, what he calls agency engagement], make a moral judgment as to the appropriate action [step 5 
& 6], and, then, choose how to achieve that end [step 7]. 
13 Blum 1994, p. 57-61 
14 Blum 1994, p. 58 
15 Blum 1994, p. 42 
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perceptual content which render a situation’s features as part of a subject’s perceptual 
experience.  
Following this, Blum writes, “the second step is to recognize the features of an 
already characterized situation as morally significant”; ‘moral significance’ meaning the 
possession of a morally evaluative dimension and relevant to one’s ethical deliberations.16 
In the case of K kicking I, that we perceive I’s suffering and that we take it to be morally 
significant are distinct steps which occur, for Blum, in step one and two respectively. I will 
refer to this second step as the recognition step in reference to a subject’s recognition that 
a situation’s features possess a morally evaluative dimension. Blum summarizes, “step one 
and two together yields the idea of a person coming upon a situation and perceiving its 
morally salient features... together [they] can usefully be thought of as moral perception, 
the second by itself might as naturally be thought of as an exercise in judgment.”17  
To note, Blum says little about whether we should take step one to be a literal act 
of perception or whether it amounts to an act of judgment. He does, however, define step 
two as an act of moral judgment18 and portrays step one as a process of applying one’s 
moral understanding (i.e., moral imagination and knowledge) and moral sensitivities (i.e., 
psychological capacities) to an occurrent experience.19 He suggests that such things make 
an agent aware of the morally relevant features of one’s experience.  This implies that Blum 
is a supporter of judgmentalism, later referred to as MPJ, even though he holds that moral 
perception is distinct from moral judgments. That is, he seems to take moral perception to 
 
16 Blum 1994, p. 58 
17 Blum 1994, p. 58 
18 Blum 1994, p. 41 “… principle-based traditions have generally failed to note the specific moral character of either of the following 
aspects of moral judgment of particular situations: (1) knowing what counts as best exemplifying, and knowing how to apply, rules or 
principles and (2) before this, recognizing given features of a situation as morally significant.”  
19 Blum 1994, p. 42 “Such perception involves a different kind of, or aspect of, moral sensibility or understanding [than that of moral 
judgement].” 
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be a function of our capacity to form general judgments about the contents of experience 
(as automatically facilitated by our understandings or psychological habits). He does not 
take them to be a feature of our moral judgments which he defines as the process whereby 
we form judgements about moral significance, which moral principles apply to the 
situation, and applying them.20 It seems, even given his silence on the issue, that Blum 
takes moral perception and moral judgment to be distinct processes within our broader 
cognitive capacity to form judgments, as I use the term. This is important to note because 
I will return to Blum’s form of MPJ in a later section, after discussing judgments and 
perceptions in more detail. 
For now, building on Blum’s distinctions between what I have labeled acquisition 
and recognition, we can describe an agent’s moral perceptions as the result of a two-step 
process.21 First, the moral agent encounters a situation facilitating the acquisition of 
perceptual content. Second, said situation, rendered by the acquired content, is then 
recognized as possessing properties with moral significance or, alternatively, moral 
properties. This acquisition-recognition framework allows us to carefully approach 
theories of moral perception by directing us to a fundamental question: what is the 
relationship between acquisition and recognition during occasions of moral perception? 
Can recognition happen during acquisition, and thereby give us literal perceptions of moral 
properties, or is recognition always about and separate from acquired contents of 
experience, and thereby a kind of judgment? Stated otherwise, are moral properties 
admissible contents of our perceptual experience? 
 
20 Blum 1994, p. 42 & 51 
21 Could there be a third step? Recognition occurs as a judgment or an influence on acquired content. It is a matter of the relationship 
between two steps and, because of this, the inclusion of a third synthesis step seems unnecessary. 
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1.3 Theories of Moral Perception: Judgmentalism and Experientialism 
With the right questions on the table, we can use the acquisition-recognition 
framework to define two kinds of positions on moral perception, one which turns on 
whether moral properties are judged or whether they can be literally perceived during moral 
perceptions. First, Judgementalist views (Moral Perceptual Judgementalism) hold that 
an experience’s moral features are recognized after the acquisition step by means of a 
judgment formation about a situation’s acquired non-moral perceptual contents. Under 
judgmentalism, moral perceptions are judgments based on perceptual content.22 Put 
formally, 
Moral Perceptual Judgementalism (MPJ):23 S has a moral perception of situation α 
when 
MPJ-I: S acquires non-moral perceptual content as of α during their encounter with 
situation α; 
MPJ-II: S possesses background beliefs (moral or non-moral) or affective 
dispositions relevant to situation α; and 
MPJ-III: S utilizes a judgement formation mechanism (i.e., inference, intuition, a 
non-inferential cognitive association, a heuristic, or an affective 
disposition) to judge α using the contents of II thereby allowing S to 
recognize α as possessing moral properties by means of judgements about 
acquired perceptual content.  
The distinguishing feature of a judgementalist view of moral perception is it holding that 
moral properties are recognized by means of a judgement formation mechanism.  
Alternatively, Experiential Views (Moral Perceptual Experientialism) hold that 
an experience’s moral features are recognized during the acquisition step (i.e., that moral 
properties, and thereby a situation’s moral significance, are admissible contents of 
experience). Under experiential views, moral perceptions are perceptual inasmuch as the 
 
22 We could call moral perceptions, under this view, moral perceptual beliefs (i.e. formed moral beliefs about perceptual contents) to 
better parallel the relationship between perceptions and perceptual beliefs.  
23 Among judgementalist, I include Blum (1991 & 1994), Little (1995 & 1997), Goldie (2007), Willett (1995 & 2014), Audi (2018 & 
2013), and Fricker (2007). These views will maintain a commitment to I and II, but will differ in regards to the details of III. 
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subject literally perceives a situation’s moral features because the observer has an 
experience of moral perceptual content.24 Put formally, 
Moral Perceptual Experientialism (MPE): S has a moral perception of situation α 
when 
MPE-I: S acquires non-moral perceptual content as of α during their encounter 
with situation α; 
MPE-II: S possesses background beliefs (moral or non-moral) or affective 
dispositions relevant to situation α; and 
MPE-III: The contents of II add to or alter the contents of I to include moral 
perceptual content by means of a perception influencing mechanism 
(i.e., cognitive penetration, imagination, or consciousness) thereby 
allowing S to recognize α as possessing moral properties.25 
It is worth noting that there is an implausible alternative to this view which posits 
that moral properties are discerned by S during the acquisition step without the influence 
of MPE-II. Put formally, such a view would look something like the following: 
Implausible Moral Perceptual Experientialism (I-MPE): S has a moral perception of 
situation α when 
I-MPE-I: S acquires non-moral perceptual content as of α during their encounter 
with situation α; and 
I-MPE-II: S acquires moral perceptual content by means of a moral perceptual 
sense allowing S to recognize α as possessing moral properties during a 
perceptual experience of α. 
What makes this latter view implausible is its implication that we possess a moral 
perceptual sense that functions in the same way as our sense of touch, sight, smell, hearing, 
taste, proprioception, or balance.26 What I-MPE-II suggests is that a moral perceptual sense 
facilitates our perceptions of good, evil, dignity, cruelty, and so on in the same way that 
other senses create perceptual states which allow for perceptions of spatial properties, 
color, shape, motion and illumination. This seems ill-conceived. 
 
24 Among experientialists, I include Jennifer Church (2013) and Sarah McGrath (2018). 
25 Cowan (2015) points to cognitive penetration as a promising topic for pursing this kind of view. Church (2013) utilizes a Kantian 
sense of imagination to motivate such a view. Mills (2007) seems to suggest that consciousness plays the perception influencing role 
in this process.  
26 McGrath (2004) and Faraci (2014) make this observation as well.  
20 
To clarify, this idea should not be confused with positions held by moral 
intuitionist, moral sentimentalists, or neighboring camps in moral epistemology or 
psychology. These kinds of views often hold that our moral intuitions (non-inferential and 
immediate cognitive apprehensions) 27 or sentiments (emotional or affective 
apprehensions)28 serve as vehicles for discerning the moral features of an occurrent 
experience. These processes are an act of judgment in the broadest sense of the term. 
Provisionally put, judgements are distinct from perceptions in that occasions of the latter 
articulate the contents of our occurrent experience whereas the former, at least during moral 
perceptions, are grounded on the contents of our occurrent experience.  
To motivate this distinction, the reader is asked to consider Figure 1.1 which 
depicts the Muller-Lyer lines (below).29 One’s perception of the lines suggests that they 
are of different length, the top line being longer. In contrast, one can come to make the 
judgement that the lines are of the same length after learning how this illusion is the result 
of conflicting depth cues which cause a kind of misfire in our perceptual system. The image 
appears to us, we have a perception of it, and we can make judgments about that perception. 
In this case, it is easy to distinguish between our judgements about the lines and our 
perceptions of them because our judgment (i.e., that they are the same length) has no 
 
27 Stratton-lake (2014) “Intuitionism in Ethics”. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  
28 Kauppinen (2014) “Moral Sentimentalism”. SEP 
29 This can be read as a parody of O’Brien’s illustration of the distinction between beliefs and perceptual beliefs. O’Brien (IEP article) 
Figure 1.1 Muller-Lyer Lines 
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influence on our perceptual field (i.e., that they appear to us as different lengths).30 The 
judgment and the perception are distinct from one another.31  
We can draw at least two ideas from this example. First, perceptions allow us to 
acquire contents of experience by utilizing our perceptual systems to apprehend a 
perceptual field. We look at the lines, acquire perceptual contents, and have an experience 
of them. In contrast, judgments, among other things, are used during occurrent experiences 
to draw cognitive associations between the contents of experience (e.g., contents of the 
perceptual field) and other propositional content by means of quick or slow cognitive 
processes. These processes include, among other things, intuition, inference, non-
inferential rule-like mental associations, heuristics, or affective associations. In the Muller-
Lyer case, our perceptual systems render, for us, a perceptual field with contents (e.g., we 
acquire perceptual contents). It is only after learning about the nature of these lines that 
we can judge that our perceptions are an illusion and recognize the erroneousness of our 
perception.  
Similarly, during occasions of moral perception, judgments are non-perceptual 
mental states which utilize slow or fast cognitive systems to manifest moral impressions 
and beliefs about occurrent experience whereas perceptions are mental states which define 
the contents of our perceptual field.32 This observation, alone, is not an observation about 
 
30 Given the implication of this paper’s on broadly construed evaluative perception, we might say that this judgment does have an 
impact on our perception of the lines. Perhaps we have the perception of something unnatural or not veridical.  
31 The distinction between moral perception and moral judgment or general judgments is not as clear, but that is one of the motivations 
for this paper. Church (2010) describes the difference between mediated states of mind and unmediated states of mind suggesting that 
the latter are clearly perceptual because they are experientially immediate to the observer and provides a kind of justificatory 
immediacy in that “perceptual knowledge is immediate knowledge in the sense that it does not depend on any other knowledge for its 
justification.” (Church (2010), p. 640) 
32 Church (2010 & 2013) seems to draw out this distinction by describing the experientially immediate nature of perception as the kind 
of thing that happens when one sees a chair or table (its in our face) and (epistemically) justificatory immediate as a source of belief 
about the contents of the world (knowing that there is a chair there requires nothing more than the sight of it). Immediate, in these 
contexts, seems to point to the idea that there is no other mental state needed to have a perception and take its content as indicative of 
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the judgment-perception question, nor does it necessarily preclude the possibility that non-
perceptual mental states influence or alter one’s perceptual states, as supporters of 
cognitive penetration hold. Instead, as it is used here, this distinction between perception 
and judgement merely motivates the idea that perceptions ground judgments about 
occurrent experience, or perceptual beliefs, not the other way around. As a result of this 
observation, views such as ethical intuitionism or sentimentalism amount to versions of 
judgmentalism. Such views utilize a judgment formation mechanism, like intuitions and 
sentiments, to motivate our apprehension of moral properties within our occurrent 
experience via perceptual belief but are silent on the issue of whether these judgments 
about perceptual experience alter or add to our perceptual contents.  
Given I-MPE’s and MPE’s perception influencing claim, even if we briefly allow 
that moral properties are admissible contents of our experience, it would be dubious to 
think that such content could be acquired in an unmediated way (e.g., without aid of our 
beliefs, affects, or associations) which leads to some influence of non-perceptual states on 
our perceptual field. To motivate this idea in a nonmoral case, consider a shoelace. There 
is, at the end of your shoelace, a hard-plastic tip used to thread the lace through a sneaker. 
It is easy to have a perception of this thing comprised of whatever color-contents or shape-
contents we acquire when we look upon the shoelace tip. We cannot, however, rightly 
assume that we, as observers, have a literal perceptual experience of this shoelace tip as 
what it is named, an aglet, until we learn about the concept “aglet”. This follows because, 
otherwise, we would be expected to have a kind of perceptual-revelation experience giving 
 
the content of the world. If there was, then such things would need to be mediated by other states. She is, however, unclear on these 
matters in many places.  
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us knowledge of what an aglet is and, arguably, this kind of thing does not happen. If a 
literal perception of kind property “aglet” is possible, it cannot occur without the aid of our 
background epistemic resources to serve as mediator. That is, F cannot perceive the 
shoelace tip as an aglet without background beliefs about the concept of an aglet.33  
In the case of moral perception, if moral properties become part of our perceptual 
experiences then our background beliefs or affective states will need to inform some kind 
of perception influencing mechanism as suggested by MPE (or, if they are not part of 
perceptual experience, a judgment influencing mechanism as suggested by MPJ). Faraci 
(2015) refers to this idea as Mediation: If perceptions of X, a moral property, are grounded 
(i.e., “perceptions of X track an experience as of Y even in the absence of Y”) in experiences 
as of Y, then “perceptions of X produce knowledge only if they are mediated by background 
knowledge of relations between X and Y.”34 He continues,  
“Mediation is highly intuitive: Suppose A’s perception of X is grounded in an experience 
as of Y. But suppose A also has no reason to think there’s any relation between X and Y. 
In that case, there seems to be no way A’s experience as of Y could produce knowledge [or 
an experience] about X.” 35 
To further motivate mediation, the reader is asked to consider Figure-1.2 (below). Imagine 
that A attends a pool party to meet a new group of people. Neither person in Figure-1.2  is 
 
33 It might be suggested that sensory properties are also kind properties. That literally seeing a stop sign as an octagon, such that the 
octagon property is taken to be a part of ones occurrent experience, is no different than one’s sensory experience of a shape extended 
in space with eight sides. Siegel (2011) draws out this distinction as a difference between content and rich content, where the former is 
more sensory basic and the latter is more conceptually informed. I make the same distinction here by starting from a conceptual 
perspective which follows her assumption that sensory contents are distinct from conceptual contents. In this way, seeing the stop sign 
as an extended shape in space is distinct from seeing it as an octagon, at least in the phenomenological sense.    
34 Faraci (2015) p. 2063 
35 Faraci (2015) p. 2063 
Figure 1.2 Pushed in the Pool 
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known to A and, thereby, A has no background knowledge about them or the context that 
prompted one person to push another into the pool. Assuming A has no background beliefs 
or affects pertaining to people being pushed into pools, the contents of A’s perception 
(perhaps even our own occurrent perception of the photo during our first read of this paper) 
would be generally mundane (i.e., without morally significant content).  
Now, suppose that A comes to learn that the man in the photo cannot swim, that the 
pusher knows this, and, also, that they possess the belief or affective disposition to hold 
that putting people in life threatening situations is morally wrong, perhaps because it does 
someone a harm or violates their human dignity. Assuming MPE or I-MPE is correct, A’s 
perception (and perhaps our own perception) of the situation would now be altered to 
include moral contents. This background content is required to perceive this situation as 
possessing an immoral quality. I-MPE is implausible because it takes moral perceptions to 
be unmediated when cases like these reveal to us that any literal moral perception, just as 
in the case of forming moral judgments, must be mediated by our background mental 
contents or structures (i.e., beliefs, affective dispositions, non-inferential cognitive 
associations, and so on) if moral contents are to become contents of perceptual experience 
in the first place.36 We are hard pressed to think that people have unmediated moral 
perceptual-revelations during morally pertinent situations like those depicted in Figure-
1.2. Even if moral knowledge of particular situations could be a form of perceptual 
knowledge, we would still need background moral knowledge about the contents of 
 
36 Issues of high-level and low-level contents of experience are seemingly relevant to this discussion. Rather than invest my time here 
trying to settle a debate about what counts as a high-level or low-level property (something I would not be able to settle here), I have 
minimally drawn a boundary line between sensory-content and conceptual-content knowing that sensory-content is arguably low-level 
content and conceptual-content is arguably high-level. That said, all that I am defending here is that conceptual-content, in virtue of its 
conceptual grounding, could not become part of perceptual experience, if it can at all, without some kind of mediation by our 
background beliefs and affects. I have taken no firm stand on what counts as high- or low-level contents. Siegel (2011) make a similar 
move when distinguishing K-properties from low-level properties.  
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morality (i.e., cognitive or affective associations pertaining to moral principles, laws, or 
virtues) with which to discern the moral features of the particular event in reference to an 
abstract moral conception of the good.37  
That said, the distinction between MPJ and MPE turns on whether moral properties 
are admissible contents of our experience. Adopting MPJ means that one commits to some 
variation on the claim that the phenomenological character of such content is reducible to 
a kind of judgment, as defined earlier. That is, MPJ is reductivist about our 
phenomenological responses during morally pertinent experiences.38 Väyrynen (2018), for 
example, takes the phenomenal character of our moral perceptions as indicative of “an 
implicit habituated transition in thought from a perceptual input to a moral representation, 
owning to the way that the relevant emotional and affective dispositions have been shaped 
by some relevant background moral beliefs which connect non-moral inputs with moral 
classifications.”39 In contrast, adopting MPE means that one holds that the 
phenomenological character of our experiences are distinctly perceptual and, thereby, not 
fully reducible to some form of judgment. As a result, an answer to the judgment-
perception question (i.e., “Are moral perceptions a kind of judgment or are they literal 
perceptions of a situation’s moral features?) depends on how the phenomenological 
character of moral perception should be understood.  
 
37 This is Faraci’s (2015) insightful claim about the limitation of moral perception as a source of moral knowledge. If moral 
knowledge is in any way a form of perceptual knowledge it must be about moral particulars and not universals otherwise we would be 
forced to admit that we have perceptual encounters of universal moral principles. As I see it, this is antithetical to the nature of what it 
means to have moral perceptions of particulars. Blum’s (1994) Moral Perception and Particularity is a testament to this idea.   
38 In general, judgementalism is, by default, a reductivist position in virtue of the idea that it takes our judgments to be the source of 
our moral perceptions rather than entertain the possibility of literal moral perception. Faraci (2015)’s position is a little more 
complicated in that while he allows for the idea that literal moral perception are viable, there is no such thing as a purely perceptual 
moral epistemology in as much as moral bridge laws (i.e., moral principles that link non-moral and moral contents). For Faraci, we 
have literal perceptions of moral particulars but not of moral universals. As a result, he is a judgmentalist about moral principles but an 
experientialist about moral properties.  
39 Väyrynen (2018) p. 123 
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1.4 The Phenomenology of Moral Perception 
 As Siegel (2011) describes it, phenomenal contrast methodology is “a way to test 
hypotheses about the contents of visual experience. Its main strategy is to find something 
that the target hypothesis purports to explain, and then see whether it provides the best 
explanation of that phenomenon.”40 Schematized, the method functions by placing person 
S into the position of observing some situation α and assuming that S is in epistemic state 
Ψ, one which lacks background beliefs or affective dispositions usually pertinent to α. Ψ is 
then altered to include beliefs or affective dispositions, usually those pertinent to α, causing 
S to enter epistemic state Δ. Person S is then placed back into situation α and the 
phenomenal character of S’s experience under Ψ (E-1) is compared to S’s experience under 
Δ (E-2). The differences between E-1 and E-2 are classified using a target hypothesis (HT) 
and this explanation is compared to alternative explanation (HA) to determine the best 
possible explanation for those differences is. 41 This section employ’s this strategy in order 
to address the judgment-perception question about moral perception.  
The target hypothesis (HT) to be tested in the case of MPE is that moral properties 
are represented by the contents of experience. Put otherwise, MPE qua HT holds that moral 
properties are recognized when we acquire perceptual contents during occurrent 
experience.  With this in mind, the reader is asked to consider the following case while 
looking at Figure 1.3.  
 
40 Siegel (2011) p. 87-88 
41 This formalization of the phenomenal contrast method is based on Siegel’s (2011) defense of the Rich Content View wherein she 
uses the phenomenal contrast method to investigate our viewing of pine trees, the contrasting experience therein being what it is like 
to view a grove of trees before knowing what a pine tree is and, again, after learning about pine trees. See Siegel (2011) p. 100-101. 
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V-J Day Photo Case: Consider Figure 1.3. S knows nothing about this photo except that 
it depicts a scene in Times Square during V-J Day, celebrating the end of WWII. In the 
absence of background information about the photo, Figure 1.3 seems morally innocuous 
to S (E-1). Later, after interviewing the man (George Mendonsa), S learns that he did not 
know the woman (Greta Zimmer Friedman). George tells S that “If that girl did not have a 
nurse's uniform on, I honestly believe that I never would have grabbed her. … [in the war] 
we were transferring the wounded onto the hospital ship, and I was watching how the 
nurses were taking care of the wounded … it was [her] uniform that did it.”42 Greta goes 
on to tell you, “Well, it wasn't -- it wasn't my choice to be kissed. The guy just came over 
and kissed [and] grabbed.”43 With this, S knows that this is a photo of unwanted kissing, 
and, assuming that S possesses background beliefs that sexual assault is wrong and that 
unwanted kissing is sexual assault, Figure 1.3 now appears to S as representing 
something immoral (E-2).   
In this case, situation α amounts to observing George kiss Greta. When S is in state Ψ, 
possessing an absence of information about α, the phenomenal character of their experience 
of the photo (E-1) is classified as what it is like to observe something morally innocuous. 
In contrast, when S is in state Δ, possessing information about α which includes the 
unwanted and forceful nature of the kiss and that such things are immoral, the phenomenal 
character of their experience of the photo (E-2) is classified as what it is like to observe 
something wrong. HT, which amounts to the MPE position, takes the difference between 
the phenomenal character of E-1 and E-2 to be driven by a difference in perceptual content 
between E-1 and E-2. Specifically, that Δ modifies S’s perceptual experience to include 
“wrong” as perceptual content in E-2 when it was not present in E-1.  
 It is worth making a clarificatory point about this case before weighing HT against 
its alternative. S’s transition from state Ψ to Δ occurs when they learn about the context of 
 
42 Interview, veterans history project, https://memory.loc.gov/diglib/vhp-stories/loc.natlib.afc2001001.42868/transcript?ID=sr0001 
43 Interview, veterans history project http://memory.loc.gov/diglib/vhp/story/loc.natlib.afc2001001.42863/transcript?ID=sr0001 
Figure 1.3 Alfred Eisenstaedt's "V-J Day in Times Square" 
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the photo (i.e., from interviews with George and Greta). It is assumed that both Ψ and Δ 
include morally relevant content such as “sexual assault is wrong” and “unwanted kissing 
is sexual assault”. Ψ is, therefore, similar to Δ in that S possesses the same content about 
the immorality of sexual assault and can identify unwanted kissing as sexual assault in both 
states. However, there are many ways we could describe the content of S’s epistemic state 
which could alter S’s take on the photo in the way described. For brevities sake, I will limit 
my discussion about such content to the following five items.  
  (a): a particular belief that image-II represents an occasion of sexual assault.  
  (p): a concluding belief or affective intuition which holds that this photo 
represents something wrong.  
  (u): a context belief that Greta did not choose to be kissed and, thereby, it was 
unwanted.44 (k): a practical belief that unwanted kissing is an occasion of sexual 
assault. 
  (w): a moral belief or affective disposition which holds that sexual assault is 
wrong. 
As presented, the V-J Day Photo Case assumes that states Ψ and Δ possess content (k) and 
(w). After learning about the context of the case, S exits Ψ and enters state Δ because they 
have acquired (u). With (u), and assuming that S is rational, it is expected that S will come 
to understand (a) because (k) and (u) entail (a). From this, S should arrive at (p) because 
(a) and (w) entail (p). As a result, state Ψ contains merely (k) and (w) whereas it is assumed 
in this example that state Δ contains (a), (u), (k), (w), and (p). This difference between Ψ 
and Δ is, seemingly, what motivates the differences between S’s experiences during E-1 
and E-2.  
 
44 One might suggest that other items should be included in this list. The description of the case as one where George grabbed Greta, 
that he did not know her, and that he forced himself upon her are just some examples. However, while there may be litigious reasons 
for including such a content in a court room, I have taken Greta’s claim that she did not choose to be embraced, and, thereby, that the 
kiss was unwanted to be sufficient reason to draw out the conclusion that this was a case of sexual assault. The other content either 
collaborate her story or makes the event just that much more shocking.  
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Additionally, we should not expect a change in the phenomenological character of 
S’s experience without (k), (w), and (u) in Δ. Without them, there would, it seems, not be 
enough content in S’s background beliefs and affects to mediate the appreciation of any 
moral features during S’s experience of the photo in situation α. This should not trouble us, 
however, because what this observation reveals is an alternative scenario we could consider 
when exploring the phenomenology of moral perception via contrast cases. If the former 
case occurs because of a change in one’s relevant non-moral knowledge, the following 
contrast occurs due to a change in one’s moral knowledge. Consider the following 
alternative case.  
Alternative V-J Day Photo Case: Consider image-II, again. S is an expert about this 
photo. They know everything one could know about its contents, the context, and its iconic 
place in history. However, S does not believe or is not affectively disposed to hold (k) or 
(w) or denies that Greta did not want to be kissed (i.e., S does not believe (u)). In the 
absence of background information (k), (w), or (u), Figure 1.3 seems morally innocuous 
to S (AltE-1). Then, over many years, S undergoes a radical transformation in their moral 
outlook and in their understanding about sexual assault. S, now, believes or affectively 
holds (k), (w), and (u).  With this, figure 1.3 now appears to S as representing something 
immoral (AltE-2).   
 In the V-J Day Photo Case, S can be said to have an epistemically deficient set of 
beliefs or affective attitudes about the photo given that they, in state Ψ, lack (a), (u), and 
(p). In contrast, the Alternative V-J Day Photo Case seems motivated by a morally 
deficient set of beliefs or attitudes from which to understand the salient moral features of 
the situation. Yet, the phenomenal difference in either contrast case would be classified in 
the same way by MPE’s articulation of HT: Holding (p), the concluding belief or affective 
disposition which takes the photo to represent something ‘wrong’, motivates a change in 
the phenomenal character of one’s experience of the photo itself.  MPE takes this change 
to occur because E-2 possesses different perceptual content than E-1. That is, (p) alters, 
through some perception influencing mechanism, experience’s perceptual content to 
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include ‘wrongness’, or something close to it, as a feature of the perceptual experience, just 
like ‘table’ or ‘chair’. Under this view, S’s insensitivity to the moral features of the photo 
is a moral perceptual miss fueled by S’s lack of non-moral knowledge in the V-J Day 
Photo Case and by a lack of moral background knowledge in the Alternative V-J Day Photo 
Case. 
1.5 Unpacking a MPE’s Account of the V-J Day Photo Case 
HT accounts for the phenomenological difference between E-1 and E-2, and also 
AltE-1 and AltE-2, by claiming that there is moral perceptual content in the second 
experience that was not present in the first. The idea here is that a difference in content is 
what prompts a difference in the phenomenological character of these experiences. That is, 
during E2, in contrast to E1, perceptual contents represent the photo’s moral features (i.e., 
its wrongness, cruelty, or harm) as literal contents of the experience. To reiterate, MPE’s 
commitment to HT means that the view takes the recognition of the photos moral features 
to have occurred during the acquisition of the experiential contents of the photo. To 
illustrate, this is how Church (2013) approaches MPE.  
Church holds that one gains perceptual knowledge of a situation’s morally 
significant properties in the same way that one does of everyday objects.45 She writes, 
“moral perception is immediate in the same way that our perception of tables and chairs is 
immediate because its justification is built into its phenomenology.”46 A perception, in 
Church’s language, occurs whenever one undergoes an experience which is both 
 
45 I take this last point to be what Church (2013) means by seeing something as objective in the Kantian sense. That is, that the chair is 
seen as objective is to give it the sense that the chair is an object and independent of my beliefs of it. See Church (2013) The 
Possibilities of perception and Church (2010) “Seeing Reasons” for examples of this kind of reasoning.  
46 Church (2013) p. 191. Emphasis added. 
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transparent to the subject and self-justificatory about its content because she takes a 
perception to occur whenever one has an experience of objectivity.47 She explains,  
“An experience is a perceptual experience precisely when the independent reality of its 
object is evident from within that experience; perceptional experience is self-justifying 
because it includes experience of its own objectivity. This is also (at least part of) what it 
means for perception to be “transparent”: it presents its objects in such a way that one is 
unaware of any distinction between how an object appears and how it is in fact.”48  
As described, “an experience of objectivity” is the central identifier for distinguishing 
between perceptions and other mental states, such as judgments.49 In the case of the Muller-
Lyer lines, what is both transparent and self-justificatory for the onlooker is that the lines 
appear to us as being of different length. We gain the perceptual belief that “these lines are 
of different length”, belief l, by sole means of the experience itself. That is, our experience 
of the lines is transparent to us because we are experientially unaware of any difference 
between how the lines appear to us from how they are, even though we need only use a 
ruler to learn that the lines are of different length. Moreover, belief l is self-justified by the 
experience, albeit erroneously in this case, because our occurrent experience of the lines 
supports our belief in l.50 In an abbreviated sense, Church claims that to have a perception 
is to have an experience which (1) gives us the sense that we encounter objects with 
properties independent of us and (2) serves as its own justification for a belief that what is 
experienced is actually the case.51    
 
47 Church (2010) p. 645 
48 Church (2010) p. 644 
49 Church (2010) p.645 
50 “Justification” as an epistemic term is used, by Church, to reference that something supports a belief, not that it necessarily supports 
a true belief. The classic illustration of this use of the term “justify” can be found in Gettier cases. I can have a justified belief that it is 
noon by looking at a clock which, unbeknownst to me, is broken because I am a competent clock user. That belief is true when it 
happens to be noon and false when it is not, but my justification is drawn from my experience of the clock. One reason Gettier-cases 
are so provocative is because, among other things, they illustrate the complex nature of justification.  
51 It is worth noting that Church also argues for an accuracy condition in order to distinguish perceptions from things like blind 
convictions (Church, 2013, Ch. 1 & 2). While this is an important component to her views within The Possibilities of Perception, I 
have forgone exploring this aspect of her project as I have abandoned the use of perception as a success term. This does not, however, 
hinder our discussion about her version of MPE beyond the need to incorporate an evaluative component to my schematization of her 
view in a future project. I do not do that here because, again, it would not only require us to investigate veridicality conditions but also 
defend some moral theory with which to judge the veridicality of one’s experience. While important to the future of this project, these 
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On the matter of how we come to have perceptions, she goes on to state that the 
imagination plays an essential part of how we come to have experiences that are both 
transparent and self-justificatory. She writes, “… we actively imagine alternative 
perspectives whenever we experience something as an objective state of affairs” and, 
thereby, experience something as knowable in a plurality of ways by virtue of our occurrent 
perceptional experience and our imagined experience of its alternatives.52 It “is our ability 
to use our imaginations to synthesize a multiplicity of different perspectives and 
possibilities (past and future, actual and merely possible) that enables us to perceive an 
object or a sequence of events as objectively valid.”53  
Technical terminology aside, the imagination, she seems to claim, utilizes our 
background understanding regarding how the world operates (i.e., our beliefs about space, 
perspective, causations, and so on) and, in the case of moral perception, our understanding 
of the contents of morality to produce background mental states which articulate a plurality 
of alternatives to how things appear to us in an occurrent experience. Using trees as an 
example, she writes, 
“we perceive an object such as a tree insofar as we simultaneously imagine how it would 
appear from other points of view. For it is the imagined convergence of different 
perspectives around a single state of affairs that gives us the experience of its spatiality and 
its objectivity... When it comes to perceiving someone as an agent—as the locus of multiply 
intertwined mental states, I want to make a similar suggestion: to perceive that someone is 
a person we must imagine that person in a variety of situations—some of which are actual 
and many of which are merely possible, and we must discover what is invariant across 
those imagined actions.”54 
On moral matters, she continues,  
 
things, again, are beyond the scope of this paper which is simply to defend the view that moral properties can be contents of our 
experience.    
52 Church (2010), p. 649 
53 Church (2013) p. 222 
54 Church (2013) p. 199-200 
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“... [imagining] is also guided by [an agent’s] implicit knowledge of what should happen.... 
It is not enough to direct one’s imagining with a loving attitude or a desire to do right by 
others plus a good understanding of causal laws; one must also know a good deal about 
what doing right by others involves, and that is where moral laws enter… in the case of 
moral perception the relevant laws must include moral laws…”55 
The takeaway here is that perception is a two-part process in Church’s view. First, 
one’s imaginative faculties recognize a situation’s various possibilities (both moral and 
non-moral) given acquired perceptual contents. Then, one’s imagination synthesizes 
recognized content with acquired perceptual content into an experience for the subject 
that is both transparent and self-justificatory, a perceptual experience. Church’s (2013) 
view, put formally, looks something like the following. 
Church’s MPE (C-MPE): S has a moral perception of situation α when they 
C-MPE-I: acquire non-moral perceptual content as of α in occurrent experience; 
C-MPE-II: possess background beliefs regarding moral and non-moral issues 
including the moral law and worldly operations (i.e., space, gravity, and so 
on) that are relevant to α; 
C-MPE-III: imagine a multiplicity of possibilities regarding I according to the 
contents of II; and   
C-MPE-IV: use the imagination to synthesize the contents of I and III into a 
perceived state of affairs which includes moral and non-moral content. This 
synthesis is Church’s perception influencing mechanism and is itself 
facilitated by the imagination.  
This view would account for the differences mentioned in the V-J Photo Cases by pointing 
to how the imaginative workings of S differ when in epistemic state Ψ verses Δ. That is, S 
cannot imagine a situation’s moral features because one doesn’t have enough information, 
in C-MPE-II, to access them. In the alternative V-J Day Photo case, an imaginative failure 
occurs because S lacks the moral knowledge to imagine relevant possibilities and, thus, the 
imaginative synthesis during C-MPE-IV leaves the moral features of the situation 
unrealized in S’s perceptual experience. As a result, the perceptual contents of E-1 differ 
 
55 Church (2013) p. 218-219 
34 
from those in E-2 thereby resulting in a difference between each experience’s 
phenomenological character.  
1.6 MPJ’s Alternative Account of the V-J Day Photo Case 
MPJ purports that an alternative hypothesis (HA) is preferable to MPE’s HT. HA 
holds that the phenomenal character of moral perceptions attach to judgments, cognitively 
or affectively articulated, rather than to the presence of perceptual contents. The difference 
in phenomenological character between E-1 and E-2 (or AltE-1 and AltE-2) under HA is 
accounted for as a difference in the sense one has when one figures things out. ‘Figures 
things out’, in this context, means to acquire a belief by means of a judgment formation 
mechanism. Common candidates for this mechanism include cognitive associations (i.e., 
inference, heuristics56, intuitions57, or a rule-like association between what is perceived 
and a moral property58)  or invoked affective states (i.e., virtuous affects including 
emotions59, the what it is like to experience virtue’s phenomenal character60, or an 
attunement to a situation’s affect-cloud61). Some views take both cognitive associations 
and invoked affective states to be at play during moral perceptions. Other versions of MPJ 
focus on one candidate over the other. Given this, three categories of MPJ are worth 
mentioning. Put formally,  
 
 
 
56 See Fricker (2007) 
57 See Audi (2018 & 2013) 
58 See Väyrynen (2018) 
59 See Little (1995 & 1997) 
60 See Goldie (2007) 
61 See Willett (1995 & 2014) 
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Broad Moral Perceptual Judgmentalism (BMPJ): S has a moral perception of situation 
α when 
BMPJ-I S acquires non-moral perceptual content as of α during their encounter with 
situation α; 
BMPJ-II S possesses background beliefs (moral or non-moral) or affective 
dispositions relevant to situation α; and 
BMPJ-III S utilizes cognitive associations and invoked affective states as 
judgement formation mechanisms to judge α using the contents of II 
thereby allowing S to recognize α as possessing moral properties by means 
of judgements about acquired perceptual content.  
Cognitive Moral Perceptual Judgmentalism (CMPJ): S has a moral perception of 
situation α when 
CMPJ-I S acquires non-moral perceptual content as of α during their encounter with 
situation α; 
CMPJ-II S possesses background beliefs (moral or non-moral) relevant to situation α; 
and 
CMPJ-III S utilizes cognitive associations as the judgement formation mechanism 
with which to judge α using the contents of II thereby allowing S to 
recognize α as possessing moral properties by means of judgements about 
acquired perceptual content.  
Affective Moral Perceptual Judgmentalism (AMPJ): S has a moral perception of 
situation α when 
AMPJ-I S acquires non-moral perceptual content as of α during their encounter with 
situation α; 
AMPJ-II S possesses affective dispositions relevant to situation α; and 
AMPJ-III S utilizes invoked affective states as the judgement formation 
mechanism with which to judge α using the contents of II thereby allowing 
S to recognize α as possessing moral properties by means of judgements 
about acquired perceptual content.  
BMPJ is a revised version of our earlier definition of MPJ. BMPJ includes cognitive 
associations and invoked affective states as specified categories of how one forms 
judgments about the moral significance of perceived content. In the moral perceptual 
literature, versions of CMPJ and AMPJ emphasize one of these categories, cognitive 
associations and affective states respectively, in their view, usually by being silent about 
the role of the other. To illustrate how each of these views might account for the 
phenomenological difference in cases like the V-J Day Photo Case under HA, this section 
lays out some prominent examples of each version of MPJ in preparation to assess which 
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hypothesis we should endorse, MPE’s HT or MPJ’s HA, in the next section.  
In Blum’s (1994) brand of BMPJ, a “failure to be in touch with part of the moral 
reality which confronts” the subject is indicative of their inability to automatically be aware 
of the occurrent situation’s moral features.  Blum’s view marks the difference between E-
1 and E-2 as a difference in one’s individuation of the moral features during each of these 
experiences. These individuations change from E-1 and E-2 because S transitions from 
epistemic state Ψ to Δ by learning new things.  
As discussed during the development of an acquisition-recognition framework, it 
should be noted that Blum does state that “moral perception cannot be identified with moral 
judgment.”62 He goes on to say that in “a given situation moral perception comes on the 
scene prior to moral judgment; moral perception can lead to moral action outside the 
operation of [moral] judgment entirely; and, more generally, perception involves moral 
capacities not encompassed by moral judgment.”63 That is, moral judgment, for Blum, 
amounts to a moral deliberation about the significance of a situation’s features and, in later 
stages of his schema, is used to determine the morally demanded course of action. In 
contrast, moral perception individuates moral features within an occurrent situation prior 
to the operation of deliberative moral judgment.64 While he is silent on the judgment-
perception question at most times, Blum seems to categorize one’s moral judgment about 
the ethical significance of a situation’s features as distinct from our discernments about the 
presence of such features, in a descriptive sense, in the first place. Both capacities, he 
argues, are important aspects of our moral lives.  
 
62 Blum (1991) p. 702 
63 Blum (1991) p. 702 
64 Blum (1991) p. 711 
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There is, given this, reason to doubt that Blum is rightly classified as supporting 
BMPJ. To address this concern, I would like to suggest that Blum’s project is less interested 
in determining whether moral perception is literally perceptual or a form of judgement than 
in recognizing “the range of distinct moral operations and capacities involved” during 
occurrent moral experiences because he claims to not rest much on his use of ‘judgement’ 
and ‘perception’.65 As a result, Blum’s work falls into to the literal-metaphorical 
ambiguity discussed earlier because it avoids the judgment-perception question from the 
start. This does not mean, however, that we cannot explore the commitments he has made 
and glean which option, BMPJ or MPE, best describes his view. Moreover, given Blum’s 
influential place in the history of moral perceptual theory it is important to take up this 
task.  
That said, Blum’s work on moral perception expands our understanding of a 
subject’s moral epistemic operations regardless of their perceptual or judgmental nature. It 
challenges a historical tradition of principle-based moral theories which, he claims, have 
overlooked two important features of moral judgment, “(1) knowing how to apply rules or 
principles and (2) recognizing given features of a situation as a morally significant one”.66 
Additionally, he argues that there is another overlooked capacity that must be considered 
if we are to make sense of moral agency. Stated plainly, Blum argues that (3) we must be 
able to individuate a situation’s moral features prior to our ability to exercise (1) and (2), 
that is prior to our ability to render them as morally significant.  It is this capacity to 
individuate a situation’s moral features that he calls moral perception. Given this, one 
charitable interpretation of Blum’s work holds that it expands our conception of morally 
 
65 Blum 1991, p. 711 - “Either term can be used to refer to some of the operations I have included within the other.” 
66 Blum (1991) p. 712 
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relevant judgment to include (1), (2), and (3) rather than taking a stand that (3) is a kind of 
perceptual capacity.   
I adopt this interpretation because Blum likens moral perceptual operations to 
psychological capacities rather than perceptual processes.67 Where moral judgements are 
acts of inference for Blum,68 ‘judgment’, generally speaking, is a broader category which 
accounts for belief states which follow from our inferential and non-inferential 
discernments.69 Moreover, non-inferential, and immediate,  discernments can be facilitated 
by cognitive associations or affective dispositions.70  Blum’s restriction of the conversation 
to a distinction between moral judgments, defined in technical terms, and moral 
perceptions, ambiguously defined, precludes him from seeing that moral perception, as a 
kind of non-inferential and immediate discernment, is seemingly a sibling of moral 
judgment in his view.  
He writes, “... I am including within “perception” anything contributing to or 
encompassed within the agent’s take on the situation - his salience-perception - prior to his 
deliberating about what to do.”71 Stated otherwise, Blum holds that an agent will be more 
or less sensitive to an occurrent experience’s features in proportion with their ability to 
derive non-inferential judgments from an experience’s perceptual contents because 
salience-perceptions, so described, take something perceived and categorize (i.e., judge it) 
 
67 Blum (1991) p. 720 
68 Blum (1991), p. 707. Emphasis added. Referencing a racially charged situation: “Tim has to construe the situation in a certain way 
in order to see it as “the cab driver passing up the woman and her child.” And her has to infer the racist motive.” 
69 Put succinctly, non-inferential discernments result from a heuristic or automatic rule-like relation which associates x with y, thereby 
the agent makes judgement y whenever confronted with content x. Inferential deliberations, in contrast, carry more cognitive weight 
on the part of the rational faculties of the subject. Inferential deliberations can be quick, but the distinguishing feature between 
inferential and non-inferential judgments is that the former has a syllogistic structure whereas the latter amount to immediately 
adopting a belief because of some form of non-rational association.  
70 It is worth noting briefly that this approach to affects takes them to be forms of judgment rather than perceptions, which has been 
argued for by some. Given that affects respond to what is represented in perceptual experience, there is reason to believe that affects, 
like emotions, are not a perceptual capacity. 
71 Blum (1991) p. 707 
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as morally relevant. Under this interpretation, Blum’s view seems to hold that acquisition 
collects perceptual content and recognition of the salient content occurs by means of a 
judgment formation mechanism wherein one individuates the features of a situation and 
exercises moral judgment to discern their moral significance. As a result, Blum’s view 
holds that judgment formations are central to moral perception.  Overall, Blum’s view 
would account for the phenomenological differences between E-1 and E-2 in our test case 
as a difference in S’s judging that the photo represents sexual assault and its wrongness in 
E-2 but not E-1. Stated otherwise, Blum’s approach to BMPJ would argue that there is a 
difference in S’s judgment which corresponds to an awareness of a salient property, like an 
act of sexual assault, and its morally evaluative dimension, like wrongness.   
 Alternatively, Väyrynen (2018) provides a straightforward account of BMPJ by, 
again, positing that cognitive associations and affective states connect non-moral 
perceptual content with moral classifications. Väyrynen’s version of BMPJ claims that HA 
has all the explanatory power of HT  without the complications associated with positing 
perception influencing mechanisms or distinct representational abilities on the part of the 
perceiver.72 He writes,  
“The rival explanation that I propose treats [different phenomenological responses] as 
reflecting an implicit habituated transition in thought from a perceptual input to a moral 
representation, owning to the way that the relevant emotional and affective dispositions 
have been shaped by some relevant background moral beliefs which connect non-moral 
inputs with moral classifications.”73  
Väyrynen argues for this view by suggesting that the difference between experiences like 
E-1 and E-2 is better accounted for by views like BMPJ because the relevant change in the 
phenomenology attaches to an experience’s cognitive phenomenology or one’s 
 
72 Väyrynen (2018) p. 121 
73 Väyrynen (2018) p. 123 
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psychologically invoked affective phenomenology rather than by perceptual content for 
three reasons.74  
First, he argues that the phenomenological difference in contrast situations can be 
tracked by affective responses informed by background cognitive associations or 
immediate cognitive apprehensions without the need for positing a change in perceptual 
content75, what I refer to as his Tracking Claim. Second, that this difference is often 
experienced as a matter of degree rather than one of kind because such experiences 
correlate to the intensity of an affective response inasmuch as it is “psychologically 
immediate” and integrated with an experience’s non-evaluative inputs76, what I refer to as 
his Immediacy Claim. Lastly, he argues that his alternative account offers a simpler and 
more unified account of moral experience than alternatives by positing one general 
representational mechanism (i.e., representations via affective responses informed by 
cognitive mechanisms) rather than two in the case of MPE (i.e., representations via 
judgments and literal perceptual representations of moral content)77, what I refer to as his 
Simplicity Claim.  
Overall, Väyrynen would seemingly account for the phenomenological differences 
between E-1 and E-2 as a difference in S’s cognitive phenomenology of what it is like to 
adopt a belief about the presence of a moral property or the affective phenomenology 
 
74 Väyrynen (2018) p.123 
75 Väyrynen (2018) p. 119 “The transition can also be psychologically immediate and bound up with the relevant emotional or 
affective responses, explaining how things can ‘strike’ us as being morally a certain way. … Alternatively the relevant transition 
might be more like a recognition based on taking in a pattern one isn’t able to articulate, where that patter gets recognized may be 
influenced by prior training or background cognitive states.” 
76 Väyrynen (2018) p. 120 – Referencing the evaluative practice of wine tasting be the expert verses the novice: “This suggests more 
forcefully still that their responses differ primarily in degree: in how psychologically immediate their responses tend to be and how 
integrated the non-evaluative inputs tend to be with the feelings of satisfaction that tasting a fine wine tends to produce.” 
77 Väyrynen (2018) p. 121 – “Explaining these moral properties seems to require only a general capacity to represent moral properties 
which is responsive to inputs from perception, imagination, supposition, and belief, and which can be psychologically immediate at 
least when the inputs are reliably and closely bound up with certain and emotional and affective dispositions.” 
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associated with an emotional response to what is understood as wrong in E-2 but not E-1. 
Moreover, this version of BMPJ would seemingly suggest that this account is reinforced 
by the apparent difference in each experience’s phenomenological intensity or, put 
alternatively, the degree to which the cognitive or affective phenomenology is 
psychologically immediate to S.   
To summarize, BMPJ reduces any claim that a change in the phenomenology 
between E-1 and E-2 in the V-J Day Photo case reduces to a difference in S’s cognitive or 
affective phenomenologies. Put otherwise, BMPJ reduces any perceptual claims about the 
presence of moral perceptual content to a claim about the presence of a judgment, cognitive 
or affectively reached, on the part of the subject and the phenomenology associated with 
those states. HA is taken as the preferable alternative to HT  by proponents of BMPJ because 
it is believed to possess more theoretical virtues (i.e., is simpler and carrying equal 
explanatory power) than HT, as in the case of Väyrynen, or properly accounting for the 
subject’s moral epistemic capacities, as in the case of Blum. As a result, acquisition occurs 
prior to recognition in BMPJ. The same acquisition-recognition relationship is a feature 
of Cognitive MPJ (CMPJ) and Affective MPJ (AMPJ). 
CMPJ accounts for moral perception by emphasizing the role of cognitive 
associations (i.e., inference, heuristics78, intuitions79, or a rule-like associations between 
what is perceived and a moral property80) in our everyday moral discernments. In general, 
these views describe the immediate cognitive formation of a judgement about an occurrent 
experience’s morally significant properties as prompting the phenomenological differences 
 
78 See Fricker (2007) 
79 See Audi (2018 & 2013) 
80 See Väyrynen (2018) 
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associated with the V-J Photo Case. Whereas Blum’s and Väyrynen’s proposals seem to 
focus on ‘non-inferential forms of judgment’ and ‘transitions in thought’ in addition to 
discussing the role of invoked affective states, others focus on cognitive associations in 
terms of intuitions (Audi 2013) or heuristics (Fricker 2007). As in BMPJ, non-moral 
perceptual content and the identification of a situation’s non-moral features occurs during 
the acquisition step. These are then associatively paired with moral content during the 
recognition step through one’s capacity to make cognitive associations.  
For example, Audi (2013) proposes a integration model of moral perception which 
ultimately holds that there is an unconscious, rule-like, pairing of non-moral perceptual 
content with moral properties by means of one’s moral intuitions or, stated alternatively, a 
“felt sense of connection”.81 Under this view, the phenomenology associated with moral 
experiences is akin to having a “sense of injustice", a personal intuition about the 
connection between a moral property and non-moral contents. Clarifying, Audi (2018)82 
writes,  
“The sense of injustice, then, a kind of impression of it, as based on, and as phenomenally 
integrated with, a suitable ordinary perception of the properties on which injustice is 
consequential – on which it is grounded, in a main use of that term – might serve as the 
experiential element in moral perception. … call [this view] an integration theory of moral 
 
81 Audi (2013), p. 37, 40-46 
82 It is worth mentioning that Audi (2013 & 2018) draws out a distinction between what he calls “perceptibility” and “perceptuality” in 
order motivate these claims. Where the former seems to be a classification for one’s cognitive phenomenology as a form of one’s 
ability to articulate a kind of moral “sense”, the later refers to the level of observable properties “accessible to the five senses.” (Audi 
2018, 64). It seems, given this, that one could take issue with what Audi takes perception to be in that the perceptual phenomenology 
of an experience are, in an alternative view, like sensory properties in that they enter into one’s perceptual experience by means of our 
apperception of the perceptual field, thereby allowing us to perceive kind properties. Both Siegel (2011) and Church (2013) hold 
something akin to this view. Sensory properties, like moral properties, could be seen as equally mysterious without this kind of 
synthesis suggesting that we should not reject the idea that moral properties can become contents of one’s perceptual experience, if 
only through non-sensory mechanisms. However, Audi takes the non-perceptual contents route instead. Moreover, if Audi had argued 
strongly that affects function to draw out this “felt sense of connection”, he would be classified as a BMPJ supporter. Instead, he 
consistency holds that a non-inferential disposition to recognize perceptually observable properties as morally significant often result 
in an emotional response but may not. This suggests that affective phenomenologies are more like side effects of cognitive 
phenomenologies for Audi rather than integral parts of the moral perceptual process. This suggests, given my scheme, that he is 
rightly categorized as a CMPJ supporter even though the affective phenomenology about the experience can play some part of his 
integration model, perhaps something like Väyrynen’s claim that the intensity of an affective phenomenology. Ultimately, Audi’s 
seems to suggest that moral perceptions are of the cognitive phenomenological character of taking something to fit, or not, (i.e., 
“fittingness”/”unfittingness” and “welcome rebalance”) and variations on that theme account for our sense of injustice, goodness, 
wrongness, or justice suggests that this is the case. 
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perception. … An important constituent in this phenomenal integration is the perceiver’s 
felt sense of connection between, on the one hand, the impression of say, injustice or (on 
the positive side) beneficence and, on the other hand, the properties that ground the moral 
phenomena. This felt sense of connection is at least akin to what some have called the sense 
of fittingness.”83  
So described, Audi’s view holds that we can have moral perceptions because we have a 
non-inferential inclination to classify the non-moral perceptual contents of an occurrent 
experience as indicative of some moral property or feature.84  We sense morality by 
incorporating the cognitive phenomenology of our non-inferential judgment about the 
moral fitness, or unfitness, of a deed or person and a context within the overall 
phenomenology of the perceptual experience.85 He goes on to characterize these cognitive 
associations as intuitions in the sense that they facilitate one’s coming to have an immediate 
belief, in a way that is “significantly analogous to perception”.86  
As Cowan (2015) characterizes Audi’s view, “Integration doesn’t involve the 
contents of perceptual experience being altered by the moral ‘experiential element’, but 
rather, leads to the formation of an overall experience which is the amalgam of non-ethical 
perceptual experience and the [moral] experiential element.”87 As I understand it, this 
integration into an overall experience incorporates a judgment formation into the moral 
experience rather than reshaping the perceptual experience to include moral perceptual 
content. Audi’s view is thereby not perceptual in nature, it predicts the aggregation of the 
phenomenology of making a judgment with the phenomenology of a perceptual 
 
83 Audi (2018) p. 63 
84 Audi (2018) p. 63 “This sense of connection I am describing normally produces, moreover, a non-inferential disposition to attribute 
the moral property of the action (or other phenomenon in question) on the basis of the property or set of properties (of that action) on 
which the moral property is grounded.” 
85 Audi (2018) p. 63 “Moral perception in some way embodies a phenomenal sense – which may or may not be in some way 
emotional – of the moral character of the act. …  In each instance of moral perception, the moral sense of wrongness, injustice or, in 
the positive case, of welcome rebalancing is essentially connected to perception of non-moral p[properties on which the moral 
properties are grounded.”  
86 Audi (2015) “Intuition and its place in ethics”. Journal of the American Philosophical Association. 1. 57-77 
87 Cowan (2015) 
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experience. Audi’s view thereby describes moral perception as an acquisition of non-
moral perceptual content which gets recognized via our intuitions as possessing moral 
properties.  
Alternatively, Fricker (2007) seems to articulate a version of CMPJ in Epistemic 
Injustice even though moral perception is not the primary topic of that work. That is, she 
seems to develop a view on moral perception while investigating the epistemological 
dimensions of hearers that put prejudicially driven credibility deficits on speakers facing 
systemic power inequities. She writes,  
“There is a form of moral cognitivism in the virtue ethical tradition which advances the 
idea of moral perception. In this neo-Aristotelian tradition, the sensibility of the virtuous 
subject is conceived as ‘trained’ or socially educated, so that the subject comes to see the 
world in moral colour. By building an analogy with the idea of a virtuous agent’s ethical 
sensibility, I hope to arrive at an account of how the responsible hearer exercises rational 
sensitivity, without inference, so as to be critically open to the word of others. … The main 
idea is that where a hearer gives a suitably critical reception to an interlocutor’s word 
without making any inference, she does so in virtue of the perceptual deliverances of a 
well-trained testimonial sensibility.”88 
And, on the matter of virtuous moral perceptual capacities, she continues, 
“I think, if one bears in mind that a virtuous moral perceptual capacity is a sensitivity to 
patterns of moral salience, a sensitivity to how different sorts of value configure in a new 
situation, action, or person. It is a sensitivity that allows the virtuous person to see the world 
in a certain light, where this has an intrinsic practical import, but where it would be 
misleading to boil the sensitivity down to nothing more than an alternative to deliberation. 
… A virtuous perception gives us a moral understanding of experiences, people, situations, 
and events – a view of the world in moral colour, as I put it …”89 
Given this, Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice (2007), as partially a study of moral perception 
during cases of testimony, investigates the phenomenological character of occurrent 
experience with a specific focus on those occasions where a testimonial exchange is taking 
 
88 Fricker (2007) p. 71 
89 Fricker (2007) p. 75 
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place and one makes discernments about a speaker’s credibility.90 Her general concern, 
using some of my language, is that there is something of a moral perceptual miss or 
misfire at work during occasions where identity prejudices trigger a systemic credibility 
deficit for a hearer about a historically marginalized or oppressed speaker. In these cases, 
a speaker is often prescribed a credibility deficit (i.e., not taken to be credible) because they 
are seen as incompetent or insincere due to their social identity. Moreover, these identities 
are deeply embedded in a pervasive social power structure and, as such, these kind of 
deficits signal, she argues, that the marginalized speaker is seen as possessing something 
less than what morality suggest they do, their moral status as a rational agent or knower. 91 
The hearer, in this way, can be seen as making moral discernments about the status of 
agents as knowers, a morally salient assessment.92 As a result, it seems that Fricker (2007) 
develops a perceptual model of testimony in order to account for our testimonial perceptual 
capacity, something she takes to be “analogous to the virtuous person's moral perceptual 
capacity.”93  
Put otherwise, she argues that agents perceive a speaker’s credibility in virtue of 
how one establishes the person’s epistemic trustworthiness, as exemplifying both 
competence and sincerity.94 In cases where a speaker’s competency or sincerity are 
wrongfully attacked due to an identity prejudicial credibility deficit, we should understand 
this as an occasion where the hearer has a moral perception of that person as possessing 
 
90 Fricker (2007) p. 80-81, “The interpretation of the hearer’s phenomenology as an unreflective yet critical alertness is mad sense of 
and vindicated if we accept the analogy with the moral perceptual model.”  
91 Fricker (2007) p. 44, - “To be wronged in one’s capacity as a knower is to be wronged in a capacity essential to human value. When 
one is undermined or otherwise wrong in a capacity essential to human value, one suffers and intrinsic injustice. The form that this 
intrinsic injustice takes specifically in cases of testimonial injustice is that the subject is wronged in her capacity as a giver of 
knowledge.”  
92 It is worth noting that Fricker (2007) categorizes “as a knower” as a moral feature indicative of human dignity by referencing 
Kantian notions of dignity and rational agents.  
93 Fricker (2007) p. 72 
94 Fricker (2007), p 45 – “Since epistemic trustworthiness requires the conjunction of competence and sincerity, a wrongful attack on 
either component is sufficient for being wronged in that capacity.”  
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something less than the human dignity they are due, there is the sense that this person is 
“not a knower”. This might take the form of infantilizing the speaker or, among other 
alternatives, taking them to be insincere. Regardless, a hearer with identity prejudicial 
tendencies possesses, in her language, heuristics which discern that a socially marginalized 
speaker is less deserving of credibility in virtue of the assumption that they are less than 
capable of knowing or speaking sincerely about what they know.95 In this way, one 
interpretation of Epistemic Injustice is that it develops, among other things, a framework 
for accounting for the kinds of moral perceptions one has of an important part of human 
dignity, our status as a knower. With this in mind, we can turn to the details of her view 
from the perspective that it accounts for a specific kind of moral perception because she 
classifies our perceptions of people qua knowers as a kind of moral discernment during 
occurrent experience of testimony.96.  
For Fricker, moral perceptions of testimony are immediate and non-inferential 
cognitive activities, and these activities facilitate “knower” discernments because they are 
saliently critical.97 One’s internalized cognitive sensibilities, or heuristics, to moral patterns 
in an occurrent experience facilitates a hearer’s perceptual judgments and it is common for 
 
95 Perhaps this is the case because the hearer believes that the marginalized subject is a member of a group that is believed to be 
intellectually inferior and knows nothing or that this group taken to always lie. 
96 Fricker (2007) p. 72  “According to the kind of cognitivism that grows out of the virtue tradition in ethics, the virtuous agent is 
marked out by his possession of a capacity for moral perceptual judgement. He is someone who, thanks to a proper moral ‘upbringing’ 
or (as I would prefer) a proper moral socialization, has come to see the world in moral colour. When he is confronted by an action or a 
situation with a certain moral character, he does not have to work out that the action is cruel or kind or charitable or selfish; he just 
sees it that way. Now this kind of perceptual judgement is spontaneous and unreflective; it involves no argumentation or inference on 
the agent's part. The virtuous agent's perceptual capacity is accounted for in terms of a sensitivity to morally salient features of the 
situation confronting him.” 
97 Fricker (2007) p. 80-81 “The five points of parallel explored above—that moral/testimonial judgement is non‐inferential, 
uncodifiable, intrinsically motivating, intrinsically reason‐giving, and typically has an emotional aspect—are all consistent with the 
spontaneous, unreflective phenomenology of testimony that has provided so much impetus for non‐inferentialism. Indeed, they 
explain how our phenomenology as hearers can be of an entirely unreflective and spontaneous piece of cognitive activity even while it 
is critical activity. More specifically, these points of parallel fit the description of the phenomenology that I gave above to the effect 
that the hearer typically has an experience of unreflective alertness to the many prompts and cues relating to her interlocutor's 
trustworthiness. Granted that our everyday on‐the‐spot credibility judgements are as I have depicted them—trained, socially situated 
perceptual judgements typically made spontaneously—then it is not surprising that the phenomenology should be unreflective and yet, 
as I suggested, abused if characterized as plain uncritical. The interpretation of the hearer's phenomenology as an unreflective yet 
critical alertness is made sense of and vindicated if we accept the analogy with the moral perceptual model.”  
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an experience’s cognitive activities to trigger some kind of affective response.98 Yet, 
inasmuch as Fricker’s sense of “heuristic” is a habituated habit of thought informed by 
background beliefs and dispositions, moral perceptual discernments in this view are a kind 
of judgment, as I have defined the term, because the perceptual-language is more an idiom 
for Fricker than a literally perceptual. Moreover, this judgement is motivated by one’s 
cognitive associations (i.e., heuristics) and seemingly not a function of one’s affective 
responses due to her system’s reliability on heuristics.99 Thus, Fricker’s view on moral 
perception seems to amount to a version of CMPJ. Her approach to the moral perception 
of individuals as knowers holds that the acquisition of non-moral perceptual content (i.e., 
a subject’s race, gender, sexuality, and other non-socially relevant features) is being 
recognized as morally significant in virtue of a perceiver's cognitive guiding, immediate, 
but non-inferential heuristics.  
As representative of CMPJ, Audi (2013 & 2018) and Fricker (2007) would seem to 
account for the phenomenological differences between E-1 and E-2 by suggesting that they 
amount to a difference in the cognitive phenomenology of the subject, a phenomenology 
located on a judgement that an occurrence has this or that moral feature. In Audi’s case, 
the V-J Day Photo represents sexual assault and its wrongness during E-1 but not E-2 
 
98 Fricker (2007), p. 83. “Just as the experiences pertinent to the training of ethical virtues are internalized in the sensibility of the 
virtuous person, so is the body of collective and individual testimonial experience internalized by the virtuous hearer, rendering it 
immanent in her testimonial sensibility. It is through the broadly inductive influence of this body of experience that we may learn, 
reliably enough, to assume trust when and only when it is in order. Thus our perception of speakers and their assertions comes to be 
informed by a wealth of individual and collective experience relating to different sorts of speakers' trustworthiness regarding different 
sorts of subject matter in different sorts of context. As hearers, our perceptions of our interlocutors are judgements conditioned by a 
vast wealth of diverse testimony‐related experiences, individual and collective.”  
99 Fricker (2007) p. 36 “I have already suggested that the hearer in everyday testimonial exchange (p.36) will often make use of 
stereotypes as heuristics to facilitate his judgement of a speaker's credibility. Hearer and speaker are engaged in a form of social 
interaction, and they inevitably trade in social perceptions of each other. Anticipating the argument for a perceptual model of 
credibility judgement that I shall give in the next chapter, let us provisionally countenance the idea that in those everyday testimonial 
exchanges in which the hearer does not deliberate about how far to trust the speaker, the hearer perceives the speaker as trustworthy to 
this or that degree in what he is telling her. She perceives him in the light of a set of background assumptions about how far people 
like him are trustworthy about things like this in relation to people like her, and I have suggested that reliable stereotypes have an 
essential role to play here. This model of the interaction between speaker and hearer helps us to see the mechanism whereby identity 
prejudice can distort a hearer's credibility judgement: it distorts the hearer's perception of the speaker.” 
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because the subject judges the fitness of the deed, unwanted kissing, with the perceived 
context by means of a “felt sense of connection”, or intuition. This suggests that the 
phenomenology of our moral experiences of the photo attaches to the cognitive 
phenomenology of the intuition. The difference between E-1 and E-2, for Audi, is 
accounted for by the presence of an intuition’s phenomenology in E-2 that was not present 
in E-1 because the background knowledge about the V-J Photo case was inadequate to 
draw out that cognitive association in E-1. For Fricker, the difference is accounted for by 
the presence of a perceptual judgment in E-2 that was not present in E-1 because there was 
insufficient background knowledge about the case to inform S’s heuristic capacities or 
cognitive habits. In both views, the presence of an invoked affective state during the 
experience occurs as a response to one’s judgment of the occurrent situation and, as a result, 
it is the cognitive phenomenology that is seemingly doing the moral perceptual work, or 
making the discernment, and not an affective process even though the affect ‘piggybacks’ 
on the experience.  
In contrast, Affective MPJ (AMPJ) takes invoked affective states to be a key 
player in facilitating immediate, non-inferential, judgments about representational contents 
during moral perception. These judgments can be facilitated by virtuous affects (Little 1995 
& 1997), the what it is like to experience virtue’s phenomenal character (Goldie 2007), or 
an attunement to a situation’s affect-cloud (Willett 1995 & 2014). In general, an invoked 
affective state triggered by some morally pertinent configuration of non-moral perceptual 
contents, as collected during the acquisition step, facilitates an immediate attribution of 
some moral feature(s) to an experience during the recognition step by connecting 
configurations of non-moral perceptual contents with moral properties. Affects, broadly 
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construed, include embodied and psychological feelings associated with emotions or 
general expressions of felt bodily states. Affects, as used here, amount to an immediate 
form of embodied prelinguistic judgments.100 These views account for scenarios like the 
V-J Photo case by suggesting that S will come to have a different affective response to E-
1 than E-2. Moreover, these affects facilitate a non-inferential, immediate, judgment about 
the situation’s moral features for S and possess the phenomenal character of an invoked 
affective state. In AMPJ, the phenomenology of moral experience attaches to the affective 
phenomenology because the justification for discerning that some moral feature is present 
in occurrent experience is built into the affective phenomenology. 
Little (1995 & 1997) and Willett (1995 & 2014) give separate versions of this kind 
of view. Granted, like Fricker (2007), Little and Willett do not take on moral perception as 
a theoretical project. Yet, Little (1995 & 1997) explores affect’s relation to perceiving the 
moral landscape and Willett (1995 & 2014) develops a view which relies on the notion of 
affective attunement to make one sensitive enough to read the moral environment. Each 
seems to suggest that the affective character of our experiences facilitates the formation of 
a non-inferential, immediate, moral judgment during occurrent experience. Given that they 
do not suggest that there is a modification of an experience’s perceptual content but hold 
that one can be directed to such content given an experiences affective phenomenology, 
both views seem rightly classified as versions of AMPJ.   
For Little (1997), affects are the collection of one’s various emotions, desires, or 
dispositions which shape the affective phenomenal character of an experience.101 She 
 
100 This claim operates under the view that affects, like emotions, are judgments rather that perceptions. Moreover, the decision to take 
affects to be a kind of prelinguistic judgment follows the Phenomenological Division of Feminist Affect theory, specifically those 
views indebted to Tomkins, but also stands against the idea that affects are forms of perception.  
101 Little (1995) p. 118 
50 
argues that the possession “of certain desires and emotions turns out to be a necessary 
condition of discerning moral properties, and hence must form part of even the ideal 
observer’s epistemic repertoire.”102 In this way, her view describes invoked affective 
responses as the discernment mechanism for picking out the moral features of an occurrent 
experience because virtuous affects carry virtuous phenomenal experiences which aid the 
subject in understanding an experience’s moral features. She suggests that the virtuous 
person approaches morality itself “as part of a parcel of broad, uncodifiable, practical 
conception of how to live, while the non-virtuous person holds it without subsuming it.”103 
That is, the virtuous person ‘sees a situation more clearly’ than the non-virtuous person.   
Where “seeing more clearly is often a matter of discerning a different gestalt of the 
individual elements one already apprehends”, she argues that the ability to recognize the 
moral significance of the configuration of these individual elements during moral 
perceptions must be facilitated by more than non-moral knowledge, as suggested by the 
contrast of S during E-1 and E-2.104 That is, the phenomenological differences between 
AltE-1 and AltE-2 illustrate, in Little’s words, that to make certain moral discernments S 
must “have certain desires and emotions. Caring, being outraged, being moved to act - all 
these are part of discerning moral features clearly.”105  
The difference is that S during AltE-1 has a different conception of how to live than 
S at AltE-2 and, as a result, they lack the ability to discern that the photo represents a 
wrongness-property during AltE-1. Without a properly attuned moral conception of how 
to live informing or regulating one’s affective response, which is motivational to some 
 
102 Little (1995) p. 125 
103 Little 1997, p. 263 
104 Little (1995), p. 127 
105 Little (1995), p. 127 
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degree, during a moral experience, one might understand that something is a case of 
unwanted kissing, as in AltE-1, but fail to apprehend its moral significance, as S does in 
AltE-2. All of which is, for Little, facilitated by an affective judgment, seemingly 
indicating that a moral experience’s phenomenology attaches to one’s affective 
phenomenology.106  
Willett (1995 & 2014), in a slightly different take on affects, suggests that one’s 
affective attunement to the world facilitates our apprehension of its moral features. Willett 
and Little would agree on much, I suspect, but we should keep in mind that the former uses 
the notion of affect in a way that is theoretically different from the latter. Looking at parent-
infant relationships, Willett writes, “Affect attunement articulates a preverbal social bond 
between infant and adult based on a predominantly nonconscious immersion in the rhythms 
and flows of ordinary life.”107 This approach to affects aims to provide a complex picture 
of the relation between affectively responsive bodies in an environment filled with 
affective triggers. One interpretation of this, in a moral perceptual framework, is that 
Willett believes affects can help us access a situation’s moral features because affects can 
facilitate morally salient beliefs about, for example, the moral status of others. Approached 
as a kind of communicative exchange, Willett (1995) argues that both parent and child 
participate in a prelinguistic form of discourse via affective states. 108 For example, she 
notes that a parent is affectively moved by the infant’s happiness and that the infant’s 
 
106 Little (1995) p.135 n5. “I have helped myself to the notion of "seeing" when I talk of apprehending moral truths. Lest that usage 
conjure worries stemming from its misuse by ethical intuitionists of previous centuries, let me say I am not positing any sui generis 
faculty of moral perception. We explain our ability to apprehend that something is cruel in the same way we explain our ability to 
apprehend that something is a table; not by appeal to any special sense organ, but by appeal to a much more familiar "faculty"-the 
capacity to apply concepts correctly. Put bluntly, we apprehend that something falls under the classification "cruel" by attending to the 
details at hand and making a judgment (which is not to say it is an easy skill to exercise).” 
107 Willett (2014) p. 82 
108 Willett (2014) p. 88 “During this early period, social interaction through crying, touching, rocking, and, after the first couple of 
months, cooing and eye-to-eye contact establishes a nuanced basis for the expression and communication of affects.”  
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happiness, expressed via giggles and smiles, is prompted by an affective response to the 
presence of the parent’s affection. Instead of an exchange of words, there is, seemingly, an 
exchange of affects.   
At the center of this view is the concept of embodied ‘affective attunements’. These 
are structured patterns of embodied dispositions that are sensitive to the affects of other 
individuals or groups which permeate our environment (i.e., affect clouds). Willett takes 
invoked affective responses to affect clouds as articulating a communicative capacity, an 
expressivity and receptivity, whereby “visual, aural, gestural, olfactory, phenomenal, and 
neurochemical transfers” intersect with social contexts to open up affective forms of 
discourse.109 As a result, Willett’s approach to affects encapsulates more than merely the 
kind of virtuous affective responses we might use to discern the moral significance of 
someone’s suffering in order to judge that it is a case of cruelty and respond according to 
our moral conception of how to live, as in Little’s view. Instead, invoked affects, regulated 
by our affective attunements, are ways for us to acquire information about an occurrent 
situation because an individual or group communicates certain affects into the environment 
for others to pick up on.  
For example, when a parent’s affective dispositions are saliently attuned to their 
child filled environment, they come to apprehend that the infant possesses a special moral 
status. Moreover, this status is an important moral feature of the parent’s occurrent 
experience of the child. In this way, Willett’s approach to affects seems akin to thinking of 
them as a prelinguistic form of testimony or dialogue without the kind of direct categorical 
 
109 Willett (2014) p. 80 “affect laden photoconversions weave substantial threads of a communicative ethics across regions of the 
biosphere.”  
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intentionality reserved for language.110 This attunement to the affective states of others in 
the environment and theirs to ours makes moral perceptions of others, human or non-
human in Willett’s eyes, seemingly possible prior to the introduction of language. 
However, this does not mean that she likens affects to perceptual content or that they 
themselves are representations of moral content.111  
To make sense of the epistemic structure of moral perception given Willett’s view 
on affects, it is important to point out that she follows the phenomenological division of 
feminist affect theory and some contemporary scholarship in that field which classifies 
affects as categorical (i.e., happiness, sadness, fear, anger, shame, and so on) and as 
invoking a sense of vitality (i.e., energizing or elevating one’s mood).112 As a result, a 
moral perceptual experience with an affective phenomenology would provoke an affective 
state with two parts in Willett’s scheme. First, one can affectively experience the intensity 
of the invoked affective response, its vitality. Second, one can have an affective experience 
that points to some moral category or property.113 While not representationally intentional 
in themselves, invoked affects during moral perceptions, for Willet, can be felt ways of 
linking an experience to moral content because of their expressive contour (i.e., an intense 
shame, an explosive benevolence, and other parings of visceral descriptor and categorical 
 
110 Willett (1995) p. 91-92 “Communicative responses between infant and parent may exhibit in some sense or another identical levels 
of vitality affect. Still the choice of an appropriate response required an element of imaginative interpretation. As Stern Himself points 
out, without an act of imagination, music remains a series of sounds that express nothing. … Attunements occur though cross-model 
correspondences that cannot be subsumed under a logic of identity, conceptual explanation, or [linguistic] intentionality.” 
111 Note, it would also be unfair to read Willett as rejecting Little’s use of affect or vice versa. Rather, Willett’s notion of affect 
attunement describes a preverbal sensitivity to waves of affect triggering spaces or things, what she calls “affect clouds”, in the 
environment. Little seems concerned with our internal affective calibration which regulates some range of our affective response to 
those stimuli. I take Willett’s overall claim to be that one’s affect attunements (i.e., a sensitivity to an environment's affect-cloud) are 
the means by which one comes to have an affective experience of the world. Its just that the affective experiences we have in the 
world are also a part of a larger affective discourse occurring in our everyday environments in a kind of prelinguistic form of call and 
response. Both are relatively silent about the other’s work due to their differences in their philosophical traditions.  
112 Willett (2014) p. 90, “Through proto-conversations, creatures with adult human logos communicate a significant range of affects. 
Influenced by the work of Silvan S. Tomkins, Stern distinguishes affects into two types: (1) categorical affects … ; (2) vitality affects 
and contours…”; Willett references both Stern’s The Interpersonal World of the Infant and The Forms of Vitality.  
113 Willett (2014) p. 90 – “Vitality is felt profoundly, for example, when one is energized and elevated in mood. Categorical affects, on 
the other hand, introduce the ethical qualities of good and bad to experience.”  
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affect). Categorical affects include, it seems, a swath of what are commonly described as 
the moral emotions which point to evaluative content.  
When confronted with cases like the V-J Day Photo case, one’s affective response 
to the photo is a complicated formation. It is sensitive to the affective responses of others 
around us as they view the photo, the affective expectations of our social world to things 
like unwanted kissing which have habituated (or tried to habituate) our affective 
attunements, but also, like Little’s concern regarding virtuous character, an individual’s 
affective attunement to the demands of morality which is more or less resilient to influences 
by the occurrent affective discourse.114 Maybe S’s response at E-1 is not merely due to a 
lack of knowledge, but also due to their life in a world where the common response to 
sexual assault has been dominated by patriarchal forces which silence any felt sense of 
outrage.115 Maybe, in E-2, S displays a particular resilience to the patriarchal affective 
discourse which once ensnared them in E-1, now allowing them to experience a kind of 
firm outrage to the photo.  
Regardless, the phenomenological difference between E-1 and E-2 would be 
accounted for by Willett as a difference in S’s affective phenomenology. Moreover, Willett 
explicitly holds that affective responses do not carry the same representational content, or 
intentionality, as language but still retain the ability to signal to the subject, in an immediate 
non-inferential way, that something  possesses an evaluative moral property like right, 
wrongness, or moral considerability.116 As a result, one charitable interpretation of her 
 
114 The last item in this list references those occasions where individuals get “swept up” in a kind of group affect.  
115 A motivational internalist, who adopts Willett’s view, could read the difference between AltE-1 and AltE-2 in this way.  
116 Willett (1995) p. 91-92 “Attunements occur though cross-model correspondences that cannot be subsumed under a logic of 
identity, conceptual explanation, or [linguistic] intentionality.” &  “Categorical affects, on the other hand, introduce the ethical 
qualities of good and bad to experience.” 
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view is that a moral experience’s affective phenomenology facilitates non-inferential and 
immediate transitions in thought. It does this by functioning as an affective bridge (i.e., a 
judgement formation mechanism) between an experience’s perceptual content and a 
situation’s moral features. These judgments are immediate non-inferential ways of making 
moral discernments because affects are prelinguistic, embodied, responses to our 
environment which is permitted by an affective discourse. As a result, Willett adopts an 
AMPJ approach to moral perception because affects operate in a judgmentalist fashion by 
means of our affective attunement. As a result, the phenomenological difference between 
cases like E-1 and E-2 attaches to the affective phenomenology of an affective facilitated 
judgment formation. One acquires non-moral perceptual content (i.e., facial expressions, 
yelps of pain, and so on) and then recognize said collections as morally salient in virtue of 
the affective messaging communicated by to us by those situations and our affective 
response to those messages.  
1.7 The Attachment Problem of Moral Phenomenology 
 This paper began with the development of an acquisition-recognition framework 
to pierce the metaphorical-literal ambiguity surrounding moral perceptional language. 
After considering some details of moral perceptual events under this framework, it became 
clear that the deeper issue facing moral perceptual theories is the need to address the 
judgment-perception question. That is, are moral discernments during occurrent 
perceptual experience merely the result of a judgment formation about non-moral contents 
(i.e., MPJ: recognition occurs after acquisition) or, rather, is there a literal perceptual 
component during these experiences wherein a situation’s moral features are perceived as 
contents of perceptual experience (i.e., MPE: recognition occurs during acquisition)? 
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Moreover, phenomenal contrast methodology and the taxonomy of views above illustrate 
that an adequate classification of moral perception as either a judgment or a perception 
depends on how we account for the phenomenology of a moral experience.  If the 
phenomenology of moral experience is adequately explained by a subject’s cognitive or 
affective phenomenology, then MPJ seems preferable.  
If, however, there is more to the picture and there is a reasonable account of that 
picture in terms of perceptual content then MPE seems preferable, especially if it appears 
that perceptual forms of knowledge are at play in these experiences. I will refer to this issue 
as the attachment problem of moral phenomenology which, put succinctly, points out 
that accounting for the phenomenology of moral perceptions is both difficult and a matter 
of determining whether that phenomenology attaches to (i.e., is explained by) a subject’s 
cognitive, affective, or perceptual mental states. This section seeks to address this problem.  
 Assuming that judgments via cognitive associations possess a phenomenal 
character, it is reasonable to expect that one usually has moral perceptions accompanied by 
some cognitive phenomenology because we often form immediate, often non-inferential, 
perceptual judgments during moral perceptual experiences. Alternatively, if judgments via 
cognitive association do not possess a phenomenal character, it would still be equally 
indefensible to suggest that one never forms judgments during moral perceptual 
experiences for the same reason. Additionally, subjects often have moral perceptions 
accompanied by some affective phenomenology. Given this, it is important to keep in mind 
that a reasonable version of MPE cannot claim that subjects do not make cognitive 
associations or experience invoked affective states during moral perceptual experiences. 
Forming immediate perceptual judgments about a perceptual event, reacting with some 
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invoked affective response to that event, and experiencing whatever phenomenology 
accompanies that event is, seemingly, a feature of our moral lives. This observation 
illustrates the reason why ‘the attachment problem of moral phenomenology’ is rightly 
classified as a problem. It is a challenge to determine what the moral phenomenal character 
of an occurrent experience attaches to because our moral perceptual experiences are, for 
lack of a better term, messy by their nature.  
When looking at the V-J Day Photo (or even the swimming pool example) with the 
relevant background beliefs or affective dispositions, S will inevitably be prompted by the 
occurrent experience to form immediate cognitive associations and undergo some invoked 
affective states. In fact, it seems that both processes aid S during their moral deliberation 
about how to respond to their occurrent experience. This observation is not in dispute and 
is a key motivator for adopting MPJ because these processes carry a lot of explanatory 
power as it relates to moral action and epistemology. A sound argumentative landscape for 
a supporter of MPE, therefore, must admit that judgments (via cognitive associations and 
invoked affective responses) are present during moral perceptions and that they have their 
role to play in moral agency. As a result, a supporter of MPE must acknowledge the value 
and existence of judgments during moral perception but successfully argue that MPJ (and 
its articulation of HA) presents an incomplete picture of moral perception rather than a fully 
incorrect one to the extent that there is some perceptual phenomenology unaccounted for 
by our judgment formations. To do this, I wish to return to the case of K kicking I as 
presented during the introduction.  
 Recall that S encounters situation α, K kicking infant I, and comes to discern that 
K’s actions are wrong. I will refer to this as moment-1 (M-1). Under MPJ, the phenomenal 
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character of S’s encounter with this situation would be linked to S’s invoked affective 
response to witnessing α or because of a cognitive association between observing α and its 
classification as morally wrong. MPJ holds that S judges that K’s actions are representative 
of something that is morally wrong. As Väyrynen (2018) might put it, the 
phenomenological character of S’s encounter with α is tracked by S’s affective responses 
or a felt sense of “figuring things out” via cognitive associations [The Tracking Claim], 
it’s intensity is “psychologically immediate” and integrated with an experience’s non-
evaluative inputs [The Immediacy Claim], and is a simple account with enough 
explanatory power to account for the experience’s phenomenology [The Simplicity 
Claim]. 
 Yet, consider what happens if S comes to learn that K is kicking a hyper-realistic 
facsimile of an infant and that there is no living, actual, infant present in situation α because 
K is practicing for their part in the production of some big-budget horror film (i.e., moment 
2 or M-2). It is expected, given this new information, that S will come to form a different 
judgment via their cognitive association about the “wrongness” of K’s action, that it is not 
representative of the wrongness of kicking babies because the thing kicked is not a real 
baby. Moreover, it is true that S could still take K’s action to be representative of something 
morally wrong, not as a function of their cognitive associations, but in virtue of some 
invoked affective state, perhaps outrage, triggered by seeing the form of an infant 
brutalized by K. So conceived, the moral phenomenology of S’s experience could not be 
accounted for by the presence of a judgment via a cognitive association because S’s 
cognitive judgment (and any accompanying cognitive phenomenology) diverges from the 
moral perception that the experience represents something morally wrong. But, the 
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affective judgment still persists and, as a result, MPJ’s candidacy as the preferred 
explanation of this situation, for many, is preserved.  
 Now, perhaps S joins the horror movie’s cast and their invoked affective response 
to seeing K kick the infant-facsimile changes over time. In fact, it changes so much that S 
no longer experiences outrage when seeing K kick the form of an infant (moment 3, M-3). 
The vital question, then, is this: could S reasonably be said to immediately and non-
inferentially take K kicking the infant facsimile as representative of something morally 
wrong in the absence of (1) an invoked affective state to intuit a “morally wrong” judgment 
while also (2) undergoing a cognitive association which facilitates a judgment that it does 
not represent something wrong because the infant is not real? I would like to suggest that 
not only is the answer to this question “yes”, but also that these kind of moments are far 
more common than their quirkiness first suggests, especially given that playacting and film 
scenarios are pervasive in our visual culture. 
 Consider that the case above aims to support the existence of moral perceptual 
content by isolating an experience, holding fixed S’s perceptual experience, and 
introducing controlled alternative epistemic states for S in order to conceptually test 
whether judgment formations completely account for S’s moral perception of the situation. 
Schematically, the argument above operates in the following way:  
  P1) S’s immediate and non-inferential moral belief (b) that situation α represents 
the moral property “wrongness” is discerned either by means of a cognitive 
association, an invoked affective state, or b is a form of perceptual knowledge 
derived from perceptual contents. 
  P2) S during M-1 is taken to have all the background beliefs or affective 
dispositions needed to acquire b in an immediate and non-inferential manner.  
  P3) S during M-2 is taken to gather additional background beliefs with which to 
perform an immediate and non-inferential judgment via cognitive association that 
60 
b is not the case but also seems to maintain some affective dispositions intuiting 
that b is the case. [b is not acquired by cognitive associations]. 
  P4) S during M-3 is taken to have altered, over time, their affective dispositions 
such that they no longer intuit that b is the case while also performing a cognitive 
association that b is not the case, but S is still understood as possessing the belief 
that situation α represents the moral property “wrongness”. [b is not acquired by 
invoked affective states or cognitive associations]. 
  C) S’s immediate and non-inferential moral belief b is a form of perceptual 
knowledge about moral perceptual contents of “wrongness” in S.  [Disjunctive 
syllogism from P1 & P4] 
The thing that allows this argument to succeed is that the introduction of a new epistemic 
state for S during M-3, which includes content from M-2, ought to return their perceptual 
experience of K kicking an infant facsimile, one indistinguishable from a real infant, to a 
state of moral mundaneness but it does not. 
If, at a previous moment M-0, S lacked all background beliefs and affective 
dispositions regarding the dignity of children or the harm K could inflict on infants, then S 
would not discern the immediate and non-inferential belief b when seeing K kick the infant 
during M-1. Once S acquires these background cognitive associations and affective 
dispositions, S is apt to acquire belief b in an immediate, non-inferential, way. However, if 
the phenomenal character of these cognitive or affective judgments are overridden by 
countervailing judgments or by the absence of an invoked affective response and an 
occurrent experience’s representational character persists, such as in M-3, the cognitive 
and affective phenomenologies associated with these judgments no longer account for the 
moral experience’s phenomenological character which represents something morally 
wrong. As a result, we have reason to believe, and acknowledge, that the presence of 
background cognitive associations and affective dispositions have a part to play in moral 
perception, but not that they provide a complete picture of moral perceptual events.  
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That is, they can facilitate the use of general moral principles or beliefs in our efforts 
to discern the contents of particular moral situations through the process of mediation 
which represents an encounter as containing moral content. However, that judgments made 
by these processes can be overridden by countervailing judgments and S can still be said 
to acquire a non-inferential and immediate belief b about the moral wrongness of viewing, 
even in a simulated manner, K kicking an infant, indicates that b is a good candidate for 
being considered a form of perceptual knowledge influenced by S’s background moral 
beliefs and affective sensibilities via some kind of perception influencing mechanism. As 
a result, moral perceptions appear to possess an experiential component and are not merely 
forms of judgment. Thus, MPE more adequately accounts for moral perceptions than MPJ; 
experientialism is preferable to judgmentalism.  
1.8 Conclusion  
In summary, I have argued that moral perceptions have a perceptual component. In 
addition to forming moral judgments during occurrent experience, moral representations 
seemingly appear during our experiences due to the presence of moral perceptual contents 
which shape, at least in part, the phenomenal character of our morally pertinent occurrent 
experiences. One might be concerned that this view undermines our ability to make reliable 
moral verdicts about particular moral situations given our tendency to see the world 
according to our current moral sensibilities, as articulated by our background epistemic 
content. I call this the circularity problem. One might also argue that MPE has the 
consequence of classifying all moral perceptions as illusory or hallucinatory. I refer to this 
as the veridicality problem. I will close by briefly discussing these issues as areas for 
future research.  
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The Circularity Problem. Briefly put, if correct, MPE suggests that it would be 
prima facie difficult to justify any moral experience because moral perceptions would 
always be influenced by one’s beliefs or affects thereby lacking a sense of perceptual 
objectivity. This objection, I believe, means that our background epistemic content stands 
the risk of undermining the reliability of our moral judgments and moral perceptions. 
However, I take this kind of objection to be sensitive to only half of MPE’s epistemic 
consequences. It could also be the case that one’s background epistemic state can be 
epistemically beneficial in cases where expertise helps us see the world more clearly. That 
is, a construction safety expert is more aptly orientated to assess safety obligations towards 
workers during an inspection than, say, a philosopher. She perceives the world differently 
in regard to its moral features (via different perceptual contents) and this enhances rather 
than undermines her access to a situation’s moral features. Given this, I take the circularity 
problem to be short sighted. Rather, it is motivated by a concern that people will make 
reliably inaccurate/accurate moral discernments based on moral perceptions in proportion 
with their familiarity and expertise about the encountered situation or their moral character. 
The objection highlights that moral deliberations based on perceptual contents requires us 
to invest ourselves in the development of a sound moral epistemic foundation. 
Consequently, it becomes the task of one’s moral life to cultivate a collection of 
background epistemic states which allows us to reliably access, to perceive, the moral 
landscape, whatever that might look like. This does not mean that we need to be an ideal 
moral person. Rather, a consequence of MPE is that it defines an epistemically relevant 
moral obligation to moral living: the need to cultivate beliefs, affective sensitivities, and 
ways of thinking that allow one to perceive the moral world according to some wider 
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conception of morality. Thus, the issue presented by this problem is not that MPE is 
untenable, but rather that we need to do work to define proper parameters from which to 
discern reliable from unreliable moral perceptions. What is more, this calls for an 
investigation of the forces which cultivate our background epistemic resources because 
these mediate our moral perceptions.  
The Veridicality Problem.  It might also be suggested that experientialism 
commits us to the idea that our perceptual experiences of a situation’s moral features are a 
kind of illusion or hallucination, that experientialism results in a view which holds that our 
moral perceptions are examples of hijacked perceptual experience. Admittedly, the 
veridicality problem is a deeper issue than can be explored here but I am not inclined to 
think that moral perceptual veridicality in experience is indefensible as a concept. Rather, 
if being veridical is about an existing correspondence between one’s perceptions and an 
actual feature of the world, then perhaps the veridicality problem is more about a concern 
between our moral perceptions and the moral realities we face in the world. Under this 
interpretation, the important issue here is whether our moral perceptions align with the 
dictates of a defensible moral theory as it describes the conditions of the occurrent 
experience. The judgment that one’s moral perceptions are veridical relies on a larger 
normative ethical project. Thus, the issue presented by this problem is, again, not that MPE 
is untenable but rather that being able to refer to moral perceptions as veridical requires us 
to index that judgment with a justifiable normative moral theory in conjunction with some 
form of correspondence view for moral perceptual veridicality.  
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Taken together, neither problem seems to undermine MPE. Rather, each opens the 
dialogue to deeper discussions about the robust avenue moral perceptual research can 
take when we take experientialism seriously.   
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CHAPTER 2. MORAL PERCEPTUAL ORIENTATION 
“What's interesting is what you write about [your rescuers] and you say that it made you 
realize, in all of these stories, it's not just the person that is doing the bad thing and the 
person that the bad thing is being done to, but there are those who see it and identify it as 
wrong and they do something about it.” 
The Daily Show’s Trevor Noah to Know My Name author Chanel Miller  
as she discusses her memoir recounting her sexual assault and  
subsequent experiences with the U.S. Justice System.  
2.1 Introduction 
Whether granting insight into another’s moral status or the moral qualities of some 
action, moral perceptions regularly inform ethical decision making. Moral perceptions 
occur when a subject comes to form an immediate discernment about the moral features of 
an occurrent experience. We should, I believe, be broadly concerned about the 
epistemological nature of these events for many of the reasons gestured at during Miller’s 
Daily Show interview. As we walk through life, there are innumerable moments where our 
immediate experiences are accompanied by immediate discernments about their content. 
Whether we encounter overt instances of racism or subtle moments of sexism, moral 
perceptions curate our appreciation of an occurrent situation’s moral features, accurately 
or otherwise, and guide ethical decision making.  
The field of ethics is often concerned with a person’s moral status and an action’s 
moral value. In a complimentary fashion, theories of moral perception aim to describe the 
process by which we, as epistemic subjects, encounter morally pertinent situations and 
come to recognize, or fail to recognize, the salient moral features of those moments. As 
illustrated by Miller’s interview, this is incredibly important because seeing that a situation 
or subject possesses some moral property (i.e., individuating some set of moral features 
and recognizing them as morally substantive) is a prerequisite for responding in the way 
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that morality demands, whatever those demands turn out to be. Theories of moral 
perception articulate a least two things: (1) whether moral perceptions include perceptual 
content (i.e., where we literally see a situation’s moral features during occurrent 
experience) or, instead, are merely forms of judgment on the part of the subject, and (2) 
give a framework for making sense of the epistemic mechanisms at work during moral 
perceptual events.   
Given these tasks, I believe that views regarding moral perception (a.k.a., ethical 
perception) can be sorted into one of two categories: moral perceptual judgementalism or 
moral perceptual experientialism117. The former holds that instances of moral perception 
are best explained by the subject’s propensity to form judgments about a situation’s moral 
features, hence the ‘judgementalism’ label. Under this view, a subject is said to have a 
moral perception of situation α because they form an immediate moral judgment about 
acquired perceptual content by means of a cognitive (i.e., heuristics, inferences, cognitive 
associations, …) or affective (i.e., moral emotional intuitions, a felt sense of connection, 
affective responses, …) judgment formation mechanism. That is, a subject utilizes 
immediate, often non-inferential, judgment formations to draw out connections between 
perceptual content and some moral property or set of moral properties. In contrast, 
experientialism holds that we have literal perceptual experiences of moral properties 
during moral perceptual events. In addition to our propensity to form immediate moral 
judgments, this view holds that a situation’s moral features are recognized as such because 
moral properties are infused into perceptual experience by means of a perception 
influencing mechanism. That is, the experientialist holds that “human agents can have 
 
117 Robert Cowan refers to experientialism as perceptualism. 
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perceptual experiences as of the instantiation of ethical properties, at least some of which 
are veridical.”118  
In what follows, I argue for a version of experientialism which I call Moral 
Perceptual Orientation (MPO). MPO asserts, among other things, that moral properties 
are a part of the perceptual contents of occurrent experience and whether those features are 
perceived is contingent on one’s background beliefs, ways of thinking, and affective 
sensitivities (i.e., background epistemic content). MPO aims to give an account of how it 
is that one encounters moral properties in perceptual experience and relies on the notion 
that moral experiences are cognitively penetrable. Under this view, one’s background 
epistemic content provides the orientation by which one curates their experience of the 
world’s moral features. Consequently, MPO emphasizes that perceptual experience is an 
important variable in understanding how we conduct our moral lives from moment to 
moment because it points out that perceptual experience is not morally neutral. 
I begin by introducing experientialism by drawing on moral perception’s analogous 
relationship to David Chalmers’s (2017) views on cognitive orientation in cases of mirror-
usage. Informed by this analogy, I define the experientialism-judgmentalism debate in 
terms of perceptual processing-stages and follow, in section two, with a pair of arguments 
in favor of experientialism. The first makes a non-modularity argument about the mind 
using Tim Bayne’s (2010) unity thesis as it pertains to the relationship between human 
non-perceptual and perceptual processing systems. The second looks to studies on the 
moral pop-out effect to make an evidence-based argument that moral properties are 
 
118 Cowan, R. (2015) p. 666 
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seemingly infused into occurrent experience. Taken together, I argue that we have good 
reason to adopt the experientialist position. In section three, I outline the cognitive 
penetration approach as described by MPO and defend it as a viable alternative to an 
approach proposed by Jennifer Church (2013). I argue that MPO is preferable because it 
maintains a more apt distinction between the perception and imagination. I then conclude 
by addressing an objection to Moral Perceptual Experientialism raised by Väyrynen 
(2018).  
2.2 The Mirror Analogy and the Judgmentalism-Experientialism Distinction 
In “The Virtual and the Real”, Chalmers (2017) describes cognitive orientation as 
that phenomenon whereby “background knowledge helps orient one to the perceived 
world, giving a global interpretation of what is perceived” where ‘global interpretation’ is 
used to express that one takes the whole phenomenal character of the experience as 
immediate.119 To illustrate, he asks us to consider mirror-usage and suggests that it is a 
prototypical case of cognitively oriented experience, as a variety of cognitive 
penetrability. That is, one’s knowledge of the mirror’s presence,  familiarity with mirror 
usage, expectations about mirror usage, and the experience-like  naturalness with which 
one uses a mirror seemingly define mirror-experiences.120 In practice, one looks into the 
rear-view mirror before shifting lanes and has a certain kind of experience of its mirror-
objects. Chalmers observes that one’s knowledge, familiarity, expectations, and sense of 
naturalness engender different kinds of perceptual experiences for experienced mirror-
users than for novice mirror-users. He writes,  
 
119 Chalmers (2017) p. 16 
120 Chalmers (2017) p. 15 
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“Consider a car’s rear-view mirror, as used by an experienced driver. When the driver looks 
in the mirror and sees cars that are actually behind her, do the cars look to be in front of 
the driver, pointing toward her? Or do they appear to be behind the driver, following behind 
her vehicle? My own intuition, and those of most people I have asked about this case, is 
clear. When I look in my rear-view mirror, the cars I see look to be behind me.”121 
In contrast, a novice mirror-user, perhaps a first-time user, would seemingly take the rear-
view mirror to be a kind of window into a world of oncoming traffic.122 He continues,  
“Now, someone who thinks that rear-view mirrors are illusory will say that we judge that 
the cars are behind us, while nevertheless the cars look to be in front of us. Or perhaps they 
might allow that cars look to be behind us, but only in a sense where “look” is tied to 
judgment and other aspects of cognition—while at the level of visual perception, visual 
experience represents the cars as being in front of us. Once again, however, I think this gets 
the phenomenology of visual experience wrong.”123 
Chalmers’s observation here is that each user would, prima facie, have a 
fundamentally different kind of experience of the cars in the mirror and, thereby, we get 
the phenomenology wrong when we classify these differences as merely ‘differences in 
judgment’. He argues that classifying these kind of contrast cases as representing merely a 
difference in judgment wrongly equates the perceptual phenomenal character of what it is 
like to unknowingly look into a rear-view mirror, see a car in motion, and take it to be 
careening towards you with knowingly looking into a rear-view mirror and seeing the same 
car. As a result, the mirror case draws our attention to experiences where our awareness, 
familiarity, expectations, and an experience’s felt sense of naturalness coalesce into a 
global interpretation, an experience with a unified perceptual phenomenal sense. It 
highlights what one means when one claims that our background epistemic resources 
influence the contents of perceptual experience. Contrast cases, like Chalmers’s mirror-
 
121 Chalmers (2017) p. 17-18 
122 It is worth noting that Chalmers’s (2017) goes on to argue that virtual reality objects are analogous to mirror-objects in these kinds 
of cases. He argues that “virtual reality need not be a second-class reality. It may be a second-level reality, in that it is contained 
within physical reality and realized by processes in the physical world, but this need not make it less real or less valuable.”  (Chalmers, 
p. 35) 
123 Chalmers (2017) p. 17 
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case or Susanna Siegel’s (2011) pine tree case, open the field for a variety of discussions 
regarding the contents of perceptual experience.  
As a morally pertinent example, consider the following testimony from Sara 
Ahmed’s (2017) Living a Feminist Life: 
“I was out jogging, just near my home. A man whirled passed on a bike and put his hand 
up the back of my shorts. He did not stop; he just carried on cycling as if nothing happened, 
as if he had not done anything. I stopped, shaking. …  I kept on going. I began jogging 
again, but it was different: I was different. I was much more nervous. Every time someone 
came up behind me, I was ready, tense, waiting. I felt differently in my body, which was a 
different way of encountering the world. Experiences like this: they seem to accumulate 
over time, gathering like things in a bag, but the bag is your body, so that you feel like you 
are carrying more and more weight.”124 
It is worth noting that Ahmed’s observations in this passage aim to motivate the idea that 
‘how we encounter the world’ is as much a practice of our affective processes as mental 
processes. For Ahmed, an instance of sexual assault was enough to radically change her 
expectations about jogging resulting in the alteration of her immediate discernments of her 
occurrent experience via her affective response to the world. A change in her background 
epistemic resources seemingly results in a different global interpretation of her occurrent 
experience in an analogous way to the mirror-novice v. mirror-expert case. As she self-
reports, she experiences the world differently than she used to.  
In parallel, what can we say about bystanders to Ahmed’s situation? In this case, 
there was indeed a person doing the bad thing and a person the bad thing had been done to, 
but what of those that observed this situation? How are we to make sense of their moral 
perceptions? It seems to me that the mirror-case is analogous to moral perceptual events 
because the relevant features driving Chalmers’s observations are seemingly relevant 
 
124 Ahmed (2017), p. 23, emphasis added. 
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during perceptions of morally pertinent events like Ahmed’s assault. In Chalmers’s 
scenario, relevant considerations included: 
1) whether the observer knows there is a mirror in front of them, 
2) the observer’s familiarity with mirrors,  
3) the observer’s expectations regarding the situation, and  
4) the observer’s felt sense of experience-like naturalness during mirror usage.  
Taken together, Chalmers argues for two things: that these features define one’s cognitive 
orientation and that this orientation curates the phenomenal character of one’s mirror-
experience. That is, (1) - (4) curates one’s global interpretation of what is observed. 
Analogously, the following questions are epistemologically relevant to outside observers 
of Ahmed’s situation: 
1') Does the observer know they are confronted with a case of sexual assault?  
2') Does the observer have a sense of familiarity with cases of sexual assault? What is 
the character of that familiarity? 
3') What are the observer’s expectations, morally or otherwise, regarding social 
interactions and sexual assault? 
4') Does the experience contain a felt sense of experience-like naturalness for the 
observer? 
Without the relevant background epistemic resources, like prudent responses to 
(1’)-(4’), the observer would seemingly fail to have a global interpretation of the perceptual 
event (i.e., Ahmed’s sexual assault) as an event representative of something deeply 
reprehensible and immoral. In other words, the moral features of the occurrent experience 
go undiscerned when one occupies an epistemically inadequate position as it pertains to 
sexual assault events inasmuch as one’s background epistemic resources amount to the 
set of beliefs, affective sensitivities, and ways of thinking. Given this, I take moral 
perceptions to be stellar candidates for being understood as cognitively orientated 
perceptual events. The phenomenal character of the experience, or global interpretation, 
of the experience one has while observing morally pertinent situations like sexual assault, 
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bullying, slavery, exploitation, brutalization, dehumanization, and so on are seemingly 
different for those with differing background epistemic resources that are more or less 
capable of orienting one to the immorality of these kinds of events. 
Yet, the analogous relationship between mirror-experiences and moral perceptual 
experiences is not a ‘knock-down argument’ for moral perceptual experientialism in the 
form of cognitive orientation as a variety of cognitive penetration, as a form of 
experientialism.125 Instead, the mirror-analogy is rhetorically useful for opening us up to 
the possibility that we literally experience moral properties in the same way that we 
experience properties like ‘oncoming traffic’. There is still much work to be done to 
directly support the claim that one’s background epistemic resources influence perceptual 
experience during perceptual processing in morally pertinent situations.  However, I would 
like to suggest that the value of the mirror-case analogy is that it sharpens our 
understanding of the central question at hand: (The Moral Perceptual Question) Are 
moral perceptions occasions where our background epistemic resources influence 
perceptual processes (experientialism) or, rather, are they merely guiding one’s belief 
response to the contents of perceptual experience (judgmentalism)? That said, a 
framework for distinguishing between ‘influences on perceptual processing’ and 
‘influences on one’s response to perceptual experience’ is required to provide much needed 
details to the experientialism-judgmentalism distinction and debate. Jenkins and Siegel 
(2015) provide just this kind of framework by offering a way to “distinguish between stages 
 
125 Chalmers (2017) makes similar observations in his own attempts to use the mirror-case to argue for the non-illusory status of 
virtual reality objects. 
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at which perceptional experience or judgment can be influenced” by one’s background 
epistemic resources.126  
As summarized in Table 2.1, views defined under moral perceptual 
experientialism (MPE) hold that perceptual experience can be influenced by background 
epistemic resources during perceptual processing during early vision or during the process 
of rendering the contents of perceptual experience. In contrast, views defined under moral 
perceptual judgmentalism (MPJ) hold that background epistemic resources influence 
“what you introspectively judge the contents of your perceptual experience to be” or the 
“non-introspective conclusions you draw from perceptual experience”.127 In other words, 
views categorized as moral perceptual experientialism hold that non-perceptual cognitive 
states have top-down effects on perceptual states and therefore influence perceptual 
experience.128 Alternatively, MPJ views reject the presence of top-down influences or 
overlook them by virtue of their silence on the subject.129  
It is clear that one’s background epistemic resources play an important role in moral 
perception and the mirror-case’s analogous relationship to moral perceptual events 
demonstrates the need to clarify the nature of that role. As a result of the details provided 
by Table 2.1, two important questions can be used as substitutes for the moral perceptual 
question and are to be addressed moving forward: (The Modularity Question) Can our 
non-perceptual cognitive systems interact with our perceptual cognitive systems in an 
 
126 Jenkins & Siegel (2015), p. 534 
127 Jenkins & Siegel (2015) p. 534 
128 Top-down influences impact cases where “information that is plausibly external to your perceptual system is relied upon in order to 
generate a perceptual experience with a content that is different from what it would have been, absent that influence.” (Jenkins & 
Siegel, p.534) 
129 Rejecting top-down influence means that one believes “influence occurs exclusively in the response to the experience, rather than 
in the production of the experience.” (Jenkins & Siegel, p.535) 
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experience influencing way? And, (The Process Question) if influence is possible, at what 
perceptual processing stage does one’s background epistemic resources seemingly 
influence perceptual experience in morally pertinent cases? I address these in the next 
section.  
Table 2.1 Framework for distinguishing between potential stages of influence 
on our discernments during moral perception. 130 
Processing 
Stage 
Aspect 
Influenced 
Non-Moral 
Examples 
Moral Examples View 
Perceptual 
Stage 
MPE 
(1) Early
Vision
shape, location, 
motion, color, 
intensity of 
feature-based 
attention 
Perceiving a 
grey-banana 
image as 
yellow-
tinted.131 
Intensified feature-based 
attention of printed moral 
terms like courage in 
contrast to non-moral terms 
like run.132 
(2) 
Unconscious 
or pre-
conscious 
perceptual 
states 
Non-transparent 
perceptual 
contents 
Unconsciously 
perceiving a 
rope as a snake 
due to fear of 
snakes, causing 
you to flinch 
but not know 
why.133 
Unconsciously perceiving 
an act of sexual harassment 
towards a jogger as 
immoral & feeling outrage 
but not knowing why.134 
(3) The
contents of
perceptual
experience
Transparent 
contents of 
perceptual 
experience 
Consciously 
perceiving a 
rope as a snake 
due to a fear of 
snakes, causing 
you to flinch. 
You also know 
you fear snakes 
and that this is 
making the 
rope look like a 
snake.135 
Consciously perceiving an 
act of sexual harassment 
toward a jogger as 
immoral, feeling outraged, 
& knowing that you are 
responding this way 
because you believe sexual 
harassment is immoral.   
130 This table is based on the layout provided by Jenkins & Siegel (2015). 
131 Witzel et al., 2011 
132 Gantman & Van Bavel, 2014 
133 Jenkin & Siegel 2015 
134 Gantman & Van Bavel (2015a) introduce the ‘detection’ language which informs this interpretation of this example. “Detection” 
will be discussed in more detail later in this paper.  
135Jenkin & Siegel 2015 
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Table 2.1 (Continued)
Processing Stage Aspect 
Influenced 
Non-Moral 
Examples 
Moral Examples View 
Responses to 
Perceptual 
Experience 
MPJ 
(4) Introspective
Judgments about
the presences of
perceptual
contents
Perceptual 
Beliefs 
Veridically 
perceiving some 
blue berries as 
green and tiny, 
and, when 
reflecting on the 
experience later, 
you judge them 
to be unripe.136 
Veridically perceiving 
someone kicking a new-
born child and, when 
reflecting on the 
experience later, you 
judge the act to be 
immoral. 
(5) Non-
introspective
conclusions
drawn from
perceptual
experience
Immediate 
Perceptual 
Judgments 
Veridically 
perceiving some 
blue berries as 
blue and big and 
immediately 
judging them to 
be ready to 
pick.137 
Veridically perceiving 
someone kicking a new-
born child and 
immediately judging the 
act to be immoral.138 
2.3 Responding to the Modularity Question & the Process Question 
If it is the case that one’s perceptual systems operate distinctly from non-perceptual 
systems, then the moral perceptual experientialist position fails from the start. That is, 
should we have reason to believe that the cognitive architecture of the mind is such that 
there is never an occasion for non-perceptual background epistemic resources to interact 
with or influence perceptual states, then we would need to accept that we are just not wired 
in ways that facilitate influences posited at stages (1) – (3) in Table 1 during moral 
perceptual events, influences which are the foundation of moral perceptual 
136 Jenkin & Siegel 2015 
137 Jenkin & Siegel 2015 
138 It is worth noting that these examples focus on cases where the moral value of some action is the central topic of concern. I see no 
reason, however, see this as a limitation. Moral perceptual events seemingly extend to discernments regarding the moral value of 
people, objects, social structures, and relations.   
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experientialism.  Modularity Arguments defend some version of this perspective, 
referring to our information processing systems as mental ‘modules’. Among other things, 
they argue that many of the mind’s cognitive mechanisms function on restricted flows of 
‘information’ into those systems for processing, that they are encapsulated.139 If perceptual 
systems receive basic inputs from perceptual organs and cannot access information from 
non-perceptual systems then the system in considered encapsulated. Encapsulation is the 
litmus test for modularity and is, as a result, indicative of the impenetrability of perceptual 
systems by non-perceptual states such as our background epistemic resources in cases of 
moral perception.140   
Granted, there are some persuasive reasons to believe that our perceptual systems 
are encapsulated. One case supporting the encapsulation of our visual systems from our 
background epistemic resources includes examples like Müller-Lyer lines.141 Our 
perceptions of these lines represent them as of different length regardless of what we 
believe, reason, or feel about this image, even if we know they are the same length. The 
Müller-Lyer lines, the impossible trident, and so on give clear cases where early vision and 
the contents of perception seem guided by perceptual processing mechanisms beyond any 
influence by top-down cognitive influences from our background epistemic resources. 
Uses of angular lines and a consistent horizon point in art regularly give the perceiver the 
impression that an image, like the one below142, has depth and does this on the basis of the 
 
139 Robbins (2017), based on Fodor (1983)’s Modularity of Mind, succinctly outlines a ‘modules’ under the following categories: other 
qualities include inaccessible to introspection, mandatoriness, speed, superficiality, dissociability, localizability, domain specificity, 
and innateness. Should the encapsulation-test fail, these other aspects are more or less moot to the issue of top-down effects on 
perception. 
140 Robbins (2017). “Cognitive impenetrability is a matter of encapsulation relative to information stored in central memory, 
paradigmatically in the form of beliefs and utilities.” 
141 Image from Donaldson, D. and Macpherson F. (July 2017) "Müller-Lyer Illusion" The Illusions Index. Retrieved from 
https://www.illusionsindex.org/ir/mueller-lyer.  
142 Image from Jaurigue, L. (2019). Depth Cues. Asu.Edu. images produced for The Chalkboard at Arizona State University. 
https://www.asu.edu/cfa/wwwcourses/art/SOACore/depthmain.htm  
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ways that our visual perceptual system processes features such as shape, environment,  and 
motion within the perceptual field. We often ‘play’ with this phenomenon in visual media. 
Among other things, this kind of phenomenon makes three-dimensional representation on 
a two-dimensional plane possible during animation. However, there are also a variety of 
reasons to think that our perceptual processing systems are not encapsulated or 
impenetrable even though the processes governing these kinds of spatial and depth cue 
examples are compulsory and, in some sense, strict.  
Macpherson (2015), while arguing for a version of cognitive penetration, points out 
that dreams and hallucination have a symmetrical relationship with perceptions. Occasions 
of loud noises while dreaming can change the content of a dream and partial hallucinations 
seem to change the content of perceptual experience. Whether it's a thunderclap leading to 
dreams of explosions or Lilliputian hallucinations leading to an experience of tiny people 
in your salad, some experiences strongly suggest that dreaming and hallucination are 
intertwined with perceptual processes in important ways.143 In cases of dream-experiences, 
the subject’s dream-perceptions are made possible seemingly because the perceptual 
processing system gets much of its information from non-perceptual states, such as 
background epistemic resources. In this way, Macpherson (2015) points out that human 
 
143 Macpherson (2015) p. 348 
Figure 2.1 Horizon Lines and Depth 
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participation in dream-experiences gives us reason to think that perceptual-systems are not 
encapsulated from non-perceptual systems. Similarly, hallucinatory experience, she 
suggests, gives us reason to think that this happens outside of dreaming. Lilliputian 
hallucinations are, prima facie, only possible if background epistemic resources, like our 
memory of people, can influence perceptual processing in such a way to render tiny people 
in one’s perceptual field.   
Moreover, rather than thinking that these occasions of non-encapsulation are 
motivated by some special set of conditions present during dreaming-experience or 
hallucinatory-experience, I believe there are viable reasons to think that the synthesis of 
non-perceptual and perceptual systems is a common feature of perceptual experience in 
general. At its foundation, I believe the modularity question asks us to consider the nature 
of our capacity to have experiences in the first place, to demystify the process by which 
each of us construct a perceptual field with phenomenal content for ourselves as 
consciousnesses. Do our mental processes facilitate the construction of an experience for 
consciousness into a single unified perceptual field with phenomenal content as the result 
of perceptual and non-perceptual processes interacting and synthesizing to form 
representational content? Or, rather, do these processes operate in a more fractured sort of 
way, wherein non-perceptual processes like judgment formation operate independently of 
and respond to perceptual experience? The modularity question is, therefore, asking us 
to consider whether perceptual experience is a unified whole or pluralistic composition. 
Given this, Tim Bayne’s (2010) argument for the Unity Thesis can be read, I believe, as an 
argument for the non-modularity of perceptual and non-perceptual systems and states. 
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Bayne’s position is that any subject of an experience enjoys that event as an 
experience because conscious states occur as a single total phenomenal state, a phenomenal 
field.144 On the Unity View, an experience is a whole over which the contents of experience 
assume the status of subsumed parts. In this whole-part relation, conscious experience takes 
on the phenomenal character that it does for an observing subject insofar as it is the 
resulting unified synthesis of these parts rendered by perceptual and non-perceptual mental 
processes. Bayne argues,  
“The plausibility of the unity thesis derives largely from introspection. Consider the 
structure of your overall conscious state. I suspect that you will be included to the view 
that all your current experiences are phenomenally unified with each other- that they occur 
as the components of a single phenomenal field: to put the same point in different 
terminology, that you enjoy a single phenomenal state that subsumes them all. Call this 
claim the unity judgement. … the unity of consciousness that is revealed to introspection 
[and thus creates the unity judgement] is not a feature that consciousness possesses only 
when one attends to its structure but is a feature that it enjoys all the time -- even when one 
doesn’t (and perhaps cannot) introspect.”145  
In contrast, Bennett and Hill (2014) propose an alternative view, Unity Pluralism. 
It holds that there is not one unity-making relation that provides a total or universal 
phenomenal field. Instead, they suggest that “unity-making relations join fairly wide 
swaths of the experiences of a subject at a time… experiences joined by one or more of our 
unity-making relations do not thereby bear a part-whole relation to some larger experiential 
whole, though some experience may still, by some measures(s), bear part-whole relations 
to each other.”146 That is, while watching a film results in an experience, the fact that the 
phenomenal sense of sitting in a chair is distinguishable from the sense of distance between 
you and the screen, they argue, is evidence for the separation, the distinctness, of these 
phenomena during experience. As a result, they claim that we should understand that the 
 
144 Bayne, T. (2010).  
145 Bayne (2010), p. 75 
146 Bennett & Hill (2014)  
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unity of experience is actually achieved by a kind of unity pluralism rather than a single 
unedifying phenomenal field.147 In short, the response to Bayne (2010) being offered is 
that there is no such ostensibly identified aspect of experience (i.e., no unifying 
phenomenal field) revealed through introspection and that what is found are relations 
between parts of experience with no unifying whole and, thereby, distinct modes of 
perception articulate themselves independently of non-perceptual states, among other 
things. They write, 
“Indeed, as we’ve noted, for the unity pluralist, no significant unity-making relation by 
itself unites all of the experiences of a subject at a time. Of course, various experiences of 
a subject at a time will typically be linked by one or more unity-pluralist unity-making 
relations - thickly, tightly, not much as all, and what have you. That is all there is to the 
unity of experience, or so we suggest.”148 
Both the Unity and Unity Pluralism views seek to detail the structures of experience 
in terms of cognitive relations. On this issue, I believe we should endorse Bayne’s 
argument in favor of Bennett and Hill for two reasons. First, while Bennett and Hill endorse 
the possible existence of unity-pluralist principles which serve the psychological 
functioning of the subject, they problematically reject the existence of an overarching 
singular experience. In their view, when I am in a theatre, the relation between me and my 
chair is separate from my relation to the film screen and, as such, they would claim that my 
experience is fractured in some way. Yet, this is not how we experience film watching. It 
is not experienced as a sitting in a chair conjoined with sitting in front of a film screen, 
rather my experience is a singular case of watching a film sitting down. There is a kind of 
phenomenal smoothness to the experience, a unified phenomenological sense. My first 
 
147 Bennett & Hill (2014), p. 237-239 
148 Bennett & Hill (2014), p. 240 
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objection then is that the unity-pluralist approach gets the phenomenology of experience 
wrong and, as a result, overlooks the singular phenomenal unity of a perceptual experience. 
Second, and more importantly, the very claim that there is a subject making sense 
of the parts of an experience presupposes a single perspective by which those events can 
be ‘made sense of together’ (i.e., synthesized) in the first place. Bayne, rather than Bennett 
and Hill, seems receptive to this kind of observation perhaps because the former is sensitive 
to an important distinction that the latter authors are not. As Susan Hurley (1994) describes 
it: 
“We can distinguish three kinds of unity. The first, unity of type or conceptual unity, is the 
kind of unity involved when various objects all share some one attribute. … The second 
kind of unity, unity of objects, is the kind of unity involved when various attributes all 
attach to the same object. The third kind of unity, the unity of consciousness at a time, is 
the kind of unity involved when various contents of consciousness at a time, including both 
experiential events and propositional attitudes, are all associated with one center of 
consciousness…”149 
With this distinction in mind, Bennett and Hill seem intent on claiming that type and object 
unity (and perhaps others) exist as a relation between parts of experience. But, as Gullick 
(2014) observes, “a conscious mental state [or experience] can exist if and only if it is 
contained within a set of representations whose contents are integrated or unified in a way 
that implies the existence of a single self or subject.”150  Put otherwise, “consciousness pers 
se requires at least some significant measure of representational unity or integration.”151 
Gullick (2014) and Bayne (2010) rightfully point out that consciousness integrates the parts 
of an experience, perceptual and non-perceptual, into an occurrent experience for the 
subject in the first place. Consciousness’s observation of perceptual experience reveals a 
 
149 Hurley (1994), p. 55 
150 Van Gullick (2014), p. 391 
151 Van Gullick (2014), p. 391 
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phenomenal field (akin to Chalmers’s global interpretation) rendered through the influence 
of non-perceptual processes on perceptual states.   What these observations amount to is 
the idea that knowledge and expectations can influence perceptual experience and its 
contents in important ways.  
That said, we should not expect moral encounters to escape the unifying or 
integrating impact of consciousness on perceptual experience. Where we take one’s 
background epistemic resources to collect one’s moral beliefs, ways of thinking,  and 
affective sensibilities (including any senses of familiarity or moral expectations), the 
unified nature of experience will seemingly synthesize the non-perceptual and perceptual 
states during one’s coming to have an experience. Echoing Chalmers’s observations about 
global interpretations, we should seemingly expect that our background epistemic content 
will shape moral perceptual experiences by virtue of our cognitive capacity to synthesize 
perceptual states and non-perceptual states into a phenomenal field of occurrent experience 
for the subject. Through the influence of non-perceptual on perceptual systems, non-
modularity is supported by the notion that our systems are more integrated that we 
commonly appreciate.   
Moreover, there is growing evidence that there are top-down influences on 
perceptual experience. As Christopher Berger (2018) observes, “The sensory information 
we imagine is often treated by the brain in the same way as information streaming into us 
from the outside world … Our [research] shows that what we imagine in our ‘mind’s eye’ 
can lead to changes in perception across our sensory systems, changing how we perceive 
real information from the world around us in the future.”152 Additionally, in non-moral 
 
152 Berger (2018)  
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considerations, Macpherson (2012 & 2015) cites the Perky effect to argue for the 
possibility of cognitive penetration during perceptual experience. Describing a Perky effect 
study, she writes: 
“Subjects are placed facing a white wall and asked to visually imagine a certain object; 
unbeknown to them, an image that is above conscious visible thresholds for normal 
subjects is shown onto the wall. In these conditions, subjects subsequently report that they 
had visual imagery but they deny that they saw anything. However, what they report 
imagining is influenced by the image that is shone onto the wall… While the image 
projected on the screen affected what was reported, indicating that perceptual processing 
must have played a part in generating the experience, what was imagined affected what 
was reported too. Subjects often reported elements to their experience in addition to those 
present in the image that was projected onto the screen.”153 
For example, some participants in the study reported that they experienced a book with 
writing when only an outline of a book was subtly projected onto the wall and others 
reported that they saw a leaf with veins running through it when only a leaf outline was 
projected. On other occasions where subjects were asked to imagine a city skyline and a 
tomato was projected on the wall, people reported having imagined the skyline at sunset. 
154 I propose that moral experiences are included in this category of cognitively penetrable 
experiences. 
 Like the Perky effect, the prevalence of the moral pop-out effect (M-POP) 
demonstrates that experiences of moral content are likely constructed by means of non-
perceptual influences on perceptual processes. M-POP is the tendency for subjects to have 
an enhanced perceptual experience of certain features in the perceptual environment.155 
Studies show that pop-out enhancements consistently correspond to the perceiver's moral 
beliefs or dispositions and seemingly manifest both as a matter of awareness shifting and 
 
153 Macpherson (2015) p. 348 
154 Macpherson (2015) p. 348 
155 Gantman & Van Bavel (2014), p. 132  
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as an emphasizing of something’s phenomenal impression. Gantman’s and Van Bavel’s 
(2014) study into the relationship between perceptual faculties and morally relevant stimuli 
concluded that “moral concerns shape our basic awareness of perceptually ambiguous 
stimuli.”156 Where “perceptually ambiguous stimuli” includes a description of the 
phenomenal character of perceptual experience, M-POP events shape experience 
suggesting that perceptions mirror pre-existing moral beliefs as a consequence. Gantman 
and Van Bavel (2015) go on to describe occasions of increased intensity and detection of 
moral content in situations where subjects were asked to identify moral terms. In their 
words, “the visual system is preferentially sensitive to moral content. Specifically, people 
correctly detect moral words (e.g., kill, moral, should) with greater frequency than 
nonmoral words (e.g., die, useful, could) – a phenomenon termed the ‘moral pop-out 
effect’.157 
Granted, Gantman and Van Bavel seem more interested in the awareness directing 
nature of moral cognition on perceptual experience than on the cognitive penetrability of 
moral experiences. However, their work is persuasive evidence for adopting the 
experimentalist position. Their research suggests that the non-perceptual contents of one’s 
background epistemic resources influence perceptual contents during occurrent experience 
in two ways, (i) by facilitating the detection of moral-features and (ii) by regulating the 
intensity of a moral-feature-based attribution during occurrent experience. As it 
pertains to (i), when researching our perceptual experience of moral language, they observe 
that “... moral words more readily reached perceptual awareness compared with non-moral 
words” and that priming observers to think that justice had been satisfied lowered the 
 
156 Gantman & Van Bavel (2014), p. 29 
157 Gantman & Van Bavel (2015a), p. 631-633 
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perceptual detection threshold for injustice seemingly because they believed no injustice 
was present thereby negating one’s detection of morally relevant content during occurrent 
experience. 158 They write,  
“When justice motives are activated (but not satiated), moral pop-out occurs on the very 
first trial. Taken together, we suggest that moral content affects word detection in a way 
that is sensitive to moral motives only when stimuli are perceptually ambiguous.” 159 
What this passage suggests is that the ability to detect moral features in occurrent 
experience and to recognize them as containing moral significance tracks the observer’s 
non-perceptual cognitive states. Again, the manifestation (i.e., coming to detect) of a 
feature in one’s experience, in this case a feature with moral content, corresponds to the 
subject’s background epistemic resources (i.e., non-perceptual states). In this way, M-POP 
is a special case of the larger Pop-out Effect phenomenon (POP). During POP events, when 
imbedded within some set of homogeneous objects, one object’s difference causes it to 
‘stand out’, as if to elevate its presence.160 For example, consider the Figure 2.2 which 
contains a green dot placed in a field of red dots. Notably, this phenomenon is used by 
advertisers to communicate with consumers. Gantman and Van Bavel’s work provides 
evidence to think of morally substantive features in occurrent experience as analogous to 
sensory experiences of colour, orientation, size, motion, and stereoscopic depth.  
 
158 Gantman & Van Bavel (2015b), 76-77.   
159 Gantman & Van Bavel (2016), p. 1728-1739. 
160 For more on POP, see Treisman, AM. (1985). “Preattentive processing in vision.” Comput Vis Graph Image Proc. 1985;31:156–
177.; Wolfe, JM. (1994). “Guided Search 2.0 A revised model of visual search.” Psychon Bull Rev 1(2):202-38.; &  Hsieh, P. J., 
Colas, J. T., & Kanwisher, N. (2011). “Pop-out without awareness: unseen feature singletons capture attention only when top-down 
attention is available.” Psychological science, 22(9), 1220–1226. 
Figure 2.2 Color Pop-out Effect 
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 As it pertains to (ii), M-POP events in perceptual experience seemingly create a 
‘‘vicious cycle’’ between beliefs and perceptions because the intensity of a moral feature 
in one’s perceptual experience is often used to motivate or justify some moral judgment. 
Gantman and Van Bavel (2014) write, “the enhanced perceptual awareness of moral stimuli 
may help shed some light on sightings of religious and moral iconography in everyday 
objects ...”.161 Their study predicts that the character of morally pertinent experience 
provides the intensification of a moral-feature’s attribution as if the feature gains a sense 
of enhanced prominence in the perceptual experience and, thereby, acquires some kind of 
forceful presence (i.e., like the green circle in a field of red circles). Given that these 
features and their intensity in the phenomenal field correlate with an observer’s background 
beliefs and affective sensitivities, one will predictably take the world to possess the moral 
features that one expects it too. These experiences carry epistemic justification on the basis 
of the prominence of the moral features in that occurrent moment for the subject, features 
which ‘pop’ as if they possessed a kind of prominence in the perceptual field through the 
intensity of a moral-feature-based attribution.  
Views pertaining to socially informed modes of perception seemingly reinforce 
evidence for the existence of the moral pop-out effect.162 For example, Charles W. Mills’s 
work on white ignorance. Mill’s argues that forces of white ignorance manifest a lived 
social reality which shapes the way we encounter value in the world, specifically how these 
realities come to hide a significant portion of that world from our observations. He argues 
 
161 Gatman & Van Bavel (2014), p. 29 
162 Adams and Kveraga (2015) report that socially relevant information pertaining to race and gender seemingly influence the 
detection of things like expressed emotions and fear responses in those people we observe during occurrent experience. Specifically, 
they suggest that top-down influences on shared social associations and identity categories influences our perceptions of others in 
social relevant situations. It is worth noting that Jenkin and Siegel also observe that Francesco Marchi  reject’s Adams & Kveraga’s 
(2015) study as conclusive and turns to studies by Carroll and Russell (1996) and Levin and Banaji (2006) pertaining to race and 
emotional expressions to support Adams and Kveraga (2015) proposed top-down model of social perception. 
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that white ignorance is an epistemic process which systematically distorts an agent's 
experiences. It does so to the extent that white ignorance articulates “... a particular pattern 
of localized and global cognitive dysfunctions producing the ironic outcome that whites 
will in general be unable to understand the world they themselves have made.”163 
Moreover, he argues that those infected by white ignorance164 come to live in a “racial 
fantasyland” wherein ignorance is the “cognitive and moral economy psychically required 
for conquest, colonization, and enslavement.”165 These agents, thereby, come to believe 
that meritocracy is  the prevailing law of the land even though there exists overwhelming 
evidence to suggest that certain classes of the population are systematically oppressed on 
the basis of race because their experiences reinforce that judgement.166  
As Mills observes, these beliefs and attitudes warp perceptions of oppression or 
exploitation in ways that make such events seem ‘just’ by blinding the subject from, as 
Gantman and Van Bavel might put it, detecting or perceiving belief-countervailing 
contents within the experience.167 The observer’s invested perceptual interest shapes their 
encounter with the world. The very preservation of this worldview is seemingly predicated 
on the idea that one’s beliefs and affective attitudes about the world impact one’s 
experience of the world. Mills points to numerous cases where white privilege overrides 
the needs of the marginalized as evidence of this phenomenon. In my estimation, these are 
cases where two subjects can have the same perceptual contents but take the situation to 
have different moral features in virtue of it having a different global interpretation for each 
 
163 Mills (1997), p. 18 
164 Mills himself claims that this infection isn’t limited to the white population and I expect that he would say the same about forms of 
Male Ignorance and Heteronormative Ignorance.  
165 Mills (1997), p. 18-19 
166 This is seemingly also the case where class, gender, and sexuality in cases of where capitalistic economic elitism or 
heteronormativity are the prevailing ideologies.  
167 Alcoff (2007), p. 48 
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observer  given that such social perceptions track moral categories like ‘just’, ‘unjust’, 
‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘fair’, ‘unfair, and ‘morally considerable’ or ‘morally non-considerable’.  
Given these observations, I believe we are justified in adopting moral perceptual 
experientialism for two reasons. First, in response to the modularity question, our 
cognitive architecture is seemingly more integrated than encapsulated thereby providing 
pathways through which top-down non-perceptual states (i.e., our background epistemic 
resources) can influence our perceptual experiences during perceptual processing in salient 
ways during stages (1)-(3) as described in Table 1. Second, in response to the modularity 
question and the process question, the moral pop-out effect demonstrates that these 
influences seemingly manifest through the detection of a morally substantive feature 
during the occurrent experience as an instance of an influence on stages (2) & (3) thereby 
shaping perceptual contents and through the intensity of a moral-feature-based attribute 
such that the detected feature pops-out during one’s global interpretation of their perceptual 
experience, as an influence on stage (1) of perceptual processing. Put informally, I believe 
we should move forward by adopting the understanding that our ability to encounter moral 
features during occurrent experience and to have them impress themselves upon us with 
some intensity is not merely a process governed by our judgments about perceptual 
experience. Rather, moral perceptions are an integral part of the process by which we have 
perceptual experiences in the first place because we seem to have literal perceptual 
experiences of moral properties during occurrent experience due to the unifying nature of 
conscious experience and as evidenced by phenomena like M-POP. This is what it means 
to adopt moral perceptual experientialism (MPE).     
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2.4 Moral Perceptual Orientation: A framework for MPE  
As a form of MPE, Moral Perceptual Orientation (MPO) purports that one 
possesses a collection of background epistemic resources of morally relevant beliefs, ways 
of thinking, and affective dispositions which can influence immediate perceptual 
experience. MPO is informed by two ideas: that perception is cognitively penetrable, as 
suggested by M-POP, and that experiences are constructed by a unifying perception-
cognition mechanism, as suggested by the given interpretation of Bayne’s Unity Thesis as 
a kind of non-modularity argument.  
In terms of the former idea, cognitive penetrability holds that cognitive states can 
have top-down effects on perceptual content acquired during perceptual experience.168 To 
paraphrase Sillins’s (2016) articulation of its main thesis:  
Cognitive Penetrability Thesis (CPT): if two agents share the same occurrent experience, 
differ in regard to their perceptual content, and differ in regard to their background 
epistemic resources, then the best explanation is that perceptual experience is cognitively 
penetrable.169 
That is, perception is cognitively penetrable in terms of its perceptual content just in case 
two people are the same with respect to their sensory inputs and the orientation of their 
perceptual gaze but differ with respect to their perceptual experience. Given this, the 
following moral corollary of CPT can be formulated: 
Moral Cognitive Penetrability Thesis (MCPT): if two agents share the same occurrent 
experience, take the situation to have different moral features, and differ in regard to their 
background epistemic resources, then the best explanation is that moral perceptual 
experience is cognitively penetrable. 
That is, if two agents share an occurrent experience (i.e., share the same immediate moral 
encounter), differ in regard to their observation of its moral features, and differ in regards 
 
168 Silins (2016) provides one of the clearest account of the cognitive penetration position and its epistemic consequences.  
169 Sillins (2016), p. 27 
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to their epistemic toolkits, then the suggestion is that moral perceptual experience is best 
explained by the cognitive penetrability of perception, by MPE.  Put this way, the previous 
two sections can be read as clarifying the details and arguing in support of MCPT and 
concluding that, as a thesis, it is sound given phenomena like M-POP. In this way, to adopt 
MPE is to affirm MCPT and, therefore, MPO affirms MCPT.   
 As it pertains to the latter idea, MPO’s approach to cognitive penetration is modeled 
on Macpherson’s (2012) two-step mechanism170 as a framework for understanding the 
cognitive penetrability phenomenon.171 The first step in this mechanism “involves our 
cognitive states causing some non-perceptual state with phenomenal character to come into 
existence or to alter the phenomenal character of some existing non-perceptual state that 
has phenomenal character.”172 The second “involves the phenomenal character of these 
non-perceptual states interacting with and affecting the phenomenal character and content 
of perceptual experiences.”173 As discussed earlier, she argues that this two-step 
mechanism is observable in very common instances of imagining, hallucinations and 
daydreaming suggesting that cognitive penetrability is a consequence of the integrated 
nature of our cognitive faculties.174 She writes,  
 
 
 
170 In modeling MPO on this two-step mechanism, I am endorsing what Macpherson (2015) calls Cognitive Penetration Lite in 
addition to the presumption that moral properties are importantly different than non-moral perceptual contents; moral features are not 
perceivable in the same way as non-moral features. As a result, MPO follows Macpherson’s arguments for Cognitive Penetration Lite, 
but commits to the idea that the perception of moral content q will not occur without a corresponding moral belief or affective 
sensitivity. Additionally, it is not unlikely to expect that moral content q can be multiply realized by a swath of varying epistemic 
toolkits. Moral content in perceptual experience is multiply realizable.  
171 Macpherson (2015), p. 331-358 
172 Macpherson (2012), p. 50-51 
173 Macpherson (2012), p. 50-51 
174 Macpherson (2012), p. 50. Macpherson also stated as much during a guest lecture at the University of Kentucky on September 28, 
2017. As evidence, she points to the incorporation of perceptual elements into dreaming, and intertwined status of perceptual and 
hallucinatory or illusory events.  
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“... the processes that typically do create perceptual imagery, dreams, or hallucinations 
interact with the perceptual processes to yield one state with phenomenal character. The 
phenomenal character of the state is determined by the contribution of both processes: 
imagery, dreaming or hallucination, on the one hand, and perception of the other.”175  
In this way, Macpherson observes that the integrated nature of our cognitive faculties plays 
a formative role in our experiences. As such, MCPT gains initial support as a species of 
CPT under Macpherson’s argument for the integrated nature of our cognitive faculties in a 
way similarly argued for by Bayne’s unity thesis.  
 Using the ‘two-step mechanism’ as a guide, MPO is constructed around the idea 
that experiences are rendered by a unifying perception-cognition mechanism which 
serves as a perception influencing mechanism.176 Put formally, MPO can be stated as 
follows: 
Moral Perceptual Orientation (MPO)177: X has a moral perception of situation y when 
I. One acquires non-moral perceptual content as of y during a morally pertinent 
occurrent experience; 
II. One possesses background epistemic resources relevant to the content as of y;  
III. One comes to possess a morally pertinent non-perceptual cognitive state (i.e., a 
belief or an affect) or comes to alter the moral character of some existing non-
perceptual state given I and II;  
IV. The non-perceptual state from III interacts with and influences the phenomenal 
character and content of our perceptual experiences by means of consciousness’s 
perception-cognition interface which unifies and constructs an experience with 
moral contents for the observer (i.e., a perception influencing mechanism which 
creates a unified experience178). This influence takes one of two forms: (i) the 
detection of a moral attribute in the contents of occurrent experience or (ii) the 
increased intensity of that moral-feature-based attribute.  
 
175 Macpherson (2015) p. 348 
176 It is worth noting that this idea is neither novel nor without precedent. Kant’s manifold of apperception and the intelligibility of 
experience under the intuitions (i.e., space and time) in combination with the categories of the understanding assents to the idea that 
consciousness could fit such a unifying role. I do not wish to defend or endorse Kant’s views on human cognition. However, the 
wherewithal to acknowledge that an experience is constructed by means of an unifying mechanism is an invaluable insight into how 
we come to have experiences in the first place. 
177 In modeling MPO on this two-step mechanism, I am endorsing what Macpherson (2015) calls Cognitive Penetration Lite which 
holds that content q can be multiply realized in perceptual experience.  
178 In Kantian terms, the best conceptual cousin to the unified experience is the manifold of apperception which represents a synthetic 
unity of the manifold by means of our intuitions (i.e., time and space) and the categories. The genealogical difference here, however, 
is that a unified experience need not be beholden to the Kant’s categories of the understanding so described in the Prolegomena or the 
Critique of Pure Reason.  
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As its name suggests, MPO takes one’s background epistemic resources to provide the 
orientation by which one comes to experience a global interpretation of the world, an 
interpretation with moral content. 
It is worth noting that an alternative approach to moral perceptual experientialism 
has been offered by Jennifer Church’s (2013) The Possibilities of Perception.179 Church’s 
brand of moral experientialism is a product of her Extended Perception Thesis. Put 
succinctly, it states that the imagination plays an essential role in our ability to have 
perceptual experiences inasmuch as it serves as both content producer and experience 
synthesizer. As Church understands the perceptual process, the imagination plays an 
essential part of how we come to have experiences in the first place. She argues that, “… 
we actively imagine alternative perspectives whenever we experience something as an 
objective state of affairs” and, thereby, occurrent experiences are rendered as perceptional 
experience in tandem with our imagined experience of alternatives to our immediate 
perceptual experience.180  Additionally, Church holds that it “is our ability to use our 
imaginations to synthesize a multiplicity of different perspectives and possibilities (past 
and future, actual and merely possible) that enables us to perceive an object or a sequence 
of events as objectively valid.”181 To illustrate, consider the following examples offered by 
Church:  
“we perceive an object such as a tree insofar as we simultaneously imagine how it would 
appear from other points of view. For it is the imagined convergence of different 
perspectives around a single state of affairs that gives us the experience of its spatiality and 
its objectivity... When it comes to perceiving someone as an agent—as the locus of multiply 
intertwined mental states, I want to make a similar suggestion: to perceive that someone is 
a person we must imagine that person in a variety of situations—some of which are actual 
 
179 Macpherson (2017) seems to flirt with a similar view regarding the role of imagination as Church.  
180 Church (2010), p. 649 
181 Church (2013) p. 222, emphasis added. 
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and many of which are merely possible, and we must discover what is invariant across 
those imagined actions.”182 
She goes on to similarly describe our imagining of moral objects or properties in the 
following way:  
“... [imagining] is also guided by [an agent’s] implicit knowledge of what should happen.... 
It is not enough to direct one’s imagining with a loving attitude or a desire to do right by 
others plus a good understanding of causal laws; one must also know a good deal about 
what doing right by others involves, and that is where moral laws enter… in the case of 
moral perception the relevant laws must include moral laws…”183 
This alternative and those like it, henceforth referred to in a general way as 
imaginative moral perceptual experientialism (IMPE), take the imagination to serve 
as a perception influencing mechanism. That is, the imagination serves as the 
synthesizer of perceptual and non-perceptual cognitive states thereby rendering a 
perceptual experience for the subject. In addition to its role as a contributor to our 
background epistemic resources, the imagination is rendering perceptual experience in a 
way that makes moral properties a feature of perceptual experience. Put formally, these 
views look something like the following:  
Imaginative Moral Perceptual Experientialism (IMPE): X has a moral perception of 
situation y when 
I. One acquires non-moral perceptual content as of y during a morally pertinent 
occurrent experience; 
II. One possesses background epistemic resources relevant to the content as of y;  
III. One comes to possess a morally pertinent non-perceptual cognitive state (i.e., a 
belief or an affect) or comes to alter the moral character of some existing non-
perceptual state given I and II through the use of one’s imaginative faculties;  
IV. The non-perceptual state from III interacts with and influences the phenomenal 
character and content of our perceptual experiences by means of imagination’s 
role as a perception influencing mechanism which creates a unified experience 
through an act of synthesis. 
 
182 Church (2013) p. 199-200 
183 Church (2013) p. 218-219 
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MPO does not rely on imagination to have the perception influencing role that 
IMPE seems to do. As a kind of view, IMPE’s reliance on the imagination as an experience 
generating faculty problematically blurs the distinction between perception and 
imagination. That is, the imagination, when understood as a creative faculty, is 
undoubtably a source of cognitive content.  Yet, IMPE is also suggesting that imaginings 
and perceptual experience share in an experience-like quality, a global interpretation a la 
Chalmers or a phenomenal unity a la Bayne, and from this suggesting that it is the 
imagination that is doing the work to construct an experience for the subject. Granted, 
daydreams and mental imaginings, perhaps even dreaming itself, do seem to possess 
something akin to perceptual experience, at least in the sense that we can be said to 
experience a dream, a daydream, and imaginative imagery.  However, rather than taking 
this to indicate that the imagination serves a synthesizing role in rendering experience, I 
think it should indicate to us that each of the aforementioned experience-like events is 
rendered by some other experience unifying mechanism. I propose the unifying function 
that consciousness serves fits this role better than the imagination.  
I take this to be the case for two reasons. First, thinking that the imagination serves 
a synthesizing role in our coming to have an experience given that imagining has an 
experience-like quality seems ill-reasoned. By way of analogy, it would be fallacious to 
conclude that the Earth is the orbit-defining determinant in a collection of planets because 
we observe that Earth, Mars, and Venus have predictable orbits. It would be strange to say 
that the Earth is the thing motivating clear orbital paths. Similarly, it would be fallacious 
to believe that patient A is the cause of the flu because we observe that patient A, B, and C 
display symptoms of the same affliction. At best, this reasoning seems like a kind of red 
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herring inasmuch as it draws our attention away from the relationship between planets and 
gravity or, as in the second case, people and viruses. With this in mind, it seems like a step 
in a wrong direction to observe that dreams, imaginings, and perceptual experiences share 
a similar experience-like quality and endorse the claim that the imagination is the 
experience-synthesizing mechanism fueling our capacity to undergo experience-like 
events. Instead, we are better off observing that dreams, imaginings, and perceptual 
experiences share something in common and start from there.  
Second, consciousness’s unifying role, as Bayne describes it, is seemingly well 
suited to account for the experience-like (i.e., ‘the phenomenal unity’ or “global 
interpretation”) nature of events like dreams, imaginings, and perceptual experience. As 
Bayne (2007) discusses related issues, the role of ‘consciousness’ during dreaming 
conceivably serves a different function for the subject than it does during waking forms of 
consciousness. That is, REM dreaming’s experience-like quality manifests cognitive states 
“in which the contents of consciousness derive from internal stimulation rather than 
environmental input, reasoning and decision‐making is impaired, and one enjoys unusual 
(at least, relative to normal waking consciousness) conscious states.”184 Defending this 
functional approach to understanding consciousness, Bayne (2007) writes, 
“The functional role of a particular conscious state is, at least in part, dependent on the 
background state of consciousness in which it occurs. In normal wakefulness the contents 
of consciousness are available to the mechanisms associated with rationality and memory‐
consolidation in a way in which they are not available in dreaming, inebriation, hypnosis 
or delirium.” 185 
The takeaway here is that the function of consciousness, given this approach, is to provide 
a unified phenomenal field upon which we, as subjects, are said to have experiences, in 
 
184 Bayne (2007) 
185 Bayne (2007) 
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waking moments or otherwise. This is precisely the role MPO takes consciousness to have 
during moral perceptions. As a result, when coupled with an appreciation of the role that 
our background epistemic resources have during cognitive penetration of our experience 
(at least in morally pertinent scenarios), I believe we have strong reasons to view MPO as 
preferable to IMPE.  
2.5 Conclusion 
 MPO, and experientialism in general, is not without its opponents. Most cutting 
among them, perhaps, is Pekka Väyrynen. Väyrynen (2018) raises several doubts regarding 
views like MPO. Generalized, his concerns center on the belief that inputs from perception, 
imagination, supposition, and belief are immediate and often bound up with certain 
emotional and affective dispositions; the result of a sense of inference which captures broad 
transitions in thought akin to intuitions, affective connections, heuristics, associations, and 
so on.186 Generally put, those in a similar camp as Väyrynen challenges experientialist 
models, like MPO, in two ways. 
First, they offer the reduction response which claims that moral perceptions 
during occurrent experience can easily be explained by judgementalist views rather than 
by experientialists views because the former posit that ‘transitions in thought’ more simply 
account for the recognition of moral features during occurrent experience. That is, a rule-
like cognitive relation between perceptual experience and moral judgments can 
automatically guide one to form moral discernments about occurrent experience. 
Väyrynen’s claim is, then, that judgmentalism avoids the need to posit a perception 
 
186 In many ways, the kind of view Väyrynen seems to lean towards views like those in Audi (2013). 
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influencing cognitive mechanism, a defining feature of experientialist views.  Ultimately, 
the reduction response takes moral perceptions to be reducible to moral judgements 
because working with transitions in thought is believed to be simpler and more likely than 
introducing a perception influencing mechanism.  
Second, they offer the empty promise response, which claims that experientialist 
views “add no explanatory power” above that of judgementalist views. We might observe 
that subjects engaged in moral encounters cannot help having the moral impression of them 
that they do. However, both automatic moral judgements (thought transitioning forms of 
judgmentalism) and moral perceptual experiences (experientialism) posit a lack of volition 
on the part of the epistemic agent regarding how one judges a situation or experiences it 
respectively. That is, if experientialism is correct, we cannot help having the moral 
perceptual experiences we do during immediate moral experience and, if judgementalism 
is correct, we cannot help making the moral judgements that we do during immediate moral 
experience. The empty promise response takes judgementalism to be as, if not more, 
helpful when understanding the epistemology of and our obligations during moral 
encounters than experientialism without the complications that come with utilizing a 
perception influencing cognitive mechanism.  
 I want to respond to these concerns by first acknowledging that some broader sense 
of inference does seem to be at play in our epistemic lives; cognitive associations are 
common. Transitions in thought by means of a rule-like relation or a felt sense of 
connection are indeed part of our everyday lives as epistemic agents. Miranda Fricker’s 
(2007) use of heuristics in Epistemic Injustice or Robert Audi’s (2013) use of an affective 
or emotional cognitive connection in Moral Perception rightly illustrate how a broader 
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sense of inference can be employed to describe judgment formations during moral 
encounters. Fricker uses heuristics to illustrate how automatic recognitions of moral 
content about the testimony of marginalized populations amounts to a non-inferential moral 
judgement formation about their credibility.187 Likewise, Audi uses a felt sense of 
connection, ‘intuitions’, between non-moral contents and moral properties to explain how 
we recognize a situation’s moral features.  
However, the real force of the reduction response is best illustrated if we turn to 
Väyrynen’s (2018) central counter-case, the possibility of cognitive penetrability during 
proton-identification.   
Proton-identification case: “When Marie, a trained physicist, sees a trail of vapor bubbles 
in the cloud chamber, she doesn’t need to figure anything out, she can just see that a proton 
is going by.”188 
Väyrynen argues that this proton-identification case gives strong reasons to believe the 
judgmentalist model, where one’s training and heuristic mechanisms facilitate judgment 
formations, is more appealing because it undermines the possibility of cognitive 
penetration in a more general sense.189  That is, what might we expect Marie to be actually 
experiencing when she sees the vapor bubbles? She may report that she is seeing a proton, 
but the idea that Marie comes to literally see the proton is problematic. Granted, Marie, by 
all accounts of perceptual sharpness, cannot come to see a literal proton because it is an 
unobservable. Yet, I do not take this to be Väyrynen’s (2018) point. By trying to describe 
 
187 Fricker calls this a perceptual-model of heuristics judgment formations because the process is non-inferential, a transition in 
thought.  
188 Väyrynen, p. 117 
189 Väyrynen p. 118 
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the epistemological mechanisms at play, the case asks us to endorse one of two 
possibilities, either: 
1) That Marie has an occurrent experience with a phenomenal character informed by 
the presence of proton-representing perceptual content which grants her perceptual 
knowledge of the proton’s presence, or 
2) That Marie has an occurrent experience with a phenomenal character informed by 
a puff of vapor which she is used to make an automatic cognitive association which 
concludes that a proton is present. In this case, Marie only comes to have non-
perceptual knowledge of the presence of the proton. 
I believe Väyrynen’s (2018) choice to endorse (2) rather than (1) is driven by a belief that 
knowledge of p, the presence of the proton, can either be a form of non-perceptual 
knowledge or perceptual knowledge, but not both, in this case. Where representational 
perceptual content of proton-ness is distinct from vapor-puff representational content, 
Väyrynen’s endorsement (2) seems motivated by the idea that nothing in the unified 
phenomenal field of the subject (i.e., their perceptual field), can properly be said to have 
proton-representing perceptual content, content which yields perceptual knowledge of the 
proton. Instead, one is better off endorsing the claim that a perceptual judgment about the 
vapor-puff is what permits Marie to have non-perceptual knowledge of the proton’s 
presence.      
However, if we grant that proton-experiences are cognitively penetrable, Marie’s 
knowledge of p, in cases where her training and expertise is robust in these kinds of 
experiments, could be said to be secured through a two-step cognitive penetrability process. 
First, logically, an immediate cognitive association occurs between the vapor-puff and the 
idea of the presence of a proton in Marie’s non-transparent background epistemic 
processes. Then, this non-perceptual knowledge would go on to influence Marie’s 
perceptual experience through the immediate perceptual detection of a proton-
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representative property in the vapor which POPs and an intensification of the vapor’s 
proton-feature attributive space in the perceptual field. Marie’s automatic, non-transparent, 
and non-perceptual understanding of p manifests perceptual experiences which yield 
perceptual knowledge of p. Yes, Marie’s training and background epistemic information 
makes her an excellent discriminator of a proton’s presence. Yet, CPT’s claim is not that 
such cognitive associations never happen, but rather that those associations play an 
important part in rendering some cognitive states, like beliefs and cognitive associations, 
into contents of perceptual experience for experts whose experience have a phenomenal 
unity with a felt sense of naturalness. In this way, the example as it is often presented sets 
up a kind of false dichotomy and, in doing so, talks past the central issue of perception 
influencing mechanisms operating in tandem with judgment formation mechanisms. 
Väyrynen (2018), as reductionist, favors (2) because it is simpler rather than address the 
possibility that our cognitive and perceptual systems are complicated to the extent that (1) 
is influenced and informed by (2). In taking this approach, the reductivist response seems 
to sidestep the modularity question and the process question. In this case, simplicity is 
not necessarily a theoretical virtue.    
Similarly, Väyrynen (2018) also offers a parallel case with an ethical twist. It is set 
up in the following way:     
Cat-abuse: “If you round a corner and see a group of young hoodlums pour gasoline on a 
cat and ignite it, you do not need to conclude that what they are doing is wrong you do not 
need to figure anything out; you can see that it is wrong.”190 
Again, Väyrynen would have us choose between two kinds of explanations in this case: 
(1’) that one gain’s knowledge of the action’s wrongness by means of perceptual 
 
190 Väyrynen utilizes this Harman (1977)’s case to facilitate a contrast scenario regarding moral perception.   
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knowledge or (2’) that one comes to have the immediate belief that the situation is wrong 
through non-perceptual knowledge facilitated by some form of cognitive association. 
Again, moral properties in this case, like proton-ness in the previous case, are seemingly 
communicated to the subject because our detection and intensification of a property in 
the experiences seemingly attaches to the experience because background cognitive 
associations occur. By stopping at these associations, however, we are not actually 
interrogating moral perceptual experiences and phenomena like M-POP because the 
reduction response seemingly gets the object of study wrong or does not afford our 
cognitive systems the complexity they possess.  
Second, and as a result of the observations above, the empty promise response 
misses the force that immediate experience has on our epistemic lives in experientialist 
approaches to moral perception. Under a judgementalist position, we are restricted to the 
claim that errors in one’s moral perceptions are errors in judgment. Yet, if MPO is correct, 
then moral discernments about our immediate experiences can be influenced at the 
experiential level rather than just the judgmental level. This has consequences for our moral 
epistemological activity. That is, MPO predicts that moral perceptions will occur in such a 
way that moral properties exhibit the same phenomenal qualities that non-moral objects 
and properties exhibit. Properties like “goodness” would function like color or shape in an 
experience of looking at a brown chair. In this way, moral perceptions under experientialist 
views harbor a kind of objective-sense which is materially distinct from the kind of 
justificatory sense one obtains from automatic judgments via various forms of cognitive 
association. Put analogously, it is very difficult to convince someone to be skeptical that 
there is a chair in front of them. As one acquires perceptual knowledge of the chair before 
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them, the individual takes their justification for belief c, “that there is a chair in front of 
me”, to be built into and supported by their experience of the chair. Similarly, convincing 
someone that there is a ‘wrong’ in front of them when they are having an experience that 
there is something ‘good’ or ‘permissible’ in front of them would be equally, if not  more, 
difficult.    
As Church (2010) puts this kind of observation, perceptual knowledge is a more 
secure, although not more reliable, source of knowledge than non-perceptual forms of 
knowledge. She writes, “Knowledge that is inferential rather than perceptual will be less 
secure insofar as it depends on a series of steps that may be forgotten [or disrupted] by the 
time the calculation is reached.”191 I may have reasons for making a judgment, but I might 
forget or loose transparent access to those reasons. In contrast, moral perceptual knowledge 
gained by a subject during occurrent experience is mediated by one’s deeply held and 
worldview guiding background epistemic resources under MPO. Church’s observation is 
that moral perceptual knowledge, from an experientialist perspective, would be less 
susceptible to doubt because the justification for holding some moral belief m, as by moral 
perceptual knowledge, gains the same kind of epistemic status as c for the observer. This, 
of course, can have both positive and negative impacts on our moral life, but this 
observation is in direct contradiction to the empty promise response and has a lot of 
explanatory power, especially in terms of Mills’s view on things like white ignorance.  
Church (2010) also observes that perceptual knowledge can be a valuable resource 
for developing and acquiring new knowledge. That is, once Marie has gained the ability to 
acquire p in the form of perceptual knowledge, she is granted the advantage of devoting 
 
191 Church (2010), p. 665 
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one’s cognitive workload towards acquiring and calculating new knowledge or, 
alternatively, using the ability to picture the location of a proton in rough visual space to 
inform other parts of the experience.192 In as much as personal moral progress is concerned, 
the capacity to inform one’s life by means of moral perceptual knowledge gained through 
acts of moral perception, as understood by MPO, would seemingly be an advantage to 
moral progress. Similar observations are made by a swath of scholars influenced by neo-
virtue theory like Fricker’s (2007) call for ‘virtuous seeing’ in Epistemic Injustice or 
Margaret Olivia Little’s (1995) description of the ‘virtuous knower’ in “Seeing and Caring: 
The Role of Affect in Feminist Moral Epistemology”.      
Moreover, Church (2010) suggests that perceptual knowledge is more efficiently 
motivating in human psychology, especially in cases of moral knowledge. Church writes, 
“perceptions usually motivate us more efficiently than beliefs that depend on inference [or 
judgment]. … Insofar as increased responsiveness to the world and to others is desirable, 
then seeing reasons will be preferable to understanding that remains non-perceptual.”193 
That is, if MPO, or another form of experientialism, is correct then it carries the benefit of 
clarifying issues related to moral motivation during occurrent experiences. Just as one is 
efficiently motivated to sit in a chair they observe in the world, one can be expected to be 
more motivated to meet the demands of the moral world should they acquire moral 
perceptual knowledge during moral perceptions of occurrent experience.  
In summary, where the reduction response to views like MPO seems to get the 
object of study wrong by looking for simpler answers to make sense of our highly complex 
 
192 Church (2010), p. 666. It is worth noting that Church’s example focuses on learning new things about the melting of ice.  
193 Church (2010), p. 666-667 
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perceptual systems, the empty promise response seemingly overlooks the viable 
explanatory points in MPOs favor. Ultimately, by taking MPO seriously, we can begin to 
make sense of the role of moral perceptions by acknowledging that there are people that 
do wrong things, people that have wrong things done to them, and that we need to turn our 
attention to understanding what it means to say that there are people that see these wrong 
things happen. More importantly, we can begin to explore why some see and others fail to 
see the world’s moral features, whatever those turn out to be.  
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CHAPTER 3. THE UNFREEDOM OF MORAL PERCEPTION DURING 
OCCURRENT EXPERIENCE 
 
“Human freedom is … rooted in the human sensibility.” 
- Herbert Marcuse, “Nature and Revolution”, Counterrevolution and 
Revolt (1972). 
 
“Even those whom you would think of as defeated are living beings figuring out how to 
stay attached to life from within it, and to protect what optimism they have for that, at 
least.”  
- Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism (2011). 
 
“The first stratification [of consciousness] is ālayavijñāna or store-consciousness, the 
repository of all vāsānas (traces of past experience). The “seeds” generated by good or 
bad action, are stored in the “ālaya-consciousness”. It is the realm of potentiality.” 
- Bina Gupta, “The Buddhist Schools”. An Introduction to Indian 
Philosophy. (2012) 
3.1 Introduction 
Dominant conceptions surrounding gender, race, class, and other group striations 
cover our social topography. They define guidelines that direct and discipline the social 
subject according to the sensibilities of the local, and sometimes global, normative social 
order. Sara Ahmed, a feminist affect theorist and social philosopher, consistently refines 
our appreciation of this by showing how social sensibilities, or norms, constitute an 
expected “way of living, a way of connecting with others over or around something.”194 
That is, life’s experiences are consistently shaped by dominant social sensibilities because 
of their directing and disciplining power. Moreover, as black feminist theorist like Patricia 
Hill Collin’s and social political theorist’s like Charles W. Mills point out, society’s 
 
194 Ahmed (2017) p. 43 
106 
interlocking social-political systems have the power to mold a subject’s epistemological 
standpoint.195 Life’s experiences, that is, also have the capacity to transcribe a society’s 
sensibilities onto the minds and bodies of its members through a socialization process that 
transforms external evaluative expectations into internal background epistemic structures 
which mediate thought and knowing. As a result, one’s background epistemological 
resources, and thereby one’s conscious apprehension of life’s experiences, are subject to 
the same dominant social sensibilities, even when they occupy cultural and sub-cultural 
spaces. Yet, what is the nature of the relationship between consciousness, a subject’s life 
experiences, and their196 background epistemic resources? What does this relationship have 
to tell us about one’s moral perceptions of occurrent experience given its capacity to impact 
our immediate apprehension of the world? 
Moral perceptions occur whenever one comes to have an immediate discernment 
about the moral features of an occurrent experience.197 If someone is walking down the 
street, it is not unreasonable to want that person to come to have the immediate belief that 
their occurrent experience represents something morally wrong should they encounter, say, 
someone kicking an infant. Yet, it is often the case that instances of bullying, exploitation, 
sexual harassment, race or gender discrimination, and other forms of oppression are 
overlooked features of occurrent experience. That is, when confronted by such events, there 
 
195 See Collins (2008) & Mills (2007) 
196 Note: ‘they’, ‘their’, and ‘them’ are used throughout this paper as a gender-neutral personal pronouns. English does not have a 
gender-neutral third-person singular personal pronoun. As a result, some version of “his or her” is traditionally used instead. However, 
I have chosen to adopt this convention in order to use gender inclusive language in my work. As a result, you will often see pronoun 
choices which reflect the following kind of change: “Someone dropped his or her book.” written as “Someone dropped their book.”. 
197 The nature of this belief, whether it is perceptual or non-perceptual, is surely relevant to this question. However, the focus of this 
current piece is to investigate the source and plasticity of our background epistemic resources. These resources serve as a ground upon 
which consciousness renders a morally pertinent encounter into an experience with moral features. Moral perceptions, as an 
immediate discernment of a situation’s moral features, can be considered perceptual or non-perceptual, judgmental, in nature, 
depending on what moral perceptual theory you endorse. Regardless of one’s preferred moral perceptual theory, a view about the 
formation of our background epistemic resources is needed in order inform our understanding of how moral perceptions are mediated 
by our existing moral beliefs and dispositions. In this way, the framework offered here is intended to apply to any moral perceptual 
theory.  
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are swaths of people that do not come to have a moral perception of a situation’s immorality 
or, instead, can falsely take an oppressive act to be ‘right’ rather than ‘wrong’. Notably, 
cases where one’s moral perceptions are insensitive to the moral status of the other are 
especially alarming (e.g., during acts of sex trafficking, slavery, testimonial injustice, and 
so on). Given this, it is important that we understand the extent to which one is free to 
influence their moral perceptions because such discernments play an indispensable role in 
navigating moral life.  
With this in mind, the aim of this piece is to develop an interdisciplinary perspective 
on the development of the background epistemic resources available to human 
consciousness in order to investigate the extent to which one is free to influence their moral 
perceptions. In what follows, I develop a dialectical view of consciousness in order to 
conceptualize the relationship between life’s experiences and our background epistemic 
resources. To do this, I synthesize the work of Herbert Marcuse with the phenomenological 
branch of Feminist Affect Theory using Buddhist moral psychology, specifically work 
from the Mahāyānan tradition. From this, I go on to argue that a subject’s moral perceptions 
of occurrent experience are outside their immediate control because background epistemic 
resources and structures cultivated through dialectical consciousness curate the contents of 
such discernments. That is, I argue that we are not free to have moral perceptions in 
whichever way we wish during occurrent experience because such immediate discernments 
are not ours to willfully control in the moment. However, I conclude by supporting the 
claim that we can influence our moral perceptions by cultivating the grounds upon which 
our dialectical consciousness is rooted. 
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3.2 Marcuse’s Epistemic Subject: Reason and Drives 
 Marcuse, a critical social philosopher from the Frankfort School of Critical Theory, 
approaches the subject qua knower, henceforth referred to as the epistemic subject, with 
the understanding that they seek to make sense of their world, to render it intelligible as a 
consciousness in that world. In his view, life shapes consciousness and society curates life. 
That is, he recognizes that society’s expectations and practices shape the epistemic 
subject’s habits of thought through manipulation of a subject’s drives and ways of thinking 
by means of curating life’s experiences through social sensibilities. He argues that the 
rationality, one’s way of thinking and connecting with others, within advanced capitalist 
industrial society is whittled down by our immersion into the happenings and sensibilities 
of society. As such, a subject’s critical reflective capacities atrophy and result in a one-
dimensional (i.e., uncritical or merely positive) form of thought and knowing. He writes,  
“The means of mass transportation and communication, the commodities of lodging, food, 
and clothing, the irresistible output of the entertainment and information industry carry 
with them prescribed attitudes and habits, certain intellectual and emotional reactions 
which bind the consumers more or less pleasantly to the producers and, through the latter, 
to the whole. The products [and infrastructure] indoctrinate and manipulate; they promote 
a false consciousness which is immune against its falsehood. … it becomes a way of life. 
It is a good way of life – much better than before – and as a good way of life, it militates 
against qualitative change. Thus emerges a pattern of one-dimensional thought and 
behavior in which ideas, aspirations, and objectives that, by their content, transcend the 
established universe of discourse and action are either repelled or reduced to terms of this 
universe. They are redefined by the rationality of the given system and of its quantitative 
extension.”198  
Alternatively put, the subject, as a result of living within an advanced capitalistic 
civilization, conforms to dominant sensibilities regarding value, morality, and meaning not 
merely because they adopt those attitudes by means of willful practice. Instead, the ways 
in which one connects and interfaces with others, social artifacts, and the material world 
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prompts the epistemic subject to internalize society’s ‘rationality’, its way of thinking and 
operating. This, in turn, governs expected forms of thought and knowing in the subject. At 
the same time, the epistemic subject’s capacity to resist this process via critical, negative, 
thought is undermined because the sense that the ‘world as it is’ is not also the ‘world as it 
must be’ diminishes. The subject comes to believe that ‘conformity with local sensibilities’ 
is a rational choice in that conformity is in the subject’s best interest, inasmuch as they are 
aware, where one’s life is ‘bettered’ by that system, sometimes at the expense of others. 
The result is that the epistemic subject acquiesces to the value and meaning structures 
governing the social world as if they were a necessity because the current social order, and 
its sensibilities, defines ‘how things are done’. One-dimensional thinking, as a kind of 
operational thinking, persists because the subject is directed and disciplined, he argues, by 
a social system which “permeates the general consciousness” resulting in the absorption of 
negative thinking into positive, one-dimensional, thinking.199   
For example, consider our relationship to automobiles. They have a certain amount 
of utility inasmuch as they are useful tools for traveling. Cars can also support meaningful 
relationships because they allow for visits with friends, family, and services (i.e., hospitals, 
grocery stores, …) that are located outside reasonable walking distances. As a result, road 
systems develop over time, cityscapes build parking garages, freeways are constructed 
between cities, freeways are tolled, street parking is established, traffic officers are hired, 
parking attendants are dispatched, demand for cars rise, people are hired to increase car 
production, mechanics learn how to fix them, and the pedestrian is restricted to walk-ways 
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and sidewalks. Cars become an integral part of contemporary life. In many places within 
the United States, having a car has almost become a precondition for life’s activities.  
With this example in mind, Marcuse’s observations about society and one-
dimensional thinking can be illustrated in the following way. Navigating society and 
connecting with people through our use of cars amounts to a kind of social administration 
of our lives because the performance of certain expected car-based actions and ways of 
thinking are required to have relationships and access services (i.e., waiting in traffic, 
finding parking, traveling on roads, …). A car-rationality, a way of thinking based on cars, 
emerges and is internalized by the subject when making decisions about their life (i.e., 
which jobs to apply to, school to attend, friends to hold on to, family to visit, ways to vote, 
…). In turn, the reality of the world, materially and socially, becomes not only more car-
friendly but car-advocating. The world systematizes the role of cars into a ‘need’ and we, 
as subjects in a world of cars, are indoctrinated to accept dominant social sensibilities about 
cars. Thoughts about robust public transportation systems, pedestrian friendly cities, and 
so on become valuable only in relationship to their car-supportive claims. Resistance to 
car-rationality is directed and disciplined so that the subject accepts the car’s place in life. 
Moreover, it becomes rational for the subject to adopt the dominant social sensibility about 
cars because the world is organized to help people by car-means. Ultimately, the roadways 
of the car-world shape the rational pathways of our inner-world wherever one says “I can’t 
get there because I don’t have a car” when in reality one can’t get there because society 
resists alternative ways of life that are not dependent on car-use (i.e., one with robust public 
transportation).  
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As a theoretical ground, Marcuse uses an interpretation of Freud’s psychoanalysis 
to flush out his view of the epistemic subject and the influential role of social sensibilities. 
He writes, “Freud’s theory reveals the biological deindividualization beneath the 
sociological one… The primary instincts pertain to life and death - that is to say, to organic 
matter as such. And they link organic matter back with unorganic matter and forward 
within higher mental manifestations.”200 The thought expressed in this passage, and 
throughout Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization, is that the sociological forces of civilization 
shape the primary life and death drives into expressions which direct our general 
disposition to the world. Such dispositions are shaped to align with some ideological 
guidelines of the good life, with some set of social sensibilities. Put alternatively, social 
scripts, both explicit and implied, communicate expectations and provide the framework 
by which society disciplines deviation from normalized standards. These standards are 
internalized by one’s drives and dictate how one is drawn to or repulsed from certain 
actions, objects, and peoples. Through this, one’s consciousness of the world is affectively 
articulated and is reason shaping.  
As an investigation into the social epistemological forces of civilization, Marcuse’s 
work on the epistemic subject’s drives seeks to unpack the relationship between social 
sensibilities (i.e., the rationality of the social system) and individual sense-abilities. 
Marcuse’s use of ‘sensibilities’ often references normative expectations which define the 
standards of appropriate rational and drive-based frameworks for social encounter-
response behaviors. However, he often uses ‘sensibilities’ in a second way. In contrast to 
sensibilities, ‘sense-abilities’ reference a subject’s rational and drive-based sensitivities 
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which render the moral and non-moral value landscape comprehensible to the subject. This 
distinction begins to form in the following passage from Marcuse’s “Freedom and Freud’s 
Theory of the Instincts”: 
“The organism develops through the activity of two original basic instincts: the life instinct 
[i.e. Eros] and the death instinct, the destructive instinct. While the former strives for the 
binding of living substance into ever larger and more permanent units, the death instinct 
desires regression to [a] condition [like that which existed] before birth, without needs and 
thus without pain… Thus the psychic dynamic takes the form of a constant struggle of 
three basic forces: Eros, the death instinct, and the outside world. Corresponding to these 
three forces are the three basic principles which according to Freud determine the function 
of the psychic apparatus: the pleasure principle, the Nirvana principle, and the reality 
principle… the pleasure principle stands for the unlimited unfolding of the life instinct [for 
joy and happiness], and the Nirvana principle for the regression into the painless condition 
before birth [i.e. of existence without struggle or suffering], and the reality principle 
signifies the totality of the modifications of those instincts compelled by the outside 
world.”201 
Marcuse’s observation of the reality principle in this excerpt highlights his commitment to 
the claim that subjects modify their sense-abilities in accordance with normative 
parameters defined by the outside social world according to its sensibilities. The influence 
of dominant sensibilities on a subject’s sense-abilities can appear wherever the subject 
strategically adapts their desires and ways of thinking in order to navigate the tension that 
exists between the reality principle, the pleasure principle (i.e., individual desires motivated 
by the life instinct), and the Nirvana principle (i.e., the pursuit of contentment motivated 
by the death instinct). Put otherwise, adaptation of one’s sense-abilities to the dominant 
sensibilities occurs as a result of the directing and disciplining forces within civilization 
on the subject trying to fit-in for their own sake.  
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Further evidence for the important role of this distinction in his work is found in 
The Essay on Liberation. Here, he points out that what we take to be obscene or beautiful 
is most often curated by the social order’s dominant sensibilities.202 He argues that 
obscenity is used as “a moral concept in the verbal arsenal of the Establishment, which 
abuses the term by applying it, not to expressions of its own morality but to those of 
another.”203 That is, a subject’s repulsion from the obscene and attraction toward the 
beautiful follow normalized standards for obscenity and beauty prescribed by society's 
dominant sensibilities. By synthesizing Marxian, Hegelian, and Freudian philosophy, 
Marcuse carries Freudian drive theory towards the realization that life’s experiences 
cultivate individual consciousness and its apprehension of occurrent experience by shaping 
a subject’s sense-abilities. In doing so, civilization utilizes socialization as a curating 
device regulating one’s life experiences to direct and discipline individuals in accordance 
with social sensibilities of value and meaning, both about morality and utility.  
In summary, Marcuse holds the following beliefs about the epistemic subject. First, 
life’s experiences shape a subject’s sense-abilities by curating their background epistemic 
resources (i.e., their drives and ways of thinking). Second, socialization directs and 
disciplines the subject’s sense-abilities towards the dominant sensibilities by curating life’s 
experiences. Lastly, while not directly discussed in this paper, Marcuse’s focus on society’s 
potential for liberation in the totality of his work204 defines a third belief: that this process 
can be resisted.205 That is, Marcuse’s call to resist the dominating forces of society by 
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204 This is especially the case in One-Dimensional Man and An Essay on Liberation, but is also true in later works and lectures such as 
“Repressive Tolerance” and “Nature and Revolution”.   
205 One such place that this is apparent is in the following passage: “"The possibility of an entirely different societal organization of 
life has nothing in common with the "possibility" of a man with a green hat appearing in all doorways tomorrow, but treating them 
with the same logic may serve the defamation of undesirable possibilities... What appears unlovely and disorderly from the logical 
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means of the cultivation of a new sensibility and the participation in a ‘Great Refusal’ to 
operate in an oppressive system signal his commitment to the idea that individual sense-
abilities can be liberated. As a result, three observations follow from Marcuse’s view of 
the epistemic subject. 
First, our drives and ways of thinking are semi-plastic but intransigent because 
civilization/society represses, sublimates, or desublimates our sense-abilities while 
maintaining an underlying set of affective and thought potentialities (i.e., Eros (the life 
drive), Thanatos (the death drive) which aims for Nirvana, and the practice of reasoning 
persists). Second, human instincts and ways of thinking are compulsory inasmuch as 
having certain dispositions, or sense-abilities, to undergo expressions of Eros or Thanatos 
manifest as an intensification of an immediate belief attitude or affective force outside the 
momentary willful control of the subject. This force pulls the subject in a particular 
direction, towards a particular object, or toward a certain belief rather than necessitating 
that certain actions be taken. Third, that the subject strategically adapts their drives and 
ways of thinking to the established culture/society and in doing so internalizes its 
sensibilities thereby shaping the subject’s sense-abilities in an accidental way. 
Given this, Marcuse’s view of the epistemic subject contains more than merely a 
commitment to a rational consciousness, a form of being plagued by pervasive one-
dimensional thinking in contemporary society. Rather, it hints at a form of affective 
consciousness, of being attuned to the world through one’s embodied drives for life and 
death, which, unfortunately, is left underdeveloped in his work on a ‘new sensibility’ in 
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The Essay on Liberation and subsequent lectures due to his passing in 1979. Yet, Marcuse 
begins to develop a deeper sense of consciousness through his realization that life “is 
experienced as a struggle with one’s self and the environment” inasmuch as one seeks to 
regulate one’s affective and rational engagement with the world in an adaptive way so as 
to affirm the life instincts or death instincts with the ultimate goal of living.206 He is 
committed to the idea that human drives and ways of thinking are semi-plastic, compulsory 
rather than purely volitional, and are accidental byproducts of a historical process that 
never allows the subject to perfectly fit with the environment, social or otherwise. 
Marcuse’s epistemic subject is defined by “man’s primary impulses and senses as 
foundations of his rationality and experience” and the manipulation of these foundations 
shapes our very encounters with the world.207 Given this, I am inclined to suggest that this 
view of the epistemic subject intersects with Feminist Affect Theory in many important 
ways and, because of this, I argue for their compatibility in the next section.  
3.3 Feminist Affect Theory and Marcuse’s Epistemic Subject 
Put briefly, Feminist Affect Theory208 takes affects to be an integral part of the 
body’s engagement with the world and it articulates embodiment as “webbed in its 
relations” to the world.209 Affects are displayed in “a body’s capacity to affect and to be 
affected.”210 Donovan O. Schaefer, a professor of material religion and visual culture, 
describes affect theory in Religious Affects as a field which “thematizes the way that the 
world prompts us to move before the interventions of language. It calls attention to 
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208 I write here primarily from the perspective of the phenomenological branch of Feminist Affect Theories. 
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embodied histories that precede the advent of language -- as well as moments when 
language is bound with other thick, embodied forces.”211 By this description, Marcuse 
shares a project in common with affect theory because each aims to critique power within 
civilization by supplementing the linguistic, or rational, perspective on human 
consciousness rather than erase it in favor of embodied forms of knowing. Both theoretical 
traditions recognize that affects, or drives in Marcuse’s case, within the embodied subject 
are of paramount importance for understanding the epistemic subject beyond its reduction 
to a form of rational consciousness.212 Moreover, where Marcuse lacks a fully developed 
view of affective subjectivity but provides a robust view of rational subjectivity, Affect 
theory provides a robust view of affective subjectivity while not treading deeply into 
rational subjectivity because it is not the central object of study for that field. As a result, 
if these views are compatible, we are presented with an opportunity to put these traditions 
into conversation in order to develop a robust conception of consciousness with the 
potential to fix what is often referred to as ‘Descartes’s error’213 by reunifying our 
conceptions of the rational and embodied subject. In this section, I argue for this 
compatibility by outlining the developmental and conceptual parallels between these two 
traditions.  
First, Schaefer describes affects as essentially semi-plastic but intransigent, 
compulsory, and adaptively accidental. He highlights affect theory’s fusion of Freudian 
drives with Darwinian evolutionary biology by describing the subject’s embodied affects 
as a set of sculpted dispositions which are configured into structures in accordance with 
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213 This is a phrase coined by Antonio Damasio (1994) in Descartes Error. It is used to reference Descartes’ mind-body distinction 
which, historically, has causes western philosophy to treat rationality and embodiment as separate, non-overlapping, aspects of human 
development and consciousness.  
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one’s embodied experiences and cultural history (i.e., the intransigence claim).214 
Additionally, these affective structures are susceptible to reconfiguration with some sense 
of general consistency (i.e. the semi-plastic claim).215 That said, it is worth recalling that 
Marcuse implicitly takes the same to be true of our drives which comprise, what he calls, 
our second nature.   
Additionally, Schaefer’s discussion of affects as compulsory and adaptively 
accidental continues to echo Marcuse’s use of Freudian drive theory. Affects are felt 
intensities aimed at the world and its objects. We often think of animal affective responses 
as mechanistic in kind. However, this is a misrepresentation of affect theory. Rather, the 
idea is that an embodied accumulation of affected experiences and evolutions over time 
configures the subject to respond affectively or rationally in particular ways to certain 
environmental stimuli. It’s about embodied compulsory affective responses, not 
compulsively necessary choice or action. 
For example, there is an episode of the U.S. version of The Office where Jim, the 
office prankster, plays a chime on his computer while offering his coworker, Dwight, a 
mint. After months of creating an affective environment which linked a chime with the 
taste of mint, Jim plays the chime and does not offer a mint. The result: Dwight is confused 
as to why his mouth tastes bad. The explanation: “Affectivity is not optional, but 
compulsory” and this compulsion is a result of having adapted one’s affective dispositions 
or instincts to the environmental stimuli in an automatic way facilitated by the subject 
living in that space.216 Schaefer writes, “Affect theory offers an alternative model [to the 
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merely rational framework of consciousness], in which affects have their own capacity to 
articulate bodies to systems of power.”217 Again, it is worth noting that this model echoes 
Marcuse’s description of our sense-abilities towards obscenities as compulsory responses 
to certain social stimuli which, in turn, influence our thoughts and knowings.  
The study of affect also gives us the tools to think about bodies in terms of 
“affective economies - economies driven by a complex matrix of compulsions that do not 
necessarily follow predictable watercourses”218; the dynamic accumulation of affects is a 
strategic response to a myriad of environmental conditions and it is not reasonable to expect 
the embodied bundle of responses to be without contradiction. There is an accidental nature 
to affects during the configuration of the body whereby one cannot expect a perfect 
affective-fit between the environment and the subject. This mirrors Marcuse’s commitment 
to the reality principle inasmuch as our instincts are being strategically adapted to the world 
in a way that permits internal contradictions. Notably, Marcuse’s belief that contradictions 
in lived experience will reveal unfreedoms is also relevant to Schaefer’s point because both 
suggest that the subject will never be completely ordered without countervailing affective, 
and as Marcuse points out, rational structures. Thus, both theories predict the development 
of internal contradictions while pointing out that oppressive systems will also attempt to 
manage and defuse those contradictions.  
Additionally, as Ahmed describes them, affects are sticky. “Affect is what sticks, 
or what sustains or preserves the connection between ideas, values, and objects.”219 For 
example, happiness, as a form of approval and a mode of affective response, possesses an 
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intentional relation to the world, according to Ahmed. Affects are taken to be intentional 
to an object or person inasmuch as that affect-producing target points to a future possibility 
(i.e., to be happy or unhappy) and they are taken to be evaluative inasmuch as the promise 
of the ‘future possibility’ articulates a value judgement of good or bad respective to the 
promise for happiness or unhappiness.220 She writes,  
“The object becomes a feeling-cause. Once an object is a feeling-cause, it can cause feeling, 
so that when we feel the feeling we expect to feel we are affirmed… for a life to count as 
a good life, it must return the debt of its life by taking on the direction promised as a social 
good, which means imagining one’s futurity in terms of reaching certain points along a life 
course.”221  
I take this to mean that affects take on a directedness toward an object and that the object 
is encountered as good or bad with respect to the object's status as a feeling-cause. These 
are objects which carry a bundle of affective and relational promises. If we recall Marcuse’s 
discussion of obscenity and beauty as attaching to objects, actions, or peoples in the world, 
then we notice that he too takes drives to possess directedness. In Marcusean terms, this 
directedness communicates an evaluative component to a subject’s sense-abilities which 
reveal the evaluative dimensions of the thing, moral or otherwise.  
Lastly, it is also worth noting that a common Freudian ground is shared by Marcuse 
and the phenomenological division of Affect Theory which guides these theoretical views 
in a way that permits compatibility. This shared basis reveals the theoretical closeness of 
Marcusean drives and Feminist Affects. Each holds that drive or affect structures emerge 
over time, as Schaefer might put it, “as the preferred method for bodies to navigate the 
ambiguity of information-rich environments. They prioritize effective strategies 
 
220 Ahmed p. 29 
221 Ahmed p. 40 
120 
intensifying motivational forces.”222 It is true that Marcuse’s construction of the epistemic 
subject takes theoretical cues from Hegelian and Marxian theory whereas Affect Theory 
takes cues from Darwinian Evolutionary Theory. However, Both Marcuse and Affect 
theory hold that response mechanisms will change over time to align sense-
abilities/affective sensitivities with best-fit strategies for experiencing the environment 
according to some functional or social standard. As a result, this difference fails to support 
the idea that these views are incompatible in light of the aforementioned parallels between 
affects and drives (i.e., their semi-plastic but intransigent, compulsory, directive, and 
adaptively accidental nature). If anything, it suggests that each tradition developed 
functionally compatible views independently and in their own traditions because the 
systems offer different ways of talking about the same process for affect-structure 
development, one grounded in the philosophy of evolutionary biology and the other in 
Hegelian and Marxist philosophy. Thereby, I take this difference between these views to 
be a non-criticism to their compatible nature given the functional and theoretical symmetry 
between Feminist Affect Theory and Marcuse’s epistemic subject.  
In summary, Marcuse’s view of the epistemic subject and Affect theory are 
compatible traditions because each is grounded in the idea that a subject’s drives or affects 
are semi-plastic but intransigent (i.e., flexibly variable within some range of defined 
possibility) , compulsory (i.e., beyond one’s immediate willful control)223, adaptively 
 
222 Schaefer p. 46 
223 It is worth noting that ‘compulsory’ could be thought of as having at least two senses. In the first sense, it might be suggested that 
someone is coerced to feel X-ly when saying that ‘X is compulsory’. This implicates that one’s drives or affects can be made to 
manifest in this or that way at any given moment by coercive means. In the second sense, it might be suggested that someone feels X-
ly in a habitual sense when saying that ‘X is compulsory’. This implicates that one’s drives/affects are automatic responses outside 
anyone’s immediate willful control. ‘Compulsory’, as it is used here, is used in this second sense. This does not mean that we are 
immune to affective manipulations by others, but rather that the way in which we can be manipulated to feel X-ly at any given 
moment is dictated by a set of compulsory configurations within the epistemic subject which regulate their affective responses to the 
world. It is these responses, or configurations, which are (in the sense used here) compulsory, outside the immediate control of the 
subject and their community.   
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accidental (i.e., imperfectly attuning to fit the environment), and possess a sense of 
directedness (i.e., intentionally directed towards meaningful content). Moreover, this 
compatibility is grounded in a shared Freudian influence which was transformed by 
different theoretical traditions which nevertheless produced functionally similar views with 
analogous consequences. As a result, each tradition’s view of the epistemic subject is 
positioned to complement and be complemented by the other thereby providing a holistic 
picture of human consciousness, and thereby the epistemic subject, in its rational and 
affective dimensions.  
3.4 Synthesizing Marcuse and Affect Theory using Buddhist Philosophy 
Compatibility, while useful for justifying our putting Marcuse’s epistemic subject 
and Affect Theory in conversation, is merely one step towards articulating a view which 
describes the extent to which life’s experiences and socialization shapes the epistemic 
subject and their moral perceptions. It is worth pointing out that one aspect of this 
compatibility is grounded in the compulsory nature of one’s conscious apprehension of 
the world. This, itself, hints at the unfree nature of moral perception during occurrent 
experience. Yet, there is still a need to synthesize these approaches into a useful framework 
that provides a robust sense of the epistemic subject that is sensitive to its rational and 
affective dimensions. For this, I turn to the Mahāyānan school of Buddhism, which will 
henceforth be referenced using ‘Buddhist philosophy’.  I make this turn because Buddhist 
philosophy provides a model for understanding the mechanisms by which social 
sensibilities become inscribed onto individuals in a way that emphasizes the causal role of 
life’s experiences on the affective and rational aggregates of the human subject. Buddhist 
philosophy develops a view of the epistemic subject which is sensitive to both Marcuse’s 
122 
concern for the rational subject and Affect Theory’s concern for the embodied subject 
because the Buddhist philosophical tradition explored here takes the human creature as an 
aggregate comprised of material (i.e., the body) and mental (i.e., the mind) components.224 
In this way, Buddhist philosophy carries the potential to guide our understanding of the 
epistemic subject towards this robust sense.  
There are at least two concepts in Buddhist philosophy relevant to the project at 
hand: store consciousness and psychological seeds.225 Thich Nhat Hanh’s The Heart of the 
Buddha’s Teaching introduces the reader to these concepts in the following way: 
“In each of us, there are wholesome and unwholesome roots -- or seeds -- in the depths of 
our consciousness… if the seed of betrayal is watered, you may betray even those you 
love… The source of our perception, our way of seeing, lies in our store consciousness… 
[what we see] depends on our mind -- our sadness, our memories, our anger. Our 
perceptions carry with them all the errors of subjectivity.”226 
As demonstrated in this passage, Buddhist philosophy is sensitive to the idea that one’s 
conscious encounter with or view of the world will be directed by one’s subjective store 
consciousness.227  
Bina Gupta, a comparative philosopher, expands on the relationship between 
consciousness and store consciousness in the following way:  
“The three transformations [of consciousness] are: sensory representation, self-awareness, 
and the store-house (i.e., store) consciousness where experiences at the two levels deposit 
their traces as seeds which need to be actualized under appropriate conditions.”228  
 
224 For the sake of bridging the linguistic gap between Marcuse/Affect theory and Buddhist philosophy, I use ‘material’ and ‘mental’ 
to categorize the Buddhism’s conception of ‘being’, the five aggregates. “Materiality’ references the body and includes the aggregate 
of matter (Mpakkhandha). ‘Mental’ aggregates which include sensations (Vedanakkhandhd), perceptions (Sannakkhandha), mental 
formations (Samkharakkhandha), and consciousness (Vinnattakkhandha). Rahula (1967) p. 20-23 
225 These are especially developed in Mahayana schools. Store consciousness is also typically associated with Yogacara Buddhism.  
226 Hanh, p. 53-55 
227 This echoes insights made by Sara Ahmed in Queer Phenomenology and in Living a Feminist Life where she describes 
Consciousness as a sensuous as well as thought dependent phenomenon. 
228 Gupta, p.220 
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That is, store consciousness contains epistemic impressions from life’s experiences which 
serve as the ground for a subject’s affective configurations, beliefs, and habits of reason. 
Store consciousness serves as the source of our background epistemic resources and we 
use it to turn our encounters with the world into meaningful experiences. Put 
metaphorically, life’s experiences plant seeds in store consciousness. These seeds are 
adaptively cultivated or repressed/neglected through our everyday experiences and choices 
under salient lived conditions. Living a life of anger or hate fosters aggressive encounters 
with the world and shapes your perceptions of it. Encountering systematic forms of 
oppression through violence can reveal empty parking lots at night as dangerous. A life 
where fear is a pervasive phenomenon, rather than a momentary occasion, will nurture 
dispositions for distrust, anger, and hate that shape one’s engagement with the world. 
Choosing to continue to engage in destructive behavior, even after one comes to understand 
it as destructive, continues to reinforce one’s own propensity for destruction over creation. 
Notably, distrust, anger, and outrage are often warranted by those facing dehumanization 
and brutalization in oppressive social systems. Examples of this phenomenon are abundant.  
To further illustrate the importance of seeds, or experiential potentialities, it should 
be noted that Buddhists hold that right view (i.e., holding the Buddhist moral and 
metaphysical outlook on life) is a fundamental step in the Buddhist path, as founded on the 
Four Noble Truths. The Four Noble Truths are, briefly put, (1) human existence is 
characterized by dukkha (i.e., suffering), (2) the immediate cause of dukkha and excess 
dukkha exists because of our ignorance towards the nature of things as fundamentally 
impermanent (i.e., suffering prompted by attachments fueled by selfish needs or desires), 
(3) dukkha can be overcome, or cease, through abating the cause of dukkha, and (4) the 
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pathway to overcoming dukkha is articulated by the Eightfold Noble Path229. As part of 
this path, Right View points to the philosophical weight of the first three Noble Truths and 
the need to adopt a view of life which recognizes a fundamental interdependence and 
interconnectedness of persons, the prevalence of surplus suffering or dukkha, and the truth 
of the non-self. If this view does not curate one’s background epistemic resources, the 
Buddha’s path can neither be walked nor seen. Buddhists philosophy articulates the need 
for the epistemic subject to, and their ability to, cultivate a store consciousness that helps 
the agent experience value in the world in a way that reveals an object, person, or relation 
as helpful or as a hindrance to a life without excess suffering (dukkha). This idea will be 
returned to in the conclusion of this piece.  
Moreover, right view emphasizes a Buddhist’s philosophical commitment to the 
existence of some set, or set of sets, of psychological seeds which should be cultivated 
under a Buddhist ethics and with contextual reference. In fact, it is the promotion of the 
sublime states that point to this kind of advice. The sublime states include loving-kindness 
or generosity of care for others, compassion or empathy, sympathetic joy for others without 
envy, and peacefulness. Each is seen as essential for epistemically navigating life's fortunes 
and misfortunes. These, it is argued, would be housed within a store consciousness capable 
of bringing the epistemic subject closer to seeing the world in a way that allows them to 
identify dukkha and pathways to minimize it. Yet, we need not adopt a Buddhist Ethics to 
use Buddhist philosophy to understand how store consciousness functions in subjectivity.  
 
229 The eightfold path is broken into three essential categories of Buddhist practice and training: “(a) Ethical Conduct (Silo), (b) 
Mental Discipline (Samadhi), and (c) Wisdom (Panna)” (Rāhula 1967). When following the paths categorized under (c) Panna, one 
acquires wisdom through adopting the (1) right view, alternatively translated as ‘right understanding’, and practicing (2) right thought. 
The features of the eightfold path categorized under (a) Silo amount to the cultivation of compassion in (3) right speech, (4) right 
action, and (5) right livelihood. Under the (b) Samadhi category one finds the call for (6) right effort, (7) right mindfulness, and (8) 
right concentration. For both a practical and accessible investigation of these items, see Rāhula (1967). 
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 Instead, to explain store consciousness and its relationship to subjective experience, 
we can turn to the teachings of Ven. Dr. Walpola Rāhula.230 The aggregate of 
consciousness (vijnanaskandha) contains three distinct aspects: (1) citta (store 
consciousness), (2) manas (self-consciousness), (3) vijnana (perceptual consciousness).231 
Rāhula writes,  
“Thus we can see that vijnana represents the simple reaction or response of the sense-
organs when they come in contact with external objects. This is the uppermost or 
superficial aspect or layer of the vijnanaskandha. Manas represents the aspect of its mental 
functioning, thinking, reasoning, conceiving ideas, etc. Citta, which is here called 
alayavijnana, represents the deepest, finest and subtlest aspect or layer of the Aggregate of 
Consciousness. It contains all the traces or impressions of the past actions and all good and 
bad future potentialities.”232 
Under this model, as articulated by the Yogācāra school of Mahāyāna Buddhism, there are 
three main aspects of human consciousness. Perceptual Consciousness (vijnana) as 
articulated by sensory interaction with the world and our embodied activity. Self-
Consciousness (manas) amounts to our self-awareness and mental activity. But, Store 
Consciousness (citta or alayavijnana) amounts to the underlying elements, concepts, ideas, 
and dispositions which dialectically articulate experience and are shaped by experience 
through vijnana and manas. Buddhist philosophers following this tradition point to the idea 
that alayavijnana stands as a unifying principle of consciousness by which conscious 
events, like seeing a bird or thinking caring thoughts about a friend, are possible and 
compulsory.  
As Jay Garfield, a comparative philosopher, puts it, store consciousness “is the pre-
reflective ground of experience... it is not introspectable and is not the seat of the 
 
230 It should be pointed out that Dr. Rāhula was the first monastic Buddhist to hold a professorship in the western world.  
231 Rāhula (1959), p. 23 
232 Rāhula (2001)  
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subjectivity of any particular conscious episode, but rather stands as a transcendental 
condition on any awareness being conscious at all.”233 If consciousness unifies awareness 
of one’s experiences into an experience, then such an event is compulsorily shaped by store 
consciousness at its very core in the Buddhist sense described here. Awareness may 
precede consciousness, but experience’s inscribing of store consciousness will, for the 
Buddhist, fundamentally shape our encounters with the world by organizing current and 
future conscious experiences in a compulsory way. Such is also the case, as we have seen, 
in both Marcuse’s view of the epistemic subject and in Affect Theory’s discussion of the 
affectively embodied subject. 
 Within this framework, it is vital to note that one’s store consciousness changes 
over time. It is just as impermanent as everything else in Buddhist metaphysics and fits as 
part of the five aggregates of our being: (1) form or embodiment, (2) sensation or 
affectedness, (3) perceptual awareness of external and internal happenings, (4) possessing 
mental states, and (5) consciousness. Under a theory of seeds, alayavijnana becomes the 
garden by which lived experience plants dispositional and cognitive seeds that grow to 
shape our encounter with the world. These seeds, or beliefs and affective dispositions 
within one’s background epistemic resources, are further cultivated during our encounter 
with the world. Alayavijnana collects one’s affective and rational experiences (i.e., those 
mental states that become seeds), and uses these to compulsorily unify experience into a 
meaningful manifold, and constantly revises that manifold’s content according to 
whichever seeds are nurtured or neglected. The Sautrāntika theory of seeds (bīja) 
 
233 Garfield (2015) p. 130. It is important to note here, as Garfield does, that this is not some attempt by Buddhist philosophers to 
“sneak” a self back into the Buddha's teachings. Rather, this is not a self in the sense that Buddhists reject, an Atman or soul-like 
permanent thing, but rather it is an ever changing and impermanent part of the aggregate of our being.  
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underlying consciousness can inform our understanding of the theory of store 
consciousness by articulating the process by which lived experience influences 
consciousness thereby shaping our encounter with future experiences in a compulsory 
way.234  
As Christian Coseru, a philosopher of mind and cross-cultural philosophy, writes,  
“A ‘seed’ in this case stands for two sets of phenomena: (1) latent dispositions underlying 
the karmic process; and (2) the capacity or power of certain causal chains to bring about a 
given result… The theory of seeds in the mental stream thus provides a mode of talking 
about causality that does not exclude the notions of latency and disposition.”235  
In this passage, Coseru points to the idea that the subject engages and encounters the world, 
but more so to the idea that that world has a causal influence on the subject by shaping 
involuntary compulsions rather than whole-hog freedom-denying psychological 
mechanisms. Given this, he acknowledges the need for a language that avoids a fatalistic 
picture of human choice. Utilizing psychological seeds to identify causally created 
epistemological structures in store consciousness provides a picture of the non-determined 
epistemic subject that avoids radical atomism and gives us a language to discuss life’s 
influence on a subject’s perceptions of occurrent experience. The way the subject chooses 
to engage the world and the way that life’s happenings influence the subject’s encounter 
with the world provide a dialectically causal story regarding how the subject affectively 
and rationally comprehends their lived reality and, thereby, comes to have the compulsory 
moral perception that they do. Coseru continues,  
“Following this process of maturation and dependence upon the repository consciousness 
there evolves a reflexive awareness whose object is none other than this subliminal or 
repository consciousness itself. This theory of cognitive emergence presumably provides a 
better account of the role that the residual forces of past cognitions play in ‘seeding’ the 
 
234 Coseru, p. 40 
235 Coseru, p. 38 -39 
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repository consciousness. It is the dynamics of these residual forces which ultimately 
generates the intentional forms of cognitive awareness that support all other forms of 
cognitive activity.”236  
From this, we gather that the seeds planted by life’s experiences are gained throughout our 
development, from infancy to our present existence, and guide store consciousness’s 
articulation of our ‘cognitive awareness’ of the world. That is, the seeds of our experience 
influence and inform our moral perceptions of the world and drive their compulsory nature.  
As a result, civilization’s socialization of the subject can plant a lot of 
instinctual/affective or rational seeds regarding expectations of value and normalcy thereby 
shaping our experience of the world. I believe a Marcusean Affect theory can be developed 
using this Buddhist approach to causality in store consciousness for three reasons. First, 
there is a catalog of affective capacities currently possessed by the human being as a result 
of evolutionary psychology and observed by Freudian instinct theory (the life-
instinct/love/attraction and death-instinct/hate/aversion as base affects) which are directed 
and shaped in accordance with the local environment. In Buddhist terms, the first seeds of 
store consciousness possess the potentiality for hate/death-instincts or love/life-instincts 
and are cultivated by life’s experiences. In this way, Buddhist philosophy articulates a 
mechanism and language with which to be precise about the process wherein sensibilities 
cultivate one’s background epistemic resources or sense-abilities.  
Second, dynamic embodied affects or drives can be cultivated or planted in store 
consciousness as the life instincts and death instincts are cultivated by life’s experiences in 
the local environment. The pleasure and reality principles describe how we come to have 
more complex affective abilities such as outrage, anger, lust, altruism, and so on. These 
 
236 Coseru, p. 44 
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would seemingly emerge or be repressed in accordance with socialization practices, life 
choices, moments of trauma or joy, and in those moments where one makes paradigm 
shifting decisions. Over time, and through natural maturation, a Buddhist theory of mind 
predicts that these affects will grow effectively motivating and that modes of rational 
thinking will emerge because of the dispositions and beliefs in one’s store-consciousness. 
Lastly, store consciousness serves as the epistemic ground for one’s experience and 
judgment of the world’s value landscape (i.e., it informs moral perceptions during 
occurrent experience). This will carry the errors of subjectivity inasmuch as one’s affective 
dispositions, propositional beliefs, and ways of reasoning will influence one’s engagement 
with the world. According to this Buddhist infused Marcusean Affect Theory, the epistemic 
subject is a triadic being whose lived experience is articulated by its store consciousness, 
its interaction with the world, and the constant reshaping of store consciousness’s epistemic 
resources (i.e., its affective dispositions, beliefs, and modes of rationality) by experience. 
Thereby, this view results in a kind of Dialectical Consciousness (DC) which is best 
articulated by the following four observations: 
1) the epistemic subject affectively (i.e., via one’s sense-abilities) interacts with and 
is shaped by life’s experiences,  
2) the epistemic subject’s rational habits judge and are shaped by life’s experiences,  
3) A subject’s moral perceptions of the world aim to make sense of perceived value 
using a store consciousness comprised of these affective and rational aspects. The 
human being simultaneously undergoes biological and culturally influenced 
processes which shape its understanding of those experiences237 and moral 
perceptions,  
4) At any given moment, one comes to have experiences that are constructed by store 
consciousness thereby mediating a subject’s moral perceptions in a compulsory, 
not willful, way, of the world that, at first glance, reinforce existing structures 
within store consciousness. Unless the subject becomes aware of some 
 
237 Schaefer p. 49 
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propositional/affective contradiction or undergoes some kind of existential 
transformation, they will not be pushed to challenge the very foundation of their 
store consciousness because their moral perceptions reinforce their justification to 
see the world as that have seen the world. Additionally, if they do not embrace a 
healthy skepticism about how to resolve contradictions or existential challenges, 
the subject will perceive value in the world as they have perceived value in the 
world. They may also dismiss inconsistent experiences as unimportant rather than 
as a signal calling for further investigation of the social world or one’s store 
consciousness as a foundation for their moral perceptions.   
With DC in view, there are several reasons why I believe we should accept it as an 
adequate picture of the epistemic subject describing our compulsory moral perceptions. 
First, it accurately predicts that certain affective dispositions and thought patterns will 
emerge as a feature of socialization during child development or during adulthood. It 
suggests that when socialization disciplines or controls a child’s engagement with the 
world then certain affective dispositions and ways of thinking will follow from the seeds 
those experiences plant when they are nurtured. For example, if we only provide boys with 
toys that are physically engaging at very young ages, then boyhood preferences for physical 
activity would predictably become part of (or an enhanced part of) a bundle of affective 
responses to and reasoning about the world. It thereby would seem natural when young 
boys do not identify with activities like reading but gravitate towards sports because of an 
aversion (as an expression of Thanatos) to the former and an attraction (as an expression 
of Eros) to the latter. These dispositions, as a result, lead to moral perceptions of sports as 
a “moral good” inasmuch as they are seen as a conception of how to live well, as a proper 
way of life for boys wherein they can  ‘function’ according to the local sensibilities of a 
good life. In fact, Martin’s 1998 study of preschool classrooms makes just this kind of 
observation. Within the study, she interrogates hidden curriculums and claims that they 
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(partially) curate embodied differences between the genders while making any correlation 
between preferences and physical differences appear and feel natural.238  
Hidden curriculums, as a form of socialization, are unseen or implicit practices that 
classrooms maintain which simultaneously serve as forms of socially controlling subjects. 
These include practices which socialize students into privileging certain modes of 
expression and these curriculums demand that students practice, she concludes, “bodily 
control in congruence with the goals of the school as an institution.”239 She writes: 
“The effects of dressing-up or bodily adornment, the gendered nature of formal or relaxed 
behaviors, how the different restrictions on girls’ and boys’ voices limit their physicality, 
how teachers instruct girls’ and boys’ bodies, and the gendering of physical interactions 
between children … suggest one way that bodies are gendered and physical differences are 
constructed is through social institutions and their practices.”240  
DC also holds that if experiences of a certain kind become normalized adults will 
develop affective responses and habits in reasoning about the world. For example, former 
President Nixon’s illegalization of marijuana and his war on drugs consistently presented 
a vilification narrative of the black body to the U.S. population. After having experiences 
that associated the black body with crime, a negative affective attunement to black bodies 
seems to have arguably been reinforced in our public life. As a result, the dominant political 
discourse seems to rationalize policies which systematically disadvantage marginalized 
populations because those “super predator” populations needed to be controlled or 
punished. Many adult epistemic subjects, usually in a position of privilege and power, came 
to have, or have reinforced, compulsory moral perceptions of the black body as if it were 
representative of ‘wrongdoing’. 
 
238 Martin, p. 494 
239 Martin, p. 494 
240 Martin, p. 497 & 510 
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Similarly, Vivyan Adair’s “Discipline and Punished: Poor Women, Bodily 
Inscription, and Resistance Through Education” echoes this observation by describing the 
systematic depiction of “Welfare Queens” as a process which disciplines our expectations 
of women on welfare. As a result, political discourse often utilizes a narrative that too often 
unwarrantedly punishes those who need aid. She writes,  
“The welfare mother -- imagined as young, never married, and black (contrary to statistical 
evidence)-- is positioned as dangerous and in need of punishment … the poor welfare 
mother threatens not just her own children but all children. The Welfare Queen is made to 
signify moral aberration and economic drain; her figure becomes even more impacted once 
responsibility for the destruction of the “American Way of Life” is attributed to her.”241  
These are, in effect, observations about our moral perceptions of Welfare Queens as made 
possible by DC. Taken together, I take Martin’s and Adair's observations (among others 
who make similar observations like bell hooks, Iris Marion Young, and Angela Davis) as 
offering evidence for the fecundity of DC to predict patterns in socialized consciousness 
as grounded in store consciousness and the resulting moral perceptions that follow.  
 The second reason to accept DC is that it accounts for the vicious loop which 
characterizes consciousness’s role in the articulation of our moral perceptions of occurrent 
experience. Sara Ahmed emphasizes this observation in Living a Feminist Life. She writes,  
“... power works as a mode of directionality, a way of orienting bodies in particular ways, 
so they are facing a certain way, heading toward a future that is given as fact … A crowd 
is directed. Once a crowd is directed, a crowd becomes directive. We are directed by what 
is in front of us; what is in front of us depends on the direction we have already taken … 
[consciousness] is a loop: we are directed by what is in front of us; what is in front of us 
depends on how we are [and have been] directed.”242  
In this, Ahmed makes the observation that there is a mutually evolving relationship 
between embodied subjectivity, lived experiences, socialization, and consciousness’s 
 
241 Adair, p. 39-40 
242 Ahmed 2017, p. 43 - 48 
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capacity to organize experience into a lived reality for the subject (i.e., to curate one’s 
moral perceptions). Socialization and life’s experiences, she claims, direct our orientation 
and encounter with the world. As a matter of course, objects in the world come to represent 
a bundle of promises towards some end or way of being. Focusing on happiness and 
sadness, Ahmed describes how social norms orientate us to approve of certain happenings 
and to disapprove of others, to have defined moral perceptions. She writes,  
“Happiness: what we end up doing to avoid the consequence of being sad. Happiness is a 
way of being directed toward those things that would or should make you happy. Happiness 
can thus also be a form of pressure. Pressure does not always feel harsh. A pressure can 
begin with a light touch. A gentle encouragement…”243 
Given this, part of DC’s value, I claim, is that it captures this account of the epistemic 
subject and acknowledges that how we come to encounter or judge the world (and to have 
moral perceptions of it) is a function of how we have encountered or judged that world 
(and our past moral perceptions of it).  
3.5 The Unfreedom of Moral Perception during Occurrent Experience 
DC might be objected to because it could be interpreted as fatalistic, especially if 
we are trying to determine how it is that we can achieve emancipatory social change. That 
is, DC emphasizes the compulsory nature of our conscious apprehension of the world and, 
thereby, the unfree nature of our moral perceptions of occurrent experience. Yet, this 
strikes me as an unnecessary interpretation of DC. Instead, DC forces us to take seriously 
the complexities of moral agency and responsibility given that store consciousness directly 
impacts our moral perceptions of the world’s moral features which, in turn, impacts store 
consciousness. DC does not predict that one cannot ever modify or reorient oneself to the 
 
243 Ahmed 2017, p. 48 
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world, to come to have different moral perceptions that one currently does. In fact, this is 
a fundamental part of Buddhist philosophy and a virtue of using Buddhism to synthesize 
Marcuse and Affect Theory. It keeps open the possibility for liberation. Ultimately, DC’s 
value is a function of its ability to provide a model for understanding socialization’s 
oppressive potential while opening up a future possibility for seeing the world differently, 
for our liberation from domination, brutalization, and oppression. Our liberation from 
dukkha.  
Specifically, it highlights society’s power to limit our capacity to freely shape our 
moral perception by showing the extent to which life’s experiences can influence our 
rational and affective parts, both of which shape the epistemic resources which prompt us 
to have the moral perceptions that we do. DC pushes us to re-interrogate the relationship 
between rationality, affective dispositions, and moral perceptions. In doing so, it forces us 
to take seriously the available reasons, rendered by our moral perceptions, one uses during 
moral decision making in our lives as moral agents.  
It does this by making explicit the scope of our unfreedom. As ether a consequence 
of our attachment to radical individualism or the influence of scientific ideology, we often 
think ourselves capable of easily overcoming the influence of the lived world and that our 
experiences are independent of our moral judgments. Sartre’s belief that we are condemned 
to be free was itself a commitment to the belief that the subject is equipped with an ever-
present capacity to transform any experience into an expression of one’s freedom to 
choose. However, social striations across our lived world exist as epistemological 
gatekeepers for epistemic agents and signpost that world with morally evaluative content. 
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The epistemic dimensions of the U.S.’s culture of silence regarding sexual violence against 
women is a prime example of this phenomenon. 
Although we have seen some reform to this of late, the atmosphere of silence 
surrounding sexual violence against women is still pervasive and especially disturbing 
given that such events are fundamentally antithetical to the dignity of women qua persons. 
A world where this is pervasive, on top of devaluing and harming women, also limits one’s 
moral perceptions of personhood when seeing women. Similarly upsetting, many men 
maintain epistemically problematic dispositions towards this reality or, at worst, are 
presently incapable of having alternative moral perceptions of it. As bell hooks, a black 
feminist philosopher, puts it, socialization in patriarchy becomes a tool used to forge people 
into expressions of masculine or feminine subjectivity under the guiding hand of a culture 
of domination. As a result, women come to fear men as an origin of violence, to have moral 
perception of them as ‘cruel’ or ‘violent’, and, hooks claims, men also come to fear that 
same violent potential.244 The perpetuation of the “wait until your father comes home” 
narrative among other things communicates the idea that masculinity is about power, 
domination, and fear. Hooks writes,  
“Patriarchy is a political-social system that insists that males are inherently dominating, 
superior to everything and everyone deemed weak, especially females, and endowed with 
the right to dominate and rule over the weak and to maintain that dominance through 
various forms of psychological terrorism and violence.”245  
She points out that patriarchal masculinity “teaches men that their selfhood has meaning 
only in relation to the pursuit of external power; such masculinity is a subtext of the 
dominator [social] model”246 where men achieve manhood, the ideal of meaning, only if 
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they dominate. Hegemonic boyhood socialization, thereby, becomes defined by the 
expression of violence, emotional distance, and coming to see any intimate or genuine form 
of emotional connection with another as alien or, at worst, obscene. Granted, men and 
women have vastly different reasons to fear the patriarchal agent and to have the moral 
perceptions of the other as they do. The violence experienced by each intersectional subject 
will vary. Yet, it is seemingly the case that fear pervades our lives as a result of our 
embeddedness in a society that perpetuates an ideology of domination. We are afraid of 
being dominated and this fear shapes our moral perceptions in a compulsory way by 
defining the epistemic grounds upon which those perceptions are formed, by shaping our 
store consciousness. 
Patriarchy, thereby, enforces an oppressive form of socialization. It systematically 
oppresses and harms because it makes intersubjective modes of fear an ever present reality 
rather than a passing moment in life.247 Where women are taught to systematically fear 
men because of the emotional or physical violence perpetrated by patriarchy’s domination 
of them qua women, it seems that men, myself included, appear to systematically fear other 
men. According to hooks, this fear results from the knowledge that failing to meet the 
demands of hegemonic masculinity makes you the target of male violence: a kind of 
violence that men are also aware of because they experience hegemonic masculinity’s 
curriculum of practiced violence, bullying, and abuse. Again, this sense of fear will be 
realized across various social identities in both content and intensity because, for example, 
the black male subject, the immigrant, and white male subject have different reasons to 
fear a routine traffic stop. Yet, as hooks points out, we are all afraid. She writes, “this is 
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the big secret we all keep together-the fear of patriarchal maleness that binds everyone in 
our culture.”248 Fear, in this sense, pushes us away from each other, it interrupts our 
connections to the other and disrupts our access to liberating moral perceptions.  
Socialization has the ability to influence the epistemic subject through hidden or 
explicit curriculums that shape store consciousness, and thereby our moral perceptions. 
DC, under a Marcusean-Buddhist Affect Theory, shows how such systems are reinforced. 
Taken together, the nature of our immediate moral perceptions of the value landscape is 
marked by unfreedom: our inability to choose how we perceive the moral features of the 
world during occurrent experience.  
To further motivate this idea that we are not as free as we wish we were, consider 
the following scenario. Phil loves his son (Sam) and takes his role as a father very seriously. 
Committed to his “manhood”, Phil expresses his masculinity through conventional 
activities by participating in sporting rituals, his work as a mechanic, and by teaching Sam 
how to fish and hunt. As Sam gets older, Phil begins to bond with Sam by rebuilding a 
truck together in preparation for his senior year of high school. Sam picks up on the skills 
quickly and soon expresses the desire to follow in Phil’s footsteps. For Phil, being with 
Sam is an experience filled with joy and, as Ahmed might put it, an encounter with Sam is 
a happy experience. Phil has moral perceptions of Sam which represent Sam’s moral value 
as a person, his dignity. One day, at dinner, Sam sits with his family (mom, dad, and his 
sister) and says that he’s not happy. Sam then comes out to his family. Phil’s beliefs about 
the moral status of homosexuality (i.e., that it is a moral wrong according to his religious 
views) results in a huge fight. Over time, Phil fails to reconcile his moral values, his life 
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with Sam, and this new information regarding Sam’s sexual identity. Experiences with Sam 
are no longer happy for Phil and Phil’s compulsory moral perceptions of Sam change into 
taking Sam to be representative of something ‘wrong’.  
There are many ways this scenario could have played out and it is not the intention 
of this example to provide a one-dimensional account of the coming-out process nor how 
one expresses any religious values. Instead, the Phil-scenario represents a contrast case 
indicative of how the unfreedom of our moral perceptions during occurrent experience can 
manifest in our lives. Phil, as a subject, is not free to experience Sam any way he wishes at 
any singular moment. Instead, his moral perceptions are compulsory and rendered 
meaningful for him by means of his store consciousness. Yet, the contents of store 
consciousness can change during transformative moments, those times which have 
significance or existential import for the subject thereby reshaping, nursing, or planting 
seeds within one’s store consciousness. In Phil’s case, we can easily contrast his pre-Sam-
coming-out experiences with his post-Sam-coming-out experiences and, in doing so, see 
that Sam’s coming out was a transformative moment for Phil. Phil’s paternal attraction to 
Sam (as an mode of affectively expressing Eros) has been reshaped into a repulsion (as a 
mode of affectively expressing Thanatos). DC’s Buddhist synthesis of Marcuse and Affect 
theory allows us to catalogue the shift in Phil’s moral perceptions of Sam while 
appreciating the conditions required for that shift because both Phil’s ways of thinking 
about Sam and the embodied affects experienced when looking at Sam point to the 
epistemological mechanisms underlying Phil’s occurrent experience. That is, Phil’s moral 
perceptions of Sam track shifts in Phil’s knowledge about Sam in conjunction with the 
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background beliefs and affective dispositions Phil as accumulated over his lifetime 
pertaining to homosexuality.  
Developing a Marcusean Affect theory by means of Buddhist concepts allows us 
to unpack our everyday moral perceptions. We can conceive of them as being founded 
upon one’s store consciousness as the background epistemic resource by which a subject 
comes to see the world as having a value landscape. This perceptual ability carries the 
errors of subjectivity inasmuch as one’s affective disposition, beliefs, and ways of thinking 
(i.e. one’s sense-abilities) about the world influence one’s moral perceptions of the world 
in an essentially compulsory way.  This is the corner stone of DC. 
DC articulates a complex model for understanding the epistemic subject as both 
affectively and rationally engaged in the world. Epistemic subjects exist in an information 
rich environment and, thereby, cannot be limited to the confines of contemporary theories 
of knowledge which exclude affects in favor of propositional knowledge. Affects reveal 
vital information about the world and how we come to see it. Moreover, DC amplifies and 
echoes claims made by Patricia Hill Collin’s Black Feminist Epistemology. That is, lived 
experiences shape consciousnesses with epistemic access to concepts and modes of 
knowing that reveal dimensions of reality (i.e., through moral perceptions) initially unseen 
or overlooked by those outside that standpoint. Presumably, individuals who exist in 
intersectional epistemic locations are, by definition, exposed to affective forces and, 
thereby, would be expected to adapt one’s accumulated affects and ways of thinking to the 
local environment.  
DC also points to a deeper need to understand that freedom is not synonymous with 
being affect-free or existing as a purely transcendental subject. Marcuse makes this 
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observation in his lecture on “Nature and Revolution” and in An Essay on Liberation. In 
the former, he writes,  
“... freedom is rooted in the primary drives of men and women, it is the vital need to 
enhance their life instincts. Prerequisite is the capacity of the senses to experience not only 
the “given” but also the “hidden” qualities of things which would make for the betterment 
of life … the senses are not only the basis for the epistemological constitution of reality, 
but also for its transformation, its subversion in the interest of liberation.”249 
Moreover, this echoes his earlier claims in the latter as he writes  
“new sensibility, which expresses the ascent of the life instincts over aggressiveness and 
guilt, would foster, on a social scale, the vital need for the abolition of injustice and misery 
and would shape the further evolution of the “standard of living” … [the] affirmation of 
the right to build a society in which the abolition of poverty and toil terminates in a universe 
where the sensuous, the playful, the calm, and the beautiful become forms of existence and 
thereby the Form of the society itself.”250  
Given DC, the liberation of the human creature’s moral perceptions depends, 
essentially, on the cultivation of store consciousness which expose the cruelty of objects 
which do not actually carry the promises they appear to have as cause-objects. The cruel 
optimism of neoliberal capitalist sensibilities regarding the good life must be undercut by 
an affective disposition which identifies such things as life-hindering rather than life-
affirming. Our affective and rational attachment to neoliberal objects of value are, as 
Marcuse puts it, forms of domination inasmuch they are mediated by the market’s depiction 
of false consumer needs or by the dominant class for the sake of maintaining existing power 
structures. We might say that these objects engender a cruel optimism in the Marcusean 
subject. As Berlant, a feminist affect theorist, puts it, this “optimism is cruel when it takes 
shape as an affectively stunning double bind: a binding to fantasies that block the 
satisfaction they offer, and a binding to the promise of optimism as such that the fantasies 
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have come to represent.”251 Or, as Ahmed puts it, “The promise of happiness takes this 
form: that if you have this or have that or do this or do that, then happiness is what 
follows.”252 
Notably, Marcuse’s call for a new sensibility, in response to these epistemic 
obstacles, becomes a praxis by which the individual takes freedom to be a biological 
necessity. This is a mode of store consciousness wherein one experiences the world in ways 
that are incapable of tolerating surplus repression and demands no other forms of repression 
other than that required for the “amelioration of life.”253 Marcuse’s new sensibility is, in 
this way, a call for a new form of experiential expression via our compulsory moral 
perceptions of occurrent experience and requires a renovation and cultivation of a new, life 
affirming, form of store consciousness. That is, it requires a revision and reinvestment into 
the praxis of cultivating life affirming sense-abilities. 
3.6 Conclusion: Marcuse’s New Sensibility and Buddhist Ethical Concepts 
 As a last takeaway, I would like to suggest that the dimensions of a new sensibility 
cultivated within a Marcusean version of Affect Theory and informed by Buddhist 
philosophy must adopt and cultivate positive dispositions to at least three Buddhist 
philosophical concepts.254 This new sensibility requires us to cultivate a store 
consciousness which emphasizes (1) the dependent origination/interdependent co-arising 
of our world, (2) the existence of dukkha and excess dukkha in our world, and (3) the 
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essential role of compassion as an affect and way of thinking in the understanding of (1) 
and alleviation of excess dukkha.  
 To the first point, (1) articulates a new sensibility which acknowledges that the 
world is fundamentally relational and that one antinomy of action is that the world comes 
to be though the collective action of individuals together. We arise together and create the 
world we live in as a collective activity. A new sensibility which acknowledges (1) adopts 
a life-affirming affect towards the interest of individuals which make up a collective 
because, as the Dalai Lama writes, “it is in everyone’s interest to do what leads to happiness 
and avoid that which leads to suffering. And because, as we have seen, our interests are 
inextricably linked, we are compelled to accept ethics as an indispensable interface 
between my desire to be happy and yours.”255 
 To the second and third points, (2) seems clearly supported by current times. 
Suffering exists and there is excess suffering both in the form of physical suffering and in 
the surplus repression of the psyche to adopt forms of cruel optimism and dispositions of 
happiness towards harmful behaviors. (3) seems to articulate at least one affective force or 
personal affect which can grant epistemic access to identifying, via moral perception, the 
various forms of excess dukkha (physical or repressive). As an expression of Eros, the life 
drive, compassion can manifest either as self-love or the love of others. In this way, 
compassion articulates an essential tool for capturing unhappy affects and to intensify one’s 
motivational force to change the conditions which create such sufferings.  
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Relatedly, Ahmed writes, “I think it is the very exposure of these unhappy effects 
[perhaps by the feminist killjoy] that is affirmative, that gives us an alternative set of 
imaginings of what might count as a good or better life. If injustice does have unhappy 
affects, then the story does not end there…. we might want to reread melancholic subjects, 
the ones who refuse to let go of suffering, who are even prepared to kill some forms of joy, 
as an alternative model of the social good.”256 As I interpret this passage, it seems that 
through an expression of enlightened compassion, a sustained engagement with the 
suffering of others and ourselves, we can wrestle with sources of excess suffering in the 
world in order to open up the possibility for liberation. By refusing to accommodate or 
identify with systems of oppression, perhaps by refusing to express our compassion in ways 
prescribed by those systems, we can reject those systems and express compassion towards 
people in those systems. In this respect, I take being a Killjoy to be an act of intense 
compassion which acknowledges humanization and liberation over brutalization and 
domination. 
 I take what has been presented here as the beginning of a process by which we can 
start to use the notion of the epistemic subject as a duality, as embodied and cerebral, to 
the advantage of social justice efforts because DC makes explicit the unfreedom of moral 
perception. This unfreedom must be addressed if we are to overcome the oppressive way 
our current society, and its members, facilitates false moral perceptions which take 
oppressive forms of life to be life affirming. Embodied affects and ways of thinking must 
not always serve the ends of neoliberal capitalist sensibilities. Rather, cultivating 
enlightened seeds of compassion, recognizing surplus dukkha in its physical and repressive 
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forms, and coming to see the deeply intersubjective nature of our existence can begin to 
shape one’s store consciousness to see the world, not just as it is, but as it could be. Moral 
perceptions prompted from this position could be truly liberating.  
Yet, how we respond to immediate experience may be prone to hegemony if we do 
not exercise a healthy amount of skepticism about our moral perceptions of occurrent 
experience because they are compulsory forms of knowing. In this way, there is hope 
because we do seem to have the capacity to influence our store consciousness by seeking 
out experiences and practicing ways of thinking which emphasize humanization and 
liberation over brutalization and domination. This capacity is the cornerstone to expressing 
our freedoms during immediate experience. To see suffering, to see its source, and to see 
the path to liberation we must begin by acknowledging that our immediate moral 
perceptions of the world are expressions of our unfreedom. 
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CHAPTER 4. MORAL BLINDNESS AND MORAL REASONS 
4.1 Introduction 
The ability to access moral reasons during an encounter with an ethically pertinent 
moment is an essential dimension of moral living by virtue of its impact on our ethical 
reasoning. Without reliable access to moral reasons, a subject navigates immediate ethical 
situations with neither sign nor signal to act in ways which meet the demands of morality, 
whatever those demands turn out to be.257 Accessing reasons for moral actions in 
immediate experience is essential to our existence as moral agents and, thereby, it should 
be troubling to us when we encounter those who seem incapable of accessing reasons for 
moral action in situations laden with oppressive potential. In a world where colonialism, 
racism, sexism, patriarchy, and other immoral social structures have resulted in an 
oppressive reality for many and where others invalidate or overlook reasons to repair those 
conditions, we should ask: what enables or maintains a subject’s immediate insensitivity 
to those moral reasons which motivate humanization and liberation as antidotes to 
brutalization and domination?  
 In what follows, I investigate how socialization shapes subjective moral ignorances 
and thereby undermines a person's’ ability to access (i.e., epistemically grasp) moral 
reasons in immediate perceptual experience. I argue that oppressive modes of socialization 
enable the cultivation of moral ignorance regarding the dignity and suffering of the other 
or self. That is, oppressive socialization coerces subjects to internalize normative 
expectations about the social world which causes pathological blindness to reasons (i.e., it 
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causes moral blindness) consequently threatening a subject’s autonomy. In making this 
argument, I unpack and defend the epistemic foundation supporting relational views of 
autonomy. Given this, I end by suggesting that a fundamental reorientation of ourselves to 
the world’s moral dimensions becomes imperative if we are to reliably access moral 
reasons during our immediate experiences of the world, reasons which motivate us to 
follow through on our obligations to others and foster conditions hospitable to moral 
autonomy.  
4.2 Immediate Experiences, Moral Reasons, and Autonomy 
Under some accounts of autonomy, one is autonomous if and only if one’s actions 
are self-regulated and where one chooses in accordance with the demands of reason by 
means of a self-driven deliberative procedure. This family of views are referred to as 
proceduralist views of autonomy. We have, among many others, Kant and, more recently, 
Gerald Dworkin to thank for this model of autonomy. Models of this kind stress the 
importance of self-reflection and procedural independence from coercive manipulation 
during choice-making processes in assessing the autonomous status of an agent. Dworkin 
(1989) adopts this view because, he claims, it ensures that the assessment of one’s 
autonomy is independent from conceptions of value.258 
It is worth noting that such views are often silent on what reasons are available to 
the agent during deliberation, relying on standards like competency or the authenticity of 
the held belief to define the subject’s relationship to the epistemic environment.259 As a 
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result, those in heavily oppressive social situations who are competent thinkers that 
genuinely hold some set of beliefs can be described as adequately deliberating within the 
boundaries of those beliefs and thereby be referred to as autonomous agents. However, this 
idealization of autonomy as a socially-isolated procedural activity is problematic for 
reasons that Charles Mills brought to our attention during his critique of ideal ethical 
theories. They are “in crucial respects obfuscatory, and can indeed be thought of as in part 
ideological, in the pejorative sense of a set of group ideas that reflect, and contribute to 
perpetuating, illicit group privilege.”260 As a result, proceduralist views seemed prone to 
overlook an essential component to autonomous living: those lived conditions which make 
autonomy possible in the first place. Afterall, as Axel Honneth points out, recognition in 
the form of acknowledged social, legal, and material needs is a precondition for the 
possibility of autonomy.261 Procedural views of the concept often overlook the 
interdependent nature of our epistemic faculties in favor of idealizing our capacity for 
independent thinking by minimizing the impact of socialization and life’s experience on 
one’s agential existence. These views pull the subject out of their lived conditions and, in 
doing so, rob us of appreciating the fact that autonomy is practiced within lived contexts, 
often within a world shaped by an ideology of domination.262 
In contrast, works by bell hooks, Patricia Hill Collins, or Paul Benson’s “Autonomy 
and Oppressive Socialization” challenge this perspective by addressing issues related to 
what reasons are available to an agent.263 These kind of views support self-reflection and 
procedural independence but also argue for some kind of substantive interdependence 
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condition in their views on autonomy; these are relational views of autonomy.264 Using 
Benson’s work as an example, relational views challenge proceduralist views utilizing the 
following kind of observation:  
“In some prominent cases, the general means by which oppressive socialization operates 
are no different than those which benign socialization takes effect. This indicates that the 
role of critical reflection in the will of agents whose autonomy is diminished could be 
largely the same as its role in the wills of those who enjoy greater autonomy. If this is true, 
then the sensitivity of conduct to critical reflection cannot be the sole determinant of 
autonomy.”265  
The point is, simply put, that it is dubious for us to claim that two agents (A and B) 
are both autonomous when A and B are equal in their critical reflective capacity but have 
disparate access to reasons in an epistemic environment shaped by oppressive structures. 
This is to suggest that cages of oppression create striations in the environment which serve 
as autonomy-limiting boundaries for epistemic agents. For example, imagine that Jack and 
Pat work at a machine shop. Jack, a white male with a modest socioeconomic upbringing, 
wakes up one morning with a moderate headache. He decides to take a sick day because, 
upon reflection, he realizes he has an abundance of sick days, he can stay home today 
without expecting much decline in his social capital at work, and so on. Given the two 
options, work or stay home, he decides to stay home because the immediate reasons in his 
experience for doing so are evidently more persuasive inasmuch as he sees few reasons to 
reject the belief that sick days are to be used for self-care. He takes his headache experience 
to contain reasons to stay home that outweigh his non-experiential immediate reasons for 
going to work.  
 
264 Christman (2018) 
265 Benson, pp. 385-408 
149 
In contrast, Pat, a white female from a modest socioeconomic upbringing, wakes 
up with a moderate headache. She is also aware that she has an abundance of sick days, 
that she could stay home today without expecting much decline in her social capital at 
work, and so on. Yet, she also believes, unlike Jack, that taking a sick day in this case 
would be a selfish expression of self-care. This last idea, that “self-care is self-indulgence”, 
is itself a socialized feature of Pat’s epistemic life and it has immediate justificatory import 
on her experience of her headache. It shapes the immediate experience she is having of her 
headache in such a way that devalues its importance when compared to those non-
experiential reasons (i.e., those propositional reasons) to go to work. As a result, she goes 
to work. We should take note that Pat possesses the same critically reflective capacities as 
Jack, she is responsive to the demands of reason, and is deliberatively competent, but 
nonetheless chooses to go to work because she takes self-care to be self-indulgence rather 
than an act of self-preservation. At first glance, Pat’s socialization undercuts her capacity 
to access or appreciate immediate reasons which prompt her to experience the need for 
self-care as justificationally immediate moral evidence for taking care of one’s self.266 Pat, 
under a relational view of autonomy, would be said to deploy her agency utilizing a limited 
exercise of autonomy whereas Jack seemingly enjoys a wider kind of autonomy. In 
contrast, under a proceduralist view, both Pat and Jack would be considered fully 
autonomous agents.  
As used here, socialization should be understood as an epistemic process which 
motivates an agent to internalize some set of social sensibilities, or norms, so that these 
standards become an essential part of how that person encounters and interprets themselves 
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and the world. Focusing on appearance narratives for women, Benson observes that this 
“is why socialization of feminine appearance does not rely solely upon [explicit] coercion 
for its effectiveness.”267 Benson rightly points out that a feature of oppressive socialization 
is that it indoctrinates targets to believe in false standards to the detriment of their epistemic 
worldview. Referencing cases of personal adornment, he writes “It is not true that feminine 
appearance is a necessary ingredient of a woman’s personal worth.”268 Oppressive forms 
of socialization can systematically lead agents to “misconstrue many of the reasons there 
are for them to act” and, Benson claims, this operates to impair autonomy.269 Put simply, 
it undermines autonomy because it undercuts the agent’s ability to see the self-evident force 
of reasons to act in morally salient ways, as seeing some reason as an efficaciously 
immediate justified reason-for-them.  
It is worth observing that socialization inscribes epistemic sensitivities into the 
subject by means of life’s experiences. Life’s events sculpt our epistemic sensitivities by 
providing definition to our affective dispositions, habits of thought, and shaping our beliefs. 
These epistemic foundations are used to render our immediate experiences intelligible 
thereby materializing a set of reasons for the agent. Benson echoes this observation in the 
following passage, 
“... feminine socialization gains much of its power by operating to deceive many women 
about the significance that cultivating an appearance which pleases men has for women’s 
worth as persons. Women’s autonomy is reduced to the extent that they are socially trained 
to be blind to the reasons there are for them to regard their appearance differently from the 
norms of femininity recommended. But, by the same token, men who develop their gender 
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identity in societies that oppressively socialize women are also liable to be blinded 
systematically to important reasons there are for them to treat women different.”270 
While Benson makes no claim about the perceptual nature of these reasons, I argue in other 
pieces that access to reasons in immediate perceptual experience is shaped by forces of 
socialization. As such, “to have access to moral reasons” signaling one to act in some 
morally demanding way, in my view, is an activity fueled by immediate moral perceptual 
experience (i.e., the moral perceptual experientialist view). However, if one takes 
immediate moral reasons to be judgements of morally neutral perceptual experience, then 
to have access to such reasons would be a function of one’s ability to infer, automatically 
or deliberately, moral judgements from morally neutral perceptual content (i.e., the moral 
perceptual judgementalist view). While I write from the experientialist perspective moving 
forward, I suspect that the judgementalist can read what follows as compatible with their 
views. However, the sense in which I claim later that one becomes morally blind to reasons 
in the experientialist view is itself not a metaphor as it would be in the judgementalist view. 
I will return to this later. 
It is worth noting that there is something fundamentally disturbing about cases 
where there are reasons to do X in the world (say to treat women with respect) and an agent 
is experientially cut off from that reason as a reason-for-them (i.e., where it is encountered 
as having immediate self-evident justification for responding X-ly) in either the affective 
or cognitive sense. In cases relevant to this project, the disturbing nature of this scenario is 
seemingly a function of oppressive socialization’s propensity to systematically blind 
people to important reasons to act in certain ways. 
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Salient moral reasons for acting X-ly may include the dignity of persons, the pain 
of others, thick evaluative content associated with certain terms like Courage or Violence, 
the future possibility of a more just world, or some other property presumably present 
during our engagements with the lived world. Regardless of kind, the opaqueness or 
absence of reasons in one’s experience appears to correlate with how our epistemic 
sensitivities are fundamentally shaped by our rational habits, affective dispositions, and 
beliefs (i.e., by our moral perceptual orientation). That is, we come to make sense of our 
reality and this can, in cases where oppressive socialization occurs, limit or warp the set of 
immediate moral reasons available to us when making decisions. It is for this reason that 
Benson argues that oppressive socialization leads to a systematic undermining of autonomy 
in the relational sense of the concept.   
That said, the goal of this section is not to produce a hard and fast defense of 
relational autonomy. The purpose of this interlude is to motivate our interest in the 
fundamental relationship between our ability to access moral reasons, ethical life, and 
socialization. Instead, this paper is intended to provide a framework for understanding the 
kind of phenomenon which often motivates relational views of autonomy. The aim is to 
provide a framework for understanding the moral epistemological foundations underlying 
relational views of autonomy. This should make clear why it is dubious to claim that two 
agents (A and B) are both autonomous when A and B are equal in their critical reflective 
capacity but have disparate access to reasons in the epistemic environment due to 
oppressive conditions that result in a shifting of the perceived experiential landscape. In 
this sense, to have disparate access to reasons means that A and B will have different access 
to reasons in the epistemic landscape because of one’s access-enabling epistemic position 
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(i.e., one informed by an access-granting lived experience, bit of knowledge, affective 
disposition, and so on as argued by Patricia Hill Collin’s postmodern yet intersectional 
articulation of standpoint epistemology) and the other’s access-disabling position (i.e., an 
access-undermining lived experience, bit of knowledge, affective disposition, and so on). 
I develop this framework in what follows by first developing a conception of moral 
ignorance and then arguing that moral blindness to reasons is the result of oppressive 
socialization’s capacity to construct modes of subjectivity marked by moral ignorance. 
Moral blindness is, at its core, a pathology spread by modes of socialization which 
perpetrate an ideology of domination through the reinforcement and replication of a 
society’s webs of domination.  
4.3 Models of Ignorance  
Linda Martin Alcoff describes models of ignorance as giving an account of “a type 
of subjectivity that forms patterns of perceptual attentiveness and supplies belief-
influencing premises” which give the subject an incomplete account of reality.271 Given 
this, any epistemology of ignorance should be understood as articulating a way of 
epistemically encountering the world that creates selectivities and blind spots in a subject’s 
epistemic life by limiting their access to reasons. An epistemic agent should be considered 
ignorant if her/his cognitive or affective habits or beliefs are inadequate to access some 
area of inquiry; I refer to this model of ignorance as the cognitive model of ignorance 
(CMI). Moral ignorance in this model is a kind of subjectivity that results from articulated 
patterns of affective attunements, beliefs, and cognitive heuristics which manifest 
selectivities and blind spots in a subject’s epistemic encounter with moral reasons in the 
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world. Under CMI, an agent’s morally articulated patterns of affective attunements, beliefs, 
and cognitive heuristics comprise what I call one’s epistemic toolkit because they shape 
our encounter with the world. Thus, to be morally ignorant is to possess an epistemic toolkit 
that supports a lived subjectivity which effectively blinds a person to certain reasons in the 
moral landscape. 
CMI is preferable to alternative views of ignorance for a few reasons. Knowledge-
dependent ignorance views, like that articulated by Code (1993 & 1995), claim that an 
ignorant agent is described as such when he/she lacks the knowledge required to accurately 
access some area of inquiry. The white male subject is seen as epistemically hindered from 
or incapable of knowing about lived experiences associated with patriarchal or racial 
oppression, as areas of inquiry, because he is the benefactor of those systems. He lacks 
knowledge of the negative consequences of his privileged systems and thereby he does not 
gain access to their oppressive structures. Under this model, this lack of knowledge results 
in a lack of access to an important set of available reasons for action.   
Clearly, a person cannot be justifiably said to have access to the quale of others or 
to say that one knows the lived experiences of others.272 However, it does not follow from 
this that the socially privileged are incapable of coming to learn (i.e., acquire knowledge 
of) things about the experiences of oppressed peoples. To claim otherwise is untenable 
because such a position ignores the human capacity for empathic imagination, sympathetic 
understanding, and narrative sharing. Granted, access may be more difficult, but it is not 
prima facie denied to the socially privileged. It is conceivable that one could couple a 
 
272 To illustrate, consider the unsound epistemic claim that a white male can know what it is like to be a black woman. At base, this is 
epistemically impossible if we expect him to understand the everyday lived subjective experience of her life. To demand as much 
would be epistemically irresponsible while also putting her subjectivity under erasure. 
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sustained empathic engagement with the scholarly or narrative projects (i.e., such as 
showing up in support of social movements) of marginalized populations in an effort to 
make strides towards understanding the alienated lives of the oppressed, to see oppressive 
conditions/structures as a moral failure of our society, and to take steps to change society 
or oneself based on that knowledge. Projects like Cherríe Moraga’s and Gloria E. 
Anzaldúa’s The Bridge Called my Back or Mishuana Goeman’s Mark my Words are prime 
examples of resources available for such undertakings. Yet, such efforts are believed to be 
ineffective under the knowledge-dependent view. Thus, I take this view to be unattractive 
because it claims that one is epistemically cut off from more things than is the case. 
Alternatively, experience-dependent ignorance views claim that one’s social 
group identity is epistemically omnirelevant across contexts because identity defines one’s 
epistemic standpoint. This model is often attributed to Sandra Harding (1991) and is 
characterized by the idea that social identity just is the driving force behind our epistemic 
lives. The ignorant agent here is defined as such when she/he possesses an underprivileged 
set of experiences towards some target of inquiry thereby limiting one’s access to reasons 
for action. Rather than lacking some knowledge set, the subject experientially acquires 
ways of thinking or affective dispositions. As a result, “epistemic advantages and 
disadvantages accrue to social and group identities per se rather than to identities only in 
relation to a given context of inquiry.”273  
However, this model too closely entertains a version of epistemic identity 
essentialism. In this view, a subject is going to be beholden to a set of rigid expectations 
across contexts. In this way, a social identity becomes essential to the subject in the 
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epistemic sense because it has become a defining feature of how that person experiences 
the world regardless of context. This is problematic because it ignores the intersectional 
nature of human ontology. That is, it takes the socially identified subject as ontologically 
limited to one or two social positions and puts any deeper sense of subjectivity under 
erasure. The black body is essentially black, the female body is essentially female, and the 
black female body is essentially black and female in every context. Yet, a black female’s 
public identification as a female can be more predominant in the formation of her 
experiences with black men and her identity as black can do the same for her experiences 
in white communities. Her experiences are not constituted the same way in all contexts, 
and the constellation of her formative social identities will be both dynamic over time and 
from context to context. The experience-dependent view problematically flirts with the 
possibility that the subject is epistemically cut off from certain knowledge because of a 
reductionary social ontology. This is problematic because it does not account for how 
shifting spaces and contexts impact lived experience or relationally constructed 
subjectivity.  
In contrast, CMI’s strengths are, in my assessment, fourfold. First, it gives an 
account of an epistemic standpoint as a function of socialization in the performative 
standards for socially constructed identities in various contexts thereby recognizing the 
intersectional nature of human ontology. Second, it acknowledges that those standards are 
accidental across contexts thereby granting that individuals maintain a sense of individual 
subjectivity in the larger scheme of a publicly assigned identity. Third, CMI theorizes that 
ignorance is a pervasive yet resolvable feature of human existence in many cases because 
every person, to some degree, inhabits an intersectional epistemic standpoint. Yet, CMI 
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also allows for the possibility of overcoming said ignorance if one commits to reshaping 
one’s patterns of affective attentiveness, ways of thinking, and belief-influencing premises.  
It is worth noting that CMI inherits its sense of subjectivity and consciousness from 
Hegel, Marx, and, in the contemporary sense, Patricia Hill Collins. Marx’s The German 
Ideology proposes a kind of subjectivity wherein “Life is not determined by consciousness, 
but consciousness by life… [individuals] developing their material production and their 
material intercourse, alter, along with their real existence, their thinking and the products 
of their thinking.”274 As a claim about the epistemic structure of the human subject and the 
order of our world, Marx’s life creating consciousness foreshadows the Hegelian-style 
work of György Lukács 1968 History and Class Consciousness. Lukács points out that the 
position of the proletariat in society and history formulates a standpoint, a node of lived 
experience, which grants that population a kind of view from below. The view from below 
allows for enhanced epistemic access to certain features of the social world; features which 
go unseen and are perhaps difficult to see by the epistemically disadvantaged bourgeois 
who were said to be imprisoned in a kind of warped immediacy.275 The bourgeois, in an 
uncritical and epistemically docile state, systematically lack access to reasons that are 
accessible to the exploited proletariat.  
Patricia Hill Collins continues this line of reasoning in the development of her 
views on black feminist epistemology. In Black Feminist Thought, Collins synthesizes 
feminist standpoint theory with post-structuralism in an effort to articulate, among other 
things, a centrality thesis: that scholars from marginalized populations must be the core 
 
274 Retrieved from https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm 
275 Hegel’s master and slave dialectic makes these same claims about the epistemic status of the master being more limited than the 
slave, who is still toiling with the world and its possibilities. 
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contributors to identity-based knowledges. Black feminist thought must be informed by 
black feminists because that population is epistemically sensitive to the lived experience 
of the black woman due to the fact that they have the right epistemic toolkits for the task. 
Experiential centrality, thereby, reveals structures in the lived world which are opaque, but 
not inaccessible, to others. What is more, Collins’s theoretical framework does not mix and 
stir identity categories in the development of an epistemic standpoint. Rather, standpoints 
become historically and structurally shaped by larger social narratives, heuristics, and by a 
subject’s lived experiences. Thus, epistemic standpoints are cultivated by the web of power 
relationships and one’s experiences articulate positions for understanding the lived world 
while not invalidating other standpoints as lacking access to the features of that world.276 
Instead, the subject’s epistemic access to the world is always partial and always shaped by, 
but not wholly determined by, the lived experiences of the subject’s identity.  
It is also worth noting that, as a theory of cognition, CMI echoes Miranda Fricker’s 
views in Epistemic Injustice. She writes “the virtuous agent’s perceptual capacity is 
accounted for in terms of a sensitivity to morally salient features of the situation 
confronting him.”277 She goes on to say that this “sensitivity is underwritten by a set of 
background assumptions about the trustworthiness of different social types in different 
sorts of context.”278 Admittedly, Fricker’s major focus in Epistemic Injustice is the 
epistemology of testimony. However, she is also giving a description of the epistemic role 
heuristics can play in an agent’s cognition of the world. Fricker argues that the epistemic 
differences between the racist hearer’s rejection of and the non-racist hearer’s acceptance 
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of testimony given by racially identified subjects follow from the heuristics developed 
throughout one’s life. These heuristics create a cognitive framework which guides our 
sense of value in the world and, thereby, leads us to experience the world as a canvas of 
values and moral impressions. Similarly, Margaret Olivia Little’s feminist moral 
epistemology (1995 & 1997) claims that the virtuously attuned agent possesses knowledge 
of the moral terrain as a conception of how to live. She rightly claims that the characteristic 
difference between a virtuous and non-virtuous person’s cognitive state is that the former 
has this sort of broad conception whereas the latter does not. This means that the moral 
landscape, as a space of reasons for action, is cognitively different for the virtuous and non-
virtuous person as a feature of each’s cognitive states. Little’s epistemic project engages 
itself with the notion that one’s character states impact the way one experiences the world. 
Taken together, Fricker and Little both hold that two subjects with two different sets of 
background believes or affective dispositions regarding moral value will invariably come 
to understand the same experiences as containing different moral content. CMI holds the 
same.  
4.4 Moral Ignorance and Moral Blindness 
Charles W. Mills argues that white ignorance manifests under certain conditions 
where the dominant social group of whiteness has a positive interest in seeing the world 
inaccurately. In my language, a dominant social group has a positive interest in preserving 
a social advantage which correlates with a positive interest in encountering certain 
privilege-preserving reasons in the world rather than privilege-dismantling reasons. Mills’s 
view, articulated by means of CMI, proposes an account of ignorance where the material 
existence of the white subject shapes the very form of his/her consciousness. Mills’s 
160 
account of white ignorance is an archetypal example of how one might utilize CMI to 
interpret the epistemic resistance displayed by the socially privileged. He shows us how a 
subjectivity sculpted by ignorance challenges the intuition that we always have an 
overriding invested interest in seeing the world as it is or in seeing every salient reason in 
the moral landscape.  
His account of white ignorance also supports the claim that ignorance is not always 
willful. One’s epistemic toolkit does not always contain willfully selected contents but 
rather it carries historized content which often conforms to a social structure whose 
effective project is to reinforce domains of ignorance in the subject -- Mills’s focus being 
racial constructions of ignorance.279 Ideology, so conceived as the superstructural region 
of society, assembles the cognitive framework of the agent in a socialization process 
thereby reinforcing self-policing behaviors, affective attunements, and thinking habits in 
conformity with the dominant ideology. Ideologies themselves “have a materialist 
genealogy and can be explained in terms of people’s “historical life-process.”280  
As such, Mills rightfully claims that white ignorance is an epistemic practice which 
systematically shapes an agent's experience of reality. It does so to the extent that structures 
of white supremacism prescribe “an epistemology of ignorance [as] a particular pattern of 
localized and global cognitive dysfunctions producing the ironic outcome that whites will, 
in general, be unable to understand the world they themselves have made.”281 Stated in 
terms of CMI, white subjects have maintained and adopted an ideology of domination 
which systematically shapes one’s epistemic toolkit in ways which pathologically 
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undercuts the white subject’s access a swath of reasons in the moral landscape. As a result, 
the privileged white subject often faces a potent insensitivity to aspects of the world as 
experienced by the oppressed; all done seemingly for the sake of preserving social 
advantage or priority. He concludes that those infected by white ignorance282 will come to 
live in a “racial fantasyland” wherein ignorance is the “cognitive and moral economy 
psychically required for conquest, colonization, and enslavement.”283 These agents will 
thereby come to see meritocracy as the prevailing law of the land even though there exists 
overwhelming evidence showing that certain classes of the population are systematically 
underprivileged and oppressed categorically by race, class, gender or sexuality. 
As a result, the truths articulated by these lived realities of the oppressed are not 
accessible reasons, observations that call for action or knowledge acquisition, for those 
plagued by systemic forms of ignorance. As Mills describes it in The Racial Contract, one’s 
cognitive model can distort reality in virtue of its historically generated content. He writes, 
“concepts orient us to the world, and it is a rare individual who can resist this inherited 
orientation. Once established in the social mindset, its influence is difficult to escape, since 
it is not a matter of seeing the phenomenon with the concept discretely attached but rather 
of seeing things through the concept itself.”284 And this is the central concern of this paper, 
understanding what it is like to see things through our moral conceptions as rendered by 
our background beliefs and affective dispositions.  
Abstracting from Mills’s example, those peoples who operate under a species of 
ignorance so defined by CMI, be it white, male, or heteronormative ignorance, continue do 
 
282 Mills himself claims that this infection isn’t limited to the white population and I expect that he would say the same about forms of 
Male Ignorance and Heterosexual Ignorance.  
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so because they (1) believe in the dominant view about the general nature of society that 
represents basic forms of oppression and exploitation as basically just and (2) they possess 
beliefs, cognitive heuristics, or affective sensitivity (i.e., an epistemic toolkit) which resists 
countervailing evidence to their beliefs about this dominant view.285 Stated otherwise, they 
possess an epistemic toolkit prone to self-preservation of personal advantage by means of 
perpetuating some form of ignorance. They are attached to this perspective of the world 
and preserve that perspective for existential-preserving reasons. To reiterate, there is an 
invested interest by those whose reasoning and affective dispositions align with CMI to 
stay ignorant because it preserves their worldview. In these cases, we can see that people 
either want “not to know” or are compulsory moved “not to know” even if they are not, 
strictly speaking, willfully ignorant.286   
Now, it should be noted that Mills goes on to say the following: “I want a concept 
of white ignorance broad enough to include moral ignorance -- not merely ignorance of 
facts with moral implications but moral non-knowings, incorrect judgments about the 
rights and wrongs of moral situations themselves.”287 However, it is unclear as to whether 
moral ignorance is a broader category than white ignorance or vice versa for Mills. I 
suggest that moral ignorance provides the ground by which a subject can sustain a 
multiplicity of ignorances. That is, moral ignorance is distinct from and required for other 
forms of ignorance.  
This seems correct given that CMI structurally points to the acquisition of deficient 
moral affects, beliefs, or reasoning habits in one’s an epistemic toolkit as a precondition 
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286 Alcoff goes on to claim that this kind of unwilful ignorance is a side effect of what Horkheimer calls the Eclipse of Reason. We 
might also see this as a kind of unwilful ignorance caused by what Marcuse would call one-dimensional thinking.  
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for the possibility of identity-based ignorances like white ignorance. Such deficiencies 
manifest as false standards in one’s epistemic toolkit for making sense of experience. 
These can be false beliefs regarding the dignity of persons (e.g., taking someone to lack 
personhood), false ways of thinking about the other or self (e.g., heuristics which impose 
identity credibility deficits), false affective responses to the suffering of others (e.g., feeling 
positively attracted to oppression perpetuating violence), false beliefs regarding the 
existence of rigid social performative expectations (e.g., women must be submissive to be 
attractive), and so on. Briefly put, where an epistemic toolkit preserves practices of 
brutalization and domination over humanization and liberation, we should expect to find 
some morally deficient tools for accessing salient reasons in the moral landscape. 
Additionally, we should also be cautious of epistemic toolkits which enforce a pathological 
one-dimensional form of consciousness, one unwilling to acknowledge any internal 
contradictions in an epistemic toolkit and motivated by an existential attachment to one’s  
perspective of the lived world.  
To be clear, I am claiming that if you suffer from white ignorance, then you suffer 
from moral ignorance. Moral ignorance makes possible other forms of ignorance, white or 
otherwise.  Again, moral ignorance is a kind of subjectivity that results from morally 
articulated patterns of affective attunements and moral belief-influencing heuristics which 
manifest selectivities and blind spots in a subject’s encounter with moral reasons in the 
world. According to CMI, a subject’s encounter with the world and its moral dimensions 
is a function of our consciousness’s articulation of those experiences by use of our 
epistemic toolkit. This process reveals or conceals reasons for action in the experientially 
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immediate sense and involves affect attunements, beliefs, and ways of thinking (i.e. 
rational habits and heuristics).  
Kant famously argued that perceptions without concepts are blind. I am inclined to 
propose further that moral perceptions without concepts are blind, but also that moral 
perceptions with concepts can blind. This turn of phrase succinctly articulates the idea that 
moral beliefs, affects, and habits of thought in our epistemic toolkit serve as the cognitive 
scaffolding by which one’s understanding renders experiences intelligible. The view of the 
epistemic subject which grounds my observations about moral ignorance amounts to the 
claim that between the perceiver and the perceived exists epistemic mechanisms which 
render our encounters with the world into coherent experiences, thereby revealing reasons 
to the epistemic subject. The unmediated “given” would be an incomprehensible bloom 
and buzzing confusion without the various aggregates within our epistemic toolkit. Mills 
seems to make a similar observation in “White Ignorance” where he writes “perceptions 
are in general simultaneously conceptions, if only at a very low level.”288  
To summarize, our epistemic toolkit facilitates our understanding of the world 
thereby allowing our experiences to become intelligible. With this epistemic framework in 
mind, we would expect to find and do find, that those who possess epistemically disabling 
toolkits (i.e., one which is access-undermining) will possess a kind of morally warped 
experience of the world.289 Mills’s work on white ignorance gestures at this general 
phenomenon and ultimately concludes that the conceptual package associated with white 
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289 Please note, the phrase “perception of the world” shares conceptual similarities with “experience of the world” in this literature. As 
such, Mills and others use the term here in such a way that it reasonable to see perception being used in a metaphorical sense to 
gesture towards the experience of perceptual content rather than brute sensory experience. However, for now, I will remain agnostic as 
to whether Mills and other CMI users are offering a theory of perception. 
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supremacy “is driving the perception, with whites aprioristically intent on denying what is 
before them.”290  CMI and socialization’s epistemic impact shows us how a systematic 
moral blindness is functionally connected to an agent's propensity for moral ignorance. 
That is, our epistemic toolkit blocks our coming to see certain reasons in the moral 
landscape and this inability to see is moral blindness, something too often maintained by 
an existential attachment to seeing a world as familiar.291  
A provocative consequence of this line of reasoning suggests that racist, sexist, 
oppressive gendered content, and so on in one’s epistemic toolkit results in a kind of false 
consciousness.292 There exists some kind of illusory experience of reality in virtue of one’s 
moral blindness: one’s inability to encounter some set of reasons in the moral landscape. 
If we define an illusion as those occurrences where one experiences the world not as it is, 
then we should expect a reality warping and access-undermining epistemic toolkit to 
consistently result in an epistemic agent viewing the world falsely because they are 
experiencing it not as it is. Given this, I take it to be less contentious to claim that the agent 
plagued by oppressive ideologies suffers from a kind of massive illusion or even a kind of 
hallucination about the world because he/she already suffers from a morally deficient or 
impaired epistemic toolkit, something Mills articulates as experiencing a “fantasyland.” If 
one is morally blind to some set of reasons, then one is morally ignorant and if one is 
morally ignorant then one’s epistemic toolkit systematically articulates a false 
consciousness about the moral landscape. As a result, one suffers from a moral illusion 
caused by moral blindness under a subjectivity of moral ignorance.  
 
290 Mills 2007, p. 24 
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292 “False consciousness” here amounts to a false view of the world in the Buddhist sense or, as Ahmed (2017, p. 62) puts it “we use 
this term to show how there is something false about our consciousness of the world.”  
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The claim here is that any form of ignorance which follows the CMI model, be it 
white or male or heterosexual or other ignorances, is a symptomatic manifestation of a 
deeper, more basic, form of moral ignorance. To drive this point home, one should note 
that Mill’s’s notion of white ignorance is categorized by two features: First, a belief in the 
dominant view about the general nature of society that represents basic forms of oppression 
and exploitation as basically just and, second, a possession of cognitive norms by which to 
resist countervailing evidence to their beliefs about this dominant view. I am merely 
pointing out that adopting the dominant view about the general nature of society just means 
to adopt a certain ideology. If one thinks in cognitive models of white ignorance, then one 
takes up some ideology by virtue of having adopted certain moral commitments in one’s 
epistemic toolkit. For example, if one affirms “all are created equal” as a deeply held 
identity forming moral commitment at the expense of countervailing evidence in the real 
world (as one does when infected by white ignorance) then one must also lack further moral 
considerations towards the other and their dignity as persons with lived-experiences in 
favor of a kind of one-dimensional and morally false consciousness. One can singularly 
commit themselves to the dominant ideology that people are created equal and, thereby, 
conscious experience warps to fit this attitude because of a moral ignorance about our 
obligations to acknowledge the lived experiences of others on their terms. Moreover, 
critical engagement with the world, under an oppressive socialization scheme, becomes 
whittled down in favor of a dogmatist approach which feeds a vicious circle of self-
reinforcement because we experience the world the way we take it to be. For, as Marcuse 
wrote in One-Dimensional Man,  
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“... the “inner” dimension of the mind in which opposition to the status quo can take root 
is whittled down. The loss of this dimension, in which the power of negative thinking- the 
critical power of Reason- is at home, is the ideological counterpart to the very material 
process in which advanced industrial society silences and reconciles the opposition. The 
impact of progress turns Reason into submission to the facts of life, and to the dynamic 
capability of producing more and bigger facts of the same sort of life… There is only one 
dimension, and it is everywhere and, in all forms,… the “false consciousness” of their 
rationality becomes the true consciousness.”293 
4.5 Conclusion: The Need for a Fundamental Self-Reorientation Towards Values  
 The upshot here is that oppressive modes of socialization regularly cause subjects 
to internalize normative expectations about the social world which, in turn, causes a 
pathological blindness to moral reasons for liberating action. Interestingly, agents ensnared 
by access-limiting epistemic toolkits due to oppressive socialization can still exercise 
appropriate proceduralist practices defined by self-regulated and self-directed agency in 
ways that are both competent and genuine. As Marcuse and Mills points out, the faculties 
of the subject can assent to the “facts of life” as rendered by an one-dimensional or ignorant 
way of experiencing the social world. The takeaway is that exercising one’s agency within 
a social system of values, meanings, and reasonings allows one to make self-directed, self-
regulated, genuine, and competent choices within that system. As a result, oppressed 
morally blind subjects are classified as autonomous agents under the proceduralist view of 
autonomy. One can be autonomous in this sense even though one cannot see beyond what 
an oppressive system guides one to see.  
 Yet, this inability to access or the possibility of being cutting off from reasons in 
the epistemic landscape, especially in the moral landscape, is itself the very phenomenon 
which relational views of autonomy take as salient to an agent’s autonomy. Authors like 
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Benson observe that agents can “misconstrue many of the reasons there are for them to act” 
and the consequence   is an impairment to one’s autonomy wherever this occurs as a result 
of oppressive social structures. It is this link between the social structure and its impact on 
the individual’s epistemic access my means of socialization which indicates that the 
relational view of autonomy gets the picture right in these cases. The proceduralist view 
overlooks this link.   
The reader is asked to consider the epistemological relationship between an agent’s 
judgments, her/his epistemic toolkit, and the space of reasons available to her. General 
intuitions about illusions suggest that they should be avoided. When walking in a desert, 
one does not want to see a mirage of an oasis; rather an actual oasis is preferable when 
making life-saving judgments. The shadow-puppets of Plato’s cave were not real but 
imperfect imitations of the real and, thus, rejected as sources of knowledge. Descartes’s 
first meditation articulates a narrative whereby the author is plagued by the possibility that 
all he experiences is merely an illusion crafted by a malicious demon; an argument that 
must be resolved for the sake of securing knowledge. Nozick’s famous experience machine 
suggests to us that the very idea of having a simulated, i.e. illusionary, experience just is 
unpalatable for the very reason that it is not substantially connected to reality in a 
meaningful way.  
However, if these were accurate intuitions about our disposition towards illusions 
or if veridicality is both epistemologically and psychologically preferable to illusion, then 
why have so many people failed to cast off the illusionary world that has taken up residence 
in the real? What force keeps race, class, and gender biases on the proverbial table given 
that they entail a false consciousness of the world? The answer, I submit, is a combination 
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of moral blindness caused by socialized moral ignorance and one-dimensional thinking. 
Together, these produce a condition preserved by our existential attachment to our existing 
worldview.  
To be clear, moral ignorance should not be confused with the non-moralist or 
amoralist position. Where the non-moralist rejects the very idea that morality exists at all 
and the amoralist acknowledges the existence of moral imperatives but rejects the 
bindingness of those claims, the agent plagued by moral ignorance can and often does 
believe in some set of moral principles. The morally ignorant agent may even sincerely 
aim to live a life according to those principles. However, there are two traits that mark 
someone as a morally ignorant agent.  
The first is that he/she possesses a set of deficient moral beliefs, affective 
attunements, or habits of reasoning which mirror (in most cases) the kind of domination 
model of social relationships where there is value found in dominating the other. The 
morally ignorant agent can claim to have and be dialogically responsive to accurate, albeit 
vague, moral claims like “people should be treated justly” and “I believe in the American 
value of freedom.” However, the morally ignorant agent will consistently endorse 
judgments about particular cases which contradict said beliefs by preserving structures of 
domination. For example, they may endorse claims like “women just need to work harder 
to earn better pay” or “black people just need to be less lazy” when confronted with 
counter-evidence regarding equality in today’s world.    
The second trait is the idea that the morally ignorant agent knowingly or 
unknowingly resists efforts to detect or correct illusion producing aspects of their epistemic 
toolkit. Where the knowingly ignorant agent resists as an act of active choice, the 
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unknowingly ignorant agent is plagued by the deeply resistant nature of moral ignorance 
itself since not knowing is signaled as permissible or where a false moral claim is endorsed 
as true in the social milieu. Existential threat and personal attachment to their worldview 
mark this kind of behavior.  
Ultimately, as I use the term, the agent plagued by moral ignorance is one whose 
overriding but deficient epistemic toolkit informs a false consciousness of the world and 
who resists any efforts to acknowledge those defects or to reorient oneself. Taken together, 
these features entail that the morally ignorant are plagued by a one-dimensional form of 
thinking.  It is to adopt a view of oneself that is simultaneously resistant to modes of 
thinking differently but also a fundamental resistance to changing one’s affective 
attunement to the world. Because of this and because the morally ignorant use a deficient 
epistemic toolkit to render immediate perceptual experience intelligible, the morally 
ignorant agent is plagued by moral blindness to moral reasons in immediate experiences 
of morally pertinent situations. 
Moral ignorance and blindness results, in what Marcuse called, a smooth 
democratic unfreedom because one feels no need to refuse, to be skeptical, about the way 
one encounters the world. This insight, I believe, informs Marcuse’s call for a new 
sensibility in his Essay on Liberation. He writes,  
“The new sensibility, which expresses the ascent of the life instincts over aggressiveness 
and guilt, would foster, on a social scale, the vital need for the abolition of injustice and 
misery and would shape the further evolution of the “standard of living” … it emerges in 
the struggle against violence and exploitation where this struggle waged for essentially new 
ways and forms of life: the negation of the entire establishment, its morality, culture; 
affirmation of the right to build a society in which the abolition of poverty and toil 
terminates in a universe where the sensuous, the playful, the calm, and the beautiful become 
forms of existence and thereby the Form of the society itself.” 
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From this, we see that the antidote to dehumanization and domination is a new form of 
perceiving the world, one antithetical to moral blindness. If this is the goal of the ethical 
life, then the possibility of moral ignorance, and subsequently moral blindness, seemingly 
places certain moral obligations on the epistemic agent.  
Those plagued by moral ignorance are resistant to correcting their defective set of 
moral categories because they have an invested interest in remaining ignorant; they have 
an interest in preserving a cognitive model that aligns with their deeply held identity 
forming moral commitments and thereby suffer from one-dimensionality. Challenging 
moral ignorance and moral blindness means that an agent must seek out some form of 
transformative experience. In one sense, this experience can manifest as a prolonged and 
gradual change over time in a person’s dispositional habits or character. Such 
transformation happens, for example, during mindfulness training or during one’s 
educational development. This kind of change, as a reshaping of one’s epistemic toolkit, 
doesn’t happen overnight. In other cases, there may be a kind of transformative shock or 
personal self-rupture wherein one feels turned inside out and fundamentally reoriented to 
the world; becoming a parent may be an example of this for some but the thought is that 
some form of existential crisis or shift occurs for the agent in these cases. Given this 
distinction, we see that such transformations will come about as a result of both willful 
effort or through our nonvolitional interaction with the world even though we want to 
encourage people to be open to experiences that enable positive transformations and 
resistant to those that enable negative ones. In either case, resistance to this kind of crisis 
becomes the mark of the ignorant agent. Ultimately, however, it is not that white ignorance 
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is to be broadly conceived as the parent to moral ignorance. Rather, it is the prevalence of 
moral ignorance across the social milieu which makes white, male, heterosexual, and other 
ignorances possible and systematically persistent. One’s deeply held and identity-forming 
moral commitments come first; racism and sexism are the symptoms of a deeper cognitive 
pathology, one perpetuated by an ideology of domination.  
It is worth noting that Marcuse’s Essay on Liberation can optimistically shape how 
we ought to approach the practical issue of moral blindness. In this essay, he makes it a 
point to describe a new sensibility by calling for the development of a reformed aesthetic 
environment. This reaffirmation of the life instincts in the form of liberated consciousness 
would, he claims, be characterized by (1) a reframing of rational expressions regarding 
what to produce and how it is to be produced, (2) a reframing of epistemic potentialities 
for the protection and gratification of life, (3) an invalidation of the distinction between 
logos and eros, and (4) the creation of a reality principle which is sublimated to the 
beautiful life294. This new sensibility would emerge in the struggle against violence and 
exploitation by standing for social justice. A great refusal occurs where this new sensibility 
allows one to see one’s self outside the personal horizons prescribed by society and it 
expresses a commitment to the life instinct. It rejects states of aggressiveness or guilt and 
manifests as an imaginative awareness of the transcendent possibilities of freedom which 
“prepare the soul for this revolution”295.  
In One-Dimensional Man, published before Essay, Marcuse describes the process 
of cognizing the world as a specific historical project. Uncritical, one-dimensional 
 
294 Marcuse 1969, p. 24-25 
295 Marcuse 1969, p. 23 
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thinking, gives itself over to the historical project. He writes, “Neither the most refined 
aesthetic sense nor the most exact philosophical concept is immune against history”296. I, 
thereby, see Marcuse’s new sensibility as the salve for relieving the pain and irritation of 
our historically determined moral ignorance. By rejecting false needs and false views on 
the obscene, Marcuse’s new sensibility replaces excess repression with an aesthetic ethos-
-an ethos which refuses to let society undermine the dignity of life by participating in a 
refusal, perhaps a Great Refusal, of oppressive socialization.  
Given the one-dimensional nature of moral ignorance and blindness in its resistance 
to critique, it is an open question as to what role a new sensibility might play in the 
epistemic liberation of individuals from the chains of moral ignorance. In a provisionary 
sense, it seems reasonable to predict that a new sensitivity requires at least one feature: a 
sensitivity to the dialectical nature of moral commitments. That is, a willingness in peoples 
to be sensitive to counter-evidence and the cultivation of one’s self-image as a consistent 
work in progress. In this way, Marcuse’s new sensibility becomes a kind of new sense-
ability since a moral commitment to X would carry an epistemic commitment to 
understanding the challenges of X’s manifestation in the lived world. It requires, what Mills 
calls, a sensitivity to a non-ideal morality.  
Given this, I expect the epistemic agent to possess a supervening commitment to 
be compassionate and sensitive to others as moral works in progress. Compassion in this 
sense requires a consistent engagement with the needs and lived realities of the other on 
their terms, an expression of mutual recognition which, if actualized, can liberate us from 
the oppressive forces of socialization under an ideology of domination. It could, perhaps, 
 
296 Marcuse 1964, p. 216 
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unshackle our efforts to be morally autonomous by revealing reasons-to-act beyond what 
we currently encounter. In this way, the new sensibility affirms the life instinct by 
acknowledging that to be alive is to be in a state of moral becoming and that the struggle 
to make accurate moral commitments is a winding path. Receptive moral sense-ability is 
the road and social justice is our destination. 
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